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1. Common Fisheries Policy 
 
 
 
1. CFP decision making framework analysis: an entrance key 
 
1.1.1 Introduction 
 
The CFP policy is an instrument used by the European Union (EU) to manage common 
pool fish resources in compliance with the original European Community's treaties. 
Introduced in 1983, the CFP was preceded by a boom in stock of several important fish 
species that occurred in the 1970s (Symes, 1997). The CFP operates in four areas (Hatcher, 
2000): 
- a common structural policy; 
- a common market organisation; 
- a resource conservation and management system; and 
- an external policy (concerned with fisheries agreements with third countries). 
 
 The Common structural policy section of the CFP dates back to the 1970s when the 
six original members of the EU adopted regulation to establish common rules and actions 
to promote harmonisation and balanced development of the fishing industry. Additionally, 
the regulation also lays down the equal-access of Members States fishing fleets into each 
other's waters (Hatcher, 2000). 
 The Common market organisation provides a system of marketing standards, 
including minimum prices (linked in to a set of trade provisions designed to protect EU 
fishers from imports priced below going market rates) and compensation payments for 
products withdrawn from the market at minimum price levels. 
 In 1977 all EC member states extended their fishery limit from 12 miles to 200 miles 
(except the Mediterranean), creating a Community fishing zone. Soon after, negotiations 
on limiting catches in the zone began, with much difficulty; finally in 1983 an agreement 
was reached. Although referred to often as the Common Fisheries Policy, the resource 
management system provides for the setting of Total Allowable Catch (TAC) for a number 
of key stocks and allocation of these national quotas at the same levels is based on the 
principle of 'relative stability'. The International Council for the Exploration of the Sea 
(ICES) gives biological advice on the state of the stocks and fishing mortality. TACs 
adopted must be agreed upon by the Council if Ministers agree (Hatcher, 2000). 
 Although there are many technical and conservation measures that effect decisions 
concerning the TACs and fishing effort levels, the final use of national quotas are left to 
the Member States themselves, provided that the basic principles of the EU membership 
are adhered to. 
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Adoption of the CFP 
 
The CFP had its early beginnings with the Hague Resolution 1976 (a special meeting at 
The Hague attended by Foreign Ministers which laid down the future development of the 
CFP). Although initiatives were taken, the formation of the CFP proved to be lengthy as 
Member states procrastinated the outcome of such a policy. A Council Declaration made in 
May 1980, showed that the Council was in agreement that the completion of the CFP was 
essential and that a policy had to be put in effect by 1 January 1981. However, it was not 
until December 1982 that there was agreement to adopt Council Resolution (EEC) No. 
170/83 establishing a Community System for the conservation and management of 
fisheries resources. This regulation came into effect on 25 January 1983 (Long and Curran, 
2000). The council agreed on the means by which the majority of stocks were to be 
assigned to Member States. 
 
CFP Implementation Measures, History and Development 
 
With the adoption of the 1983 Management Regulation, the Council agreed upon a set of 
technical measures for the conservation of fishery resources. The 1983 Technical 
Regulation (Council Regulation No. 171/83) contains detailed rules consisting of minimum 
mesh sizes and fish sizes, maximum by-catches and closed seasons, for the conservation of 
the Atlantic and North Sea. The technical measures are aimed at protecting small classes of 
fish and protecting marine ecosystems by improving the inter-species selectivity of fishing 
gear (Long and Curran, 2000). 
 The original Technical Regulation for the North Sea was amended six times and 
ultimately repealed when the Council adopted Regulation 3094/86, which was also 
subjected to 20 amendments. After the adoption of Regulation 3094/86 and two years of 
debate in Council working groups, a new regulation was adopted on March 30 1997. 
However, the measures of the 1997 regulation, which were aimed at reducing the 
exploitation of immature fish and to reduce the number of undersize fish discarded by 
fisherman at sea, were not implemented till 2000. The regulation, which also prohibited the 
sale and marketing of undersize fish, was implemented later to allow for industry to adjust 
to their new obligations (Long and Curran, 2000). 
 
Enforcement Measures 
 
The CFP has evolved from a basic policy in its earlier days to a comprehensive fisheries 
regime today. The CFP regulates all aspects of the fishing industry. In 1993, a new control 
regulation was created after a review of the CFP in 1992 concluded that the policy had to 
be more effective and weaknesses were identified and new measures were adopted to 
improve surveillance in various strands of the CFP. The 1993 regulation measures, 
reinforced the role of surveillance and extended its area of actions from direct conservation 
measures to include implementation in the field of structure, marketing, transport and sale 
of fish and shellfish (EC, 1995-2002). 
 Other than the rules governing the CFP that are adopted at the Community, the main 
responsibility for ensuring the rules are applied and enforced rests with the competent 
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inspection and control authorities in each Member State. Each Member State has to police 
its own waters and consequently control the activities in its territory. The organisation for 
Monitoring, Controlling and Surveillance (MCS) services differs between to Member 
States, as some Member States have inspection services specifically for fisheries activities 
and others rely on several government departments, which also perform functions other 
than fisheries surveillance. The Dutch organisation AID (General Inspection Service) 
which serves with the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Management and Fisheries, inspects 
all CAP (Common Agricultural Policy) and CFP regulations (Verborgh, 2000). 
 Member States have to ensure that vessels that fly their flags comply with regulations 
in force wherever they operate (which is a problem for Member States who have vessels 
that are quota hopping and using their flag for purely economic purposes). In order to 
manage their water and territories and vessels, Member States require a network of 
services including surveillance and inspection activities, landing, marketing and 
transportation of fish products, administrative surveillance of structural and other measures 
as well as procedures for the prosecution and punishment of the wrongdoers in courts (EC, 
1995-2002). 
 The inspection service that exists at Community level (Community Inspectorate) has 
a role ensuring effective enforcement, fairly and equally across the Community. Although, 
the Inspectorate does not carry out any direct inspections (except when operating in 
international water within the framework of regional fisheries organisations), they 
accompany and observe national inspectors in the course of their operations and report 
their findings to the Commission. The inspection service also monitors that Member States 
extend enforcement to their vessels, which fish in third countries and international waters 
(EC, 1995-2002). 
 Initially, the enforcement of the CFP was mainly concerned with conservation 
regulations such as quota management and implementation of technical measures. Catch 
levels were monitored in order to ascertain quotas availability. Catch composition was also 
inspected to determine whether rules regarding quantities of targeted species and non-
targeted species where obliged. These checks were carried out at sea and at ports. Some 
Member States have resorted to aerial inspection to cross check vessels location with data 
contained in logbooks. If they do not match, skippers are suspected of misreporting. These 
inspection activities are still carried out. However, in order to strengthen the CFP and 
reduce fishing effort, further reinforcement and extension of enforcement regulation had to 
be carried out (EC, 1995-2002). 
 Prior to 1993, there were great differences in level of enforcement across the 
Community, which stemmed from the differences between Member States in most aspects 
of control activities. Great variations were found among national enforcement services, 
inspection priorities, prosecution proceedings and penalty rates. The 1993 regulation 
encouraged Member States to engage in common or coordinated inspection programmes. 
Improvements have been made, but the Commission's report shows that there is still vast 
room for improvement (EC, 1995-2002). 
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1.1.2 The European level and the Common Fisheries Policy 
 
Common Fisheries Policy 
 
Fisheries management systems of these eleven countries work within the context of the 
Common Fisheries Policy, although this policy differs for the Mediterranean fishery. 
Common market policy and structural policy apply to all Member States. Management and 
conservation of resources (TACs and quotas) does not apply to the four EU Mediterranean 
countries. This is also the case regarding the technical measures, although there a first step 
towards homogenisation in the Mediterranean has been taken in the EC Reg. 1626/94. 
 
The European Union 
 
The European Union is the supra governmental level. The Union consists of four 
institutions: The Council, the Commission, the European Parliament and the Court of 
Justice.1 The Council has the power to adopt legislation, and can delegate this power to the 
Commission. The Member States' Ministers (for fisheries topics, Ministers with fisheries in 
portfolio) are representatives in the Council. The commissioners of the European 
Commission (EC) are appointed by the Member States for four years. The Common 
Fisheries Policy (CFP) is defined for 20 years, till 2002. The CFP consists of policies for 
Structures, Markets, External relations, Conservation and technical measures. Each year 
the European Commission determines Total Allowable Catches (TACs) per species and 
area in the European Atlantic and North Sea, on the basis of biological advice of the 
International Council of the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) and political negotiations. The 
EC allocates national quotas for different species to the Member States (not to the 
Mediterranean countries). CFP also establishes maximum fleet capacities within Member 
States through Multi-annual guidance programmes (MAGP) and sets marketing standards, 
a minimum price for selected species and a common trade regime with non-EU countries. 
 
Role of science 
 
Scientific advice to the Council is given by the Advisory Committee on Fisheries 
Management (ACFM) of ICES and by the Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee 
for Fisheries (STECF). Outside the EU the International Council for the Conservation of 
Atlantic Tuna (ICCAT) and the General Council of Mediterranean Fisheries (GCMF) of 
the FAO are important institutes (see Chapter 1 for more details). 
 
In-between organisations 
 
The EC consults the Advisory Committee on Fisheries which consists of representatives 
from all sectors of the fishing industry plus consumers. The European Association of Fish 
Producers' Organisations and Europêche, which represents fishing fleet owners, have also 
representatives in the Advisory Committee. The Committee consists of three sub-
                                                 
1 Here only the Council and Commission are considered. 
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committees, dealing with resources, markets, and structures. Relations between EC and the 
sub-committee on resources are strained for the reason that the sub-committee is frequently 
not consulted on proposals (concerning TACs) until after they have been adopted by the 
Commission. This is partly due to lack of time (Holden, 1994). 
 Provisionally established within the Advisory Committee is a 'Mediterranean Ad Hoc 
Group' in 1992 (Galle, 1993). This Group meets at least every two months, and consists of 
fishermen/vessel owners, representatives from cooperatives, one scientist and one regional 
administrator, from Mediterranean Member States. Its aim is to define in what manner the 
industry may participate in a future Mediterranean fishing policy and to make joint 
propositions. 
 
1.1.3 Atlantic Institutions 
 
The institutions under consideration are Atlantic/North Sea fisheries management 
institutions in Belgium, Denmark, Atlantic France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Atlantic Spain and the United Kingdom. 
 
Organisations 
 
Governmental institutions 
The central governmental institution dealing with fisheries management is in most 
countries a Directorate or Service within a Ministry concerned with Fisheries. These 
Directorates are responsible for the establishment of fisheries management schemes within 
the context of the CFP and national schemes. The Ministers have to discuss and give 
account on fishery matters in Parliament and have a seat in the EU Council. Furthermore 
within or on behalf of the Member States' Ministry, monitoring of fisheries regulations is 
undertaken by Inspection Services. Some examples: the Netherlands has the General 
Inspection Service which is monitoring fishing activities and has legal powers to lead 
violators to court. In the UK enforcement is undertaken by the Royal Navy and by the 
Scottish Fisheries Protection Agency. In Denmark these tasks are performed by Danish 
fisheries Control, a separate body dependent on the Ministry's Fisheries Directorate. 
 
In-between institutions 
In many Atlantic countries an organisational layer between government and industry has 
been created for consultation. For the Dutch fishing industry this institution is the Fish 
Commodity Board (FCB). For the Fisheries Directorate this FCB is the partner in 
discussions of proposed management schemes. The Danish law on fisheries management 
specifies that the Ministry must hold an Advisory Committee on management, in which the 
industry is strongly represented. In France the National Maritime Fish and Aquaculture 
Committee fulfils the role of a consultative body. The ministry needs to consult this 
organisation which is composed of representatives of fishermen's organisations' and local 
and regional committees (Galle, 1993). The Portuguese department for fisheries has an 
Advisory Committee made up of the professional organisations representatives (POs, 
associations and unions) in which members are invited to give their opinion. In the United 
Kingdom there are Management Committees on national and Fisheries Department level, 
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including industry representation. In Galician Spain there is a formal consultative body, the 
Consejo Gallego de Pesca, in which the FOs and regional administration are jointly 
involved. Informal consultations take place between central government and the national 
committees of the industry's representative organisations (CEMARE/University of Hull, 
1996). 
 No 'in-between' organisation became apparent from literature in Belgium, Germany 
and Ireland. 
 
User group organisations 
The fishing industry itself created a variety of organisations and associations on local, 
regional, national and (sub)sectoral basis. In some cases the origins of these organisations 
go far back in history. Relatively new are Producer Organisations (POs) which were set up 
according to EC rules. POs originally mainly played a role in the implementation of the 
common organisation of the market for fishery products.1 As mentioned earlier these POs 
are also represented at the EU level. 
 
Influence of user-groups 
 
Influence of user-groups on quota management 
Output measures under consideration are TACs, quotas and other catch limits. User-groups 
are not influential in the establishment of the yearly TAC levels for the European Union as 
a whole. TACs are divided in national quotas. The degree in influence of user-groups on 
the management of national quotas varies, although influence possibilities have been 
harmonised recently. The Marketing Regulation of the CFP has been expanded by 
allowing POs to manage quotas on behalf of their members and, at the discretion of 
Member States, the national quotas.1 'This extension of power placed POs firmly to the 
fore in EU fisheries resource management decision-making. (Young, 1996). In the case of 
the UK quota-management responsibilities had earlier been entrusted to POs. But their 
degree of active involvement varies. Non PO-members are subject to the government's 
own management arrangements as administered by management committees including 
industry (Europêche, 1995). In the case of the Netherlands quota management has been 
entrusted to 'Groups' of fishermen within POs. While fishermen exploit their ITQ, the 
Group Management Board is responsible for up-take of the pooled quotas. Almost all 
vessels participate in the management groups (Hoefnagel and Smit, 1995). In France an 
attempt in 1990 to introduce a system of quota-allocations to POs was abandoned after 
three years, largely because of disagreement over the basis for allocation. Furthermore POs 
were unable to implement catch restrictions for quota management purposes. Now 
government allocates quotas to the coastal regions, where they are subdivided by 
'competent administrative authorities'. The roles of POs remain centred on the management 
of the market and their membership is primarily determined with reference to marketing 
requirements (CEMARE, 1996). However, marketing rules of French POs may sometimes 
work as output restrictions, for example limits on landed tonnage. In Belgium, the PO 
'Redercentrale' is responsible for the administration and organisation of meetings between   
                                                 
1 CFP Marketing Regulation Articles 5-8. 
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government and Quota Commission. The Quota Commission, established in 1994, consists 
of representatives from the different Belgian fleet segments. The meetings discuss all of 
the quota regulations for the next three months (Europêche, 1995). In Denmark an 
Advisory Committee meets every month and advises the Ministry on the allocation of 
quotas at national level. This Committee is made up of representatives from the 
Fishermen's Association, POs, Fish processing industry and trade, the fish oil and fish meal 
industry, the fish canning industry, and the Workers' Union (Europêche, 1995). In 
Germany: 'Governmental regulations stipulate quota allocation per fishing zone, per vessel 
type and per species. Eligible fishermen must be member of the Deutsche Fischerei 
Verband. Certain quotas are available to anyone entitled to fish on a 'first come, first serve' 
basis. (...) Other quotas, cod for instance, are distributed to POs which allocate them to 
their members. For saithe in the North Sea, quotas are distributed to the individual cutter 
fishing companies' (Europêche, 1995). In Ireland quota management is entirely the 
responsibility of the Ministry of Fisheries. In Ireland there is an ad hoc Industry Committee 
which has no legal standing, but gives advice on some aspects of quota-management. In 
Portugal the Department of Fisheries of the Ministry for Agriculture is responsible for 
distributing quotas and maximum catches. The Department has an Advisory Committee 
consisting of representatives of professional organisations (POs, associations and unions), 
(Europêche, 1995). In Atlantic Spain Cofradías, have quota-management functions through 
the design of fishing plans. These fishing plans need to be approved by the appropriate 
authorities. 'The regional government sees potential in the Cofradías for improving 
management, and is working for them to be formally recognised as producers organisations 
(...)' (Jentoft and McCay, 1995). 
 
Degree of influence on structural measures 
Structural measures under consideration are capacity and activity limitations (licensing 
respectively days-at-sea). All Member States are subject to MAGP (see Chapter 3). 
Influence of professional organisations on structural measures is on the whole quite 
limited. It is exerted mostly through in-between institutions. Given the limits, user-groups 
sometimes try to establish collective rules in order to, for instance, restrict fishing time and 
spread catches over the season/year. 
 There is no indication that Belgian fishermen's organisations had influence on the 
prevailing maximum HP and GT regulations, on the licensing scheme, on the 
decommissioning measures or in the past on the abandoned restrictions on days-at-sea 
(Europêche, OECD 1995). 
 The UK fishing fleet is subject to a licensing scheme in which government consulted 
(probably) the industry. POs may purchase licences held by members, in order to hold 
them separately from individual vessel catch records. A government proposal to introduce 
a system of individual days-at-sea allocations has been successfully challenged by FOs and 
POs. 
 In Denmark a subcommittee of the above-mentioned Advisory Committee on 
fisheries management advises the Ministry representatives on the national structural policy. 
Structural measures include decommissioning schemes and modernisation of the fleet 
                                                 
1 Council Regulation 3759/92, as amended by Council Regulations 697/93 and 1891/93. 
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(Europêche, 1995). Following working group meetings between the fishermen's 
association, scientists and the Ministry, days-at-sea restrictions were adopted on an 
experimental basis in the Kattegat. This effort regulation is considered to be co-
management (Nielsen and Vedsmand, 1995). In the Netherlands the industry is consulted 
by the Ministry through the Fish Commodity Board. The FCB discusses and tries to 
influence proposed structural management schemes measures as decommissioning, days-
at-sea regulation and licensing. The new-formed Groups manage fishing effort by 
approving well tuned fishing plans per vessel and the possible allocation of extra days-at-
sea during the year. 
 In France, POs may take management measures for their members such as fishing 
plans aimed at regulating fishing effort on certain sub-quotas depending on prevailing 
market conditions or given their up-take. Fishing effort is regulated through limits on the 
number of days per fishing trips and restrictions on unloaded tonnage (Europêche, 1995). 
French fleet capacity is regulated through the Permis the Mise en Exploitation (PME) 
(CEMARE). This is administered by the national management committee. 
 In Germany there is no days-at-sea regulation. Since 1 February 1995 fishing is only 
allowed with a valid licence on board (EC Regulation No. 3690/93). Licences are issued by 
the Federal Office (Europêche, 1995). 
 The Irish Ministry of Fisheries (Department of Marine) is entirely responsible for the 
management of the fishing effort. Some fisheries are licensed by the State. Regional 
Fisheries Boards determine the maximum number of licences for salmon fished at sea. 
 All Portuguese fishing vessels require a fishing licence that authorises the type of 
fisheries and fishing area. These licences are issued by the Ministry for Agriculture, 
Fisheries and Food (Europêche, 1995). 
 Responsibilities for the managing of fishing effort in Spain are divided over the 
Ministry, the Autonomous Communities and professional associations. Vessels operating 
in Union waters are governed by a fishing plan that is drawn up by fleet associations and 
approved by the authorities concerned. Apart from quotas, these plans consist of the period 
in which fishing activities are requested, the vessels concerned, the species targeted, the 
fishing gear used. The General Secretariat for maritime fisheries consults the sector 
(coastal or ocean fisheries) to try to find the best possible compromise between fishermen's 
demands and the actual circumstances, also on structural measures like temporary limits 
and closed seasons. 
 
Degree of influence on technical measures 
As with structural measures, influence of user-groups on technical measures is limited in 
the CFP framework. 
 Minimum sizes and temporary closure of the sole fisheries in January 1995 have 
been stipulated by Belgian government, in correspondence with CFP (Europêche, 1995; 
OECD, 1995). In the UK different national technical measures are applied, like gear 
regulations, minimum landing sizes of specified species and the closure of certain areas to 
specified types of fishing for specified periods. Influence of user-groups is not clear from 
the Europêche 1995 report. In the Baltic sea, Danish fishermen have to stop (by mandate) 
fishing during the period June, July and August, they receive a tying-up compensation 
(Europêche, 1995). The Dutch Fisheries Directorate consults the FCB in proposed 
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management schemes like technical measures as gear restrictions, however, many 
measures have been designed by EU regulation. Current French technical measures have 
been established by EU regulation (Europêche, 1995). In Germany there are no closed 
fishing periods. (Other technical measures follow probably CFP rules.) In Ireland the State 
regulates the prohibition of certain methods of fishing and minimum fish-sizes (Europêche, 
1995). The Portuguese Ministry issues gear permits and regulates gear restrictions like 
mesh sizes, and minimum fish sizes. Sometimes zones are closed periodically by decree 
for biological reasons. In Spain, government consults the sector in technical matters, like 
minimum fish sizes. 
 
 
1.2 Assessment of the inefficiencies of the present CFP 
 
The Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) is based on four principles: conservation of stocks, 
structural policy, commercialisation of fish and fishery products and relations with third 
countries. Though the system based on TACs and quotas underpinned by scientific 
evidence, is widely accepted, it is also regarded as inefficient. The CFP has not achieved 
the intended results, namely the conservation of fish stocks. The crisis of fish stocks is not 
limited to the Community but can be observed at a worldwide level. In fact, in other parts 
of the world actual stock collapses have taken place whereas these have mercifully been 
avoided in the European waters. 
 Many of the inefficiencies of the present CFP have been highlighted in the Green 
Paper on the Revision of the CFP. We shall discuss these issues here. 
 
1.2.1 Ineffectiveness of CFP: stock decline 
 
The fish stocks have steadily deteriorated in spite of 25 years of CFP; fortunately no stocks 
have actually collapsed, contrary to what happened in other parts of the world. 
Nevertheless, in 2002, cod appears to be in serious decline and, according to ICES, 
continued fishing at current levels will lead to collapse of the stock. David Griffith, 
General Secretary of ICES, made the following statement in October 2002: 
 
'We have had to resort to recommending complete closure of these fisheries as the 
only way of giving these depleted stocks a period of time to recover, and, hopefully, 
to return to their former productive state. Cod stocks in the North Sea, Skagerrak, 
Irish Sea and waters west of Scotland have been in decline for a number of years, and 
are now at, or near, their lowest recorded levels.' 
 
State of stocks1
 
North Sea 
As mentioned above, cod is in serious decline. The state of other stocks in the North Sea is 
very variable. 
                                                 
1 The following information on stocks is taken from the ICES ACFM advice of October 2002. 
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 There is reduction in the number of age groups. Recruitment for most stocks is, 
however, very variable. For a number of species (cod, whiting, plaice) recruitment in most 
years has been lower than in previous decades. At the same time it is observed that a 
number of species (cod, haddock, whiting, sole, plaice) simultaneously show a reduction of 
growth. On the contrary, other (southern) species like sea bass and red mullet have 
increased and in some times attracted a fishery. 
 The stock of whiting has shown a continued decline over time but appears to be 
increasing again. However, it is considered likely that the whiting stock is still outside safe 
biological limits. Plaice and sole are outside safe biological limits. The North Sea 
component of the North-East Atlantic mackerel stock collapsed in the early 1970s and 
shows no signs of recovery. 
 The saithe stock is now considered to be within safe biological limits. The stock of 
haddock profits from a good year class, but the spawning stock is expected to decrease 
rapidly due to the very low recruitments, which followed the strong 1999 year class. 
 Norway pout and sand eel are short-lived species and their biomasses show large 
fluctuations in accordance with large variability of recruitment. These stocks are both 
considered within safe biological limits. 
 The herring stock in the North Sea collapsed in the mid-1970s due to heavy 
exploitation, but has recovered after a closure of the fisheries between 1977 and 1981. The 
stock has been outside safe biological limits for a number of years, but has recovered to 
above Bpa and is expected to increase further. 
 The sprat stock fluctuates considerably between years. The actual state of the sprat 
stock is not precisely known, but the biomass is thought to be high at present. 
 
West Coast of Scotland 
 
The assessments of demersal and herring stocks continued to be hampered by the poor 
quality of catch data, although this has become less of a problem for round-fish species in 
recent years. It is likely that the stocks of haddock, saithe, anglerfish, and megrim are 
closely related to those of the same species in the North Sea. All round-fish stocks in this 
area are outside safe biological limits and ICES advice points to the need of reducing 
fishing mortality. 
 
Irish Sea 
The stock of cod is outside safe biological limits. The stocks of Nephrops in the Irish Sea 
are considered to be fully exploited. A notable phenomenon in the Irish Sea, and also in the 
Celtic Sea, during the 1990s has been a growth in the stocks of haddock. The stock of 
plaice is within safe biological limits as well as the sole stock. 
 
Environmental changes affect fish stocks 
The decline of the stocks cannot be totally blamed on fishing. The impact of environmental 
factors on the fish stocks should not be underestimated even though it has not been 
quantified yet. The European waters are polluted by industrial and human activities; the 
effect of these on the quantity of fish and on the success of their reproduction is not well 
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known. Moreover, changes in sea water temperature and salinity are being observed; their 
effect on fish behaviour, fish migration and reproduction have been poorly assessed. 
 
1.2.2 Inefficiencies within the CFP 
 
The inefficiencies of the CFP are due to two types of causes: firstly, the CFP doesn't 
actually function as intended; some rules are breached and some principles have never 
been implemented. We shall discuss these implementation problems first. In the next 
section, we shall discuss the deeper causes of the malfunctions within the CFP, namely 
systematic flaws in the concepts of the CFP. 
 
Fisheries Council sets TACs above scientific advice 
 
Annual catch limits, called Total Allowable Catches (TACs) are set yearly during political 
negotiations in the Fisheries Council, which is the meeting of Fisheries Ministers of the 
Member States. The TACs are very often set at a higher level than that recommended by 
the Commission on the basis of scientific advice from ICES ACFM. The reasons for not 
following the advice are numerous and complicated. During the political negotiations, each 
Minister might wish to obtain the best possible deal for his national fleet and therefore try 
to obtain higher TACs than proposed. Another reason might be that in the present state of 
scientific knowledge, scientific stock advice cannot claim to be totally accurate and 
definite; therefore, counterclaims by fishermen that the stocks are much higher may seem 
credible. It may therefore seem acceptable to set higher TACs than recommended by 
scientists. 
 
Discards high 
 
In general, the catches appear to be higher than what the stocks can support. In the simple 
equation of 
 
catches   =   landings   +   discards 
 
 This means that either the landings (being the TAC) or the discards, or both, are too 
high. The CFP is a system based on management of the landings only namely by setting 
TACs and quotas per species. The CFP does not control discards at all; European fisheries 
are characterised by high discards. 
 We can distinguish two types of discards, depending on their reason. Firstly, 
European fishermen may discard perfectly good fish, for which species the vessel has no 
quotas at the time of catching. Especially in multi-species fisheries where fishermen find it 
difficult to limit their catch to a particular species, catches and quotas are very difficult to 
match. A large volume of fish may be discarded as 'above-quota fish'. Secondly, fishermen 
discard fish which is below the legal landing size, or which is of low value. The latter is 
called high grading. 
 The only way by which the CFP attempts to address discards is by introducing 
technical measures that allow undersized fish to escape. However, these rules are often 
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difficult to understand, to apply and to enforce. As a consequence, technical measures are 
seldom successful. 
 Not only does the present EU quota system fail to control discarding, but it even 
presents incentives for high grading. This is the case as long as the loss suffered by 
dumping low value fish is less than the profit obtained from continued fishing and landing 
high value fish. 
 
Catches higher than TACs 
 
On the one hand, the yearly TACs are often higher than recommended by ICES and by the 
Commission; on the other hand the actual catches themselves are higher than the TACs. 
This is due to high discards - as discussed above - but also to illegal landings above the 
quotas, so-called black fish. 
 The equation 'catches = landings + discards' mentioned above is more accurately 
described as: 
 
catches    = landed part of TACs    + illegal landings    + discards 
 
 It is not possible to quantify the extent of these illegal landings, neither is it possible 
to determine in which areas these landings reach the highest levels; suffice it to say that the 
existence of illegal landings is denied by few. These above-quota landings are facilitated 
by fish buyers or processors; they are a symptom of insufficient enforcement by the proper 
authorities. 
 
Technical measures under-used 
 
The CFP allows for the introduction of technical conservation measures and a variety of 
temporary or local measures: square mesh panels, seasonal or area closures, various twine 
thickness, various mesh sizes etc. Minimum landing sizes of fish could also be increased. 
Some of these measures let juvenile fish survive, either by letting them escape from the 
nets or by not letting them being caught in the first place. Scientists are often sceptical 
about the effectiveness of technical measures. Unfortunately, these measures have rarely 
been used; there might have been opportunities for more technical measures. 
 
National Subsidies cause Inequality 
 
Some Member States are giving subsidies to modernise the fleet or to reduce exploitation 
costs. This causes inequality between the fleets of the Member States, as the subsidised 
fleets are in a better financial position than those of countries where there haven't been 
subsidies for many years. This causes resentment between fishermen of different Member 
States. Moreover, if ITQs were to be introduced, these fleets will be in a better financial 
position to buy up quotas than their more cash-strapped counterparts. 
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National Monitoring ineffective 
 
Because monitoring and enforcement are responsibilities of the Member States, rules may 
be applied differently in different countries. Fishermen have the impression that their 
foreign colleagues can violate the rules and therefore gain a competitive advantage. 
Diversity in enforcement causes a perception of inequality among the European fishermen. 
The organisation of monitoring and control in the CFP is fragmented. Better co-ordination 
of inspection resources is needed. There is no satisfactory follow-up of infringements. 
 
Fleet over-capacity 
 
The EU fleet has a higher capacity than necessary to harvest the available fish in a 
profitable manner. Clearly, if there are too many boats to catch the available fish, there will 
be two inescapable consequences. Firstly, the boats will not manage to be profitable; 
fishermen and their communities will therefore experience financial hardship. Secondly, 
fishermen will be under great pressure to land more fish than legally allowed by the TAC 
level. 
 Fleet decommissioning has not taken place at the same pace as the reduction of 
TACs. The Multi-Annual Guidance Programmes (MAGPs) which were the instrument to 
reduce fleet capacity, were not ambitious enough, were not enforced properly and were 
difficult to administer. 
 Moreover, as in all industrial sectors, technological progress has increased the 
catching capacity of fishing vessels, thereby reducing the effects of decommissioning. 
 Finally, subsidies for construction and modernisation of vessels in some Member 
States interfered with the fleet reduction programmes. 
 
Social and economic decline of the fisheries sector 
 
The profitability of the fleet is declining. In some fleet segments, it has become very 
difficult to find crewmembers willing to work on fishing vessels. In other fleet segments, 
vessel owners are trying to maintain profit margins by reducing operating costs. This if 
often done by reducing crewing levels which now are below safety levels, as crews work 
increasingly long hours in increasingly intensive conditions. 
 Employment in the fish catching sector is declining steadily, at a rate of 2% per 
annum. Over the period 1990-1998, there has been a loss of 66,000 jobs in the fish 
catching sector, or an overall decrease of 22%. 
 This affects not only the social and economic fabric of fishery dependent regions; it 
also has important safety repercussions. 
 
Processing industry 
 
The European processing industry has structural problems. Employment in the sector has 
dropped by 14% in the period 1990-1998. The small enterprises which make out the largest 
part of this sector, have difficulties in coping with irregular and dwindling supplies, 
 21
growing hygiene regulations, competition from outside the EU and economic pressure 
from the large retailers. The sector has been grant aided by the Community. 
 
1.2.3 Principles of CFP have systematic flaws 
 
The previous section discusses the problems encountered due to imperfect functioning of 
the principles of the CFP. There are however also a number of systematic, conceptual 
problems in the CFP. We shall now discuss these. 
 
Scientific knowledge insufficient 
 
To manage fisheries by means of TACs, one needs exact scientific information on fish 
populations and on interactions between fish stocks. This type of information does not 
exist. The marine eco-system is extremely complex; it cannot be reproduced in laboratory 
conditions, neither can scientists go and count all the fish in the sea. The functioning of 
marine ecosystems and the side effects of fishing are not well known. The severity of the 
impact of fishing is not known. More importantly, the time required to reverse the effects 
of fishing are not known. Interactions between species in the marine ecosystem are often 
still poorly understood. 
 
Stakeholders dissatisfied with CFP 
 
Fishermen are not pleased with the CFP. One of the reasons for this dissatisfaction is the 
complexity of EU decision-making, which is too far removed from stakeholders. The 
Fisheries Council might postpone necessary decisions for reasons that are not inherent to 
fisheries; political compromises are sometimes made against scientific advice. Some 
Member States might be unwilling to be seen to give up national sovereignty. Finally, the 
fisheries sector has a low political priority due to its small share in the GDPs of the 
Member States. 
 There is generalised distrust between the stakeholders. Biologists distrust fishermen. 
Some will blame fishermen for the present crisis, calling them irresponsible and intend on 
catching as much as they can before all the fish has gone. Fishermen on the other hand 
complain that the reality they see does not match the advice formulated by biologists and 
that scientists dismiss fishermen's intimate knowledge of the marine environment. 
Fishermen involved in multi-species fishery also complain bitterly about the compulsory 
discard of species for which they have reached their quota; it is a waste of a good resource. 
 
Mixed fishery difficult to manage with TACs 
 
Many of the fleets in the North Sea do not fish single species but catch a mixture of cod, 
haddock, and whiting, or a mixture of sole, plaice, and cod. Stocks of different species do 
not evolve in synchrony. Therefore, the advice provided independently of the linkages 
between species may result TACs that cannot be obtained simultaneously in mixed 
fisheries. This raises concerns for stocks in need of special conservation. For instance, to 
reduce catches of cod in the North Sea, scientists have recommended a cut in the catches of 
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all the other species caught simultaneously with cod even though these might not actually 
require protection. TACs are being adjusted downward for some of the species in the mix. 
 An alternative would be to adjust effort. This can be done in many different ways, for 
example by days-at-sea regulations, fleet reduction, area closures and/or seasonal closures. 
 
Focus on key species and Lack of eco-system approach 
 
The CFP focuses on a few historically important species such as cod, haddock, sole and 
herring. The management of species which are less well known from a biological 
perspective is probably neglected, as is the case for monkfish (anglerfish - lotte). There is 
no eco-system approach. 
 
Lack of Multi-annual Planning 
 
At present, the TACs are set for one year; the resulting annual leaps and bounds of quotas 
make business planning difficult for vessel owners. It is uncertain whether biologists 
would be able to predict more than one year ahead. Some species fluctuate a lot from year 
to year, other species are more stable. Long term TACs are not suitable for fluctuating 
stocks. On the other hand, long-lived stocks require a long-term perspective. There seems 
to be a contradiction between the need for stability to manage business and the need for 
flexibility to manage fluctuating stocks. 
 
Biology & Output Management rather than input control 
 
The CFP focuses on managing stocks rather than managing the industry. However, at 
present fisheries science is not - and does not claim to be - an exact science. It is difficult to 
assess individual stocks and it is nearly impossible to attempt ecosystem management 
comprising all species and their interaction. Unfortunately, a management system based on 
rather uncertain biological evidence does not provide a basis for structural long-term stock 
management. Biological advice is at present the foundation of the CFP building; if the 
foundation starts shaking, the whole building collapses. To further complicate matters, 
biological stock assessment does not equal the TACs, as these are set after political 
negotiation. 
 Although the CFP focuses on output management - i.e. quota setting - there have 
been attempts to manage inputs via MAGP. MAGP are set for each Member State, while 
quotas are set by stock and sea area - not by country. The attempts to control fishing effort 
have proven unsuccessful. The EU fleet shows over capacity and profitability is poor in 
many fleet segments. The incentives to re-structure the industry are insufficient and too 
weak. 
 
Economic information not integrated 
 
The CFP doesn't have a proper mechanism to integrate economic and socio-economic 
information in its management procedures. 
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Principles of good governance not integrated 
 
The CFP was designed several decades ago and was gradually amended without major 
reviews. At the time of its conception, the principles of good governance were not 
integrated in the CFP. Nowadays, these principles cannot be ignored. Openness, 
participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence will have to be fully 
implemented to reach a consensus among stakeholders. 
 
Mediterranean Sea 
 
The present management system is very different in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean; 
the latter does not fall under the CFP. This fishery is multi-species: some fleet segments 
target a variety of different species and take part in different fisheries at different times of 
the year. Too many species and too many landing places make monitoring difficult. 
Moreover, each fleet fishes mostly in its own local waters. 
 The Mediterranean fishery has not managed to implement technical measures 
satisfactorily; data on the sector are lacking and there has been slow progress in 
international co-operation. 
 
Quota Hopping versus Relative Stability 
 
Within the present CFP there is ample space for Member States to develop their own quota 
management system (cf. UK and Netherlands), which on the one hand has allowed for the 
development of systems adapted to local social, economical and political circumstances. 
On the other hand it results in each Member State having a slightly different management 
system. An added difficulty is that the underlying legal systems are very different. 
 De facto, all quota systems seem to evolve into transferable quota systems. Quotas 
presently change hands between Member States, under the form of quota hopping and 
quota swaps. These systems are neither well monitored nor transparent - but they are legal. 
It is a largely unregulated practice and would benefit from a more open and free approach 
instead. Member States take measures to limit quota hopping. With increased possibilities 
of free transfer of commodities, people and capital throughout the EU, international quota 
trade is just a matter of time. Relative stability is an exception to principles of free 
movement of capital and labour. Although ITQs exist in some Member States without 
catastrophic results, some fishermen attach great importance to Relative Stability because 
they are worried that ITQs will allow a brutal take-over of fishing rights by foreign 
fishermen. 
 
Aquaculture industry 
 
The aquaculture industry is playing a growing role in the fisheries sector, by providing 
steady supplies to processors and by creating employment in fishery dependent areas. The 
main challenge at present for the aquaculture sector is to successfully address 
environmental and health protection concerns. 
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International dimension of CFP 
 
EU fleets used to fish in third countries. These fishing opportunities are gradually 
disappearing in a context of legitimate aspirations of these states to develop their own 
fishing industry. The consequence is that some EU fleet segments have lost their traditional 
fishing grounds outside Europe and now need to either find fishing opportunities in Europe 
or decommission. 
 
1.2.4 New objectives for CFP 
 
In its Green Paper, the Commission stated that many of the CFPs problems are caused by 
its lack of clear objectives. In its roadmap for the review of the CFP, the Commission has 
proposed a set of new objectives, which are briefly repeated here: 
1. responsible and sustainable fisheries and aquaculture activities that contribute to 
healthy marine ecosystems; 
2. an economically viable and competitive fisheries and aquaculture industry which will 
benefit the consumer; 
3. a fair standard of living for those who depend on fishing activities. 
 
 The principles of good governance also have to be embodied in the new CFP: 
1. openness and transparency, in particular by improving the quality and transparency 
of the scientific advice and data on the basis of which policy decisions are taken; 
2. participation, through greater and broader stakeholder involvement from conception 
to implementation of policy, including at local and regional level; 
3. accountability, through a clearer definition of responsibilities at European, national 
and local level; 
4. effectiveness, through decision-making processes whose results are properly 
evaluated, controlled and complied with; and 
5. coherence with other Community policies, in particular environment and 
development policies, through a cross-sectoral approach. 
 
 The Green Paper also stressed the need for the CFP to address a few other points: 
1. to integrate health requirements; 
2. to bring fleet capacity into line with resources; 
3. to ensure effective enforcement; 
4. to address the structural adjustments that will result from the changes; 
5. to promote responsible exploitation in international waters; 
6. to improve data to support decision-making. 
 
 
1.3 Analysis of the common fisheries policy 
 
The common fisheries policy grew from a market policy to a structural policy, and then a 
conservation policy in 1983. This development has been marked by the prospect of 
entrance of new member states entering the EU. In terms of effectiveness, the CFP has had 
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problems (the enforcement of quotas and catch capacity regulations as well as technical 
measures). In terms of coherence, the above described developments turned out to produce 
inconsistent results. There were subsidies for increasing fleet capacity, whereas there was 
not yet a conservation policy fully instituted. 
 The formal structure consists of (a) the council of ministers, (b) the commission, (c) 
the European parliament and (d) international scientific bodies. The commission makes 
propositions, and the council and the parliament arrive at separate decisions, however, the 
council has the final say in the decision process. The main actors involved in the decision 
making processes are, (a) member states (voiced through the ministerial level), (b) the 
fishing industry (both national and European), (c) lobbying groups representing 
environmental groups, fishermen and regions. The fishermen are formally represented in 
the social and economic committee and regional authorities are formally represented in the 
regional council. 
 Following upon the CFP review process, recently partnerships have been introduced 
providing platform for more direct involvement of fishermen in commenting on ICES 
stock assessments. Driving force for change is that the legitimacy of the TAC has been 
rather problematic and especially local authorities tried to involve fishermen. 
 Failure of the conservation policy (enforcement difficulties, structural overcapacity 
of the fleet.) Enlargement of European Union with new Members States. 
 Issues that are currently under review are: 
- increased focus on environmental policy and development policy; 
- increased involvement of fishermen in management decision making; 
- more flexibility in the TAC system: multi-annual TACs; 
- POs are supposed to assume role in quota management; 
- more important role for non-legal instruments (code of conduct, eco labelling, ...); 
- creation of regional committees; 
- development of European framework for trans-boundary integrated coastal zone 
management. 
 
 Driving forces for these changes have been the lack of long-term view on fisheries 
conservation, and the reaction time to respond immediately to new developments (for 
example in the stocks). 
 Entering international agreements on fisheries and environmental issues (Rio-
precautionary principle introduction in EU policies at large, Paris Convention on 
Protection of Marine environment of north-east Atlantic, 1992 Convention biological 
diversity, 1995 Code of conduct for responsible fisheries). 
 An obstacle for introducing multi-annual TACs is change in power balance between 
Council and Commission (Council is not involved anymore in yearly setting of TACs). 
 ICZM has become an issue because there is indirect influence of CFP on coastal and 
inshore fisheries. An obstacle for ICZM is that national jurisdiction in 12 miles zones have 
been reinforced. 
 Possibly there will be a more direct connection between POs and Commission in the 
future (multi-annual TACs). 
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2. Norway 
 
 
 
2.1 From closed shop to transparent decision-making? 
 On the history, structure and process of Norwegian fisheries management 
 
2.1.1 Introduction 
 
In Norwegian fisheries, management proper dates back to the collapse of the Atlanto-
Scandinavian herring stock in the late 1960s. Although specific fisheries were 'managed' 
long before that (Jentoft and Kristoffersen 1989, Jentoft and Mikalsen 1994), the passing 
of the so-called 'Limited Entry Act' in 1972 marked the inception of a management regime 
whose subsequent development has been characterised by a complex interplay between 
science, economics and politics. The end result, thus far, has been a regime pointedly 
characterised as a system of 'centralised consultation' (Hoel et al., 1996). The ultimate 
authority to manage is vested in the hands of central government, albeit with an element of 
power sharing through corporatist arrangements facilitating the participation of a select 
group of interest organisations - mainly within the industry itself. 
 This structure, to be described in more detail later, has been criticised for fostering a 
process that is too exclusive and 'benign' to the economic interests of the fishing industry. 
Transparency and stakeholder involvement are currently being hailed as core values of the 
'ideal' management process - accompanied by demands that the influence of industry be 
countered by including other groups and interests in decision-making, thus broadening the 
scope of representation beyond those directly affected by management decisions. As we 
shall see, certain moves in that direction have already been made - largely in response to 
demands for a more open and transparent process. However, proposals for change in 
current structures, be they for decentralisation, delegation or more power to scientists, are 
rarely anchored in a thorough analysis of the present regime; its principles, problems and 
possible effects. The question of what reforms that are needed and should be adopted, 
cannot be adequately addressed unless we examine, more systematically, the background, 
rationale and functioning of existing institutions in general, and the problems of user-group 
participation and centralised decision-making in particular. 
 In this paper we shall address some of the questions and issues that pertain directly to 
the current quest for institutional reform in Norwegian fisheries management: What are the 
roots of the Norwegian fisheries management regime? How is it organised and how does it 
work? Who are the key actors and what are their roles and relative influence? What are the 
major challenges being faced by established institutions, and what are the pros and cons of 
a more transparent and democratic process? 
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2.1.2 Managing Norwegian fisheries: a historical sketch 
 
While the history of fisheries management as we know it today is relatively short, 
government intervention is nothing new in the Norwegian fishery. Historically, three basic 
forms of management-like intervention stand out: The first are the formal rules set to solve 
problems of crowding on the fishing grounds. Preserving order and avoiding conflicts 
among fishermen using different types of gear was a major concern here. These 
'operational rules' were regional in scope and established through so-called 'Regional 
Fisheries Acts', of which the single most important was the Lofoten Act of 1897. The 
second type is measures aimed at regulating raw fish sales. Here, the Raw Fish Act, 
introduced in 1938, allowed the cooperative sales organisations of fishermen to interfere in 
the fishery in order to avoid over-supply, and hence a low price, at the dockside. The third 
type of instrument is aimed at limiting entry into particular fisheries through the issuing of 
licenses. These were, of course, also anchored in formal legislation. Examples are the 'Salt 
Water Fishing Act' of 1955, the 'Trawler Act' of 1951 and the 'Limited Entry Act' of 1972. 
While a detailed analysis of the purpose, character and enforcement of these acts is beyond 
the scope of this essay, a few points deserve to be elaborated as they pertain to the 
subsequent development of management institutions and practices. 
 
Driven by technology? 
 
To begin with, it should be noted that the early attempts at managing the fisheries - through 
'operational rules' as well as comprehensive legislation, were largely a response to 
problems and conflicts generated by the introduction of new harvesting technology. The 
acts that were passed and enforced were, initially, geared to the protection of fishermen 
using traditional gear such as handline, nets and longline, against the intrusion of modern 
technology such as seines and trawl. 
 Second, legislation was then, as now, discretionary - leaving their interpretation and 
enforcement mainly in the hands of government officials. The power thus given to officials 
was, however, balanced by an element of 'democratic' consultation as the legal framework 
allowed - even required - user groups to participate in applying the rules and enforcing 
regulations. This applied, in particular, to the Lofoten cod fisheries, where fishermen were 
- and still is - directly involved in regulatory decision-making through local 'management 
committees' (Jentoft and Kristoffersen 1989). 
 The system of regionally enacted rules was complex, and the need for both 
simplification and extension led to the passing of the 'Salt Water Fishing Act' in 1955, 
bringing together - in a single 'document' - most of the rules pertaining to 'management' 
that were in force at that time. The act was discretionary legislation at its most typical in 
that it gave the Ministry of Fisheries a general authority to enforce measures well beyond 
the scope of 'operational rules'. These measures ranged from restrictions on the size and 
design of gear to the setting of total allowable catches (TACs) for particular stocks. 
Although this legislation was wide in scope, the rules and regulations eventually enforced 
did not restrict entry into the fisheries; neither did they put limitations on catches. 
 Of somewhat greater interest, from our point of view, are the 'Trawler Act' and 'The 
Ownership Act' - both passed in 1951 - that were introduced shortly before the 
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aforementioned 'Salt Water Fishing Act'. They were not a response to management 
problems as such, but intended to protect bona-fide fishermen from competition from 
outside investors. Legislation such as this was initiated in response to the growing number 
of large trawlers. These were financed and controlled by processors, and led to demands 
from the Norwegian Fishermen's Association that something be done to prevent the big 
players in processing from taking control over the fishing fleet. Vertical integration would 
weaken the position of bona-fide fishermen, it was argued, and government responded by 
legislation intended at restricting entry and investments in harvesting. However, as 
conservation was not a major concern at the time, restrictions on investment and ownership 
came under increasing pressure. The outcome was a gradual - and controversial - 
slackening of these restrictions in an attempt at adjusting formal rules to the requirements 
of new technologies (Mikalsen and Sagdahl 1982). In this sense, there is - in the history of 
Norwegian fisheries management - a close connection between technological change and 
'management' policy. 
 
Limited entry and resource conservation 
 
Fisheries management proper dates back to the late 1960s when the depletion of the 
Atlanto-Scandinavian herring stock led to a ban on the introduction of new vessels into this 
fishery. This was a highly controversial issue at the time. The Cabinet split on the issue, 
and there was resistance in parliament to legislation that would limit the 'professional 
freedom and discretion' of existing or would-be boat owners. The controversy was 
somewhat surprising, given the dismal state of the herring stock, but it illustrates that the 
ban on new vessels in the fishery was conceived as a qualitatively new type of government 
intervention. Although the effects of this particular measure were limited, it was significant 
in that it signalled a new era, characterised by the introduction and continuous increase in 
restrictions on harvesting across a wide range of stocks and fisheries. 
 The idea of limited entry was first (officially) floated in 1967 - by a top fisheries 
bureaucrat in an address to the annual meeting of the Norwegian Fishermen's Association. 
The response was by and large favourable, and by the end of that year a proposal had been 
drafted for what would eventually become the 'Limited Entry Act'. The gist of this proposal 
was that the government, i.e. the Ministry of Fisheries, be authorised to limit participation 
in specific fisheries through licensing and/or catch quotas. The Fishermen's Association 
came out in favour of stricter measures to protect the stocks - with the caveat that the 
industry would be consulted on the content and scope of future regulations. In 1972, 
Parliament passed the 'Limited Entry Act' - authorising the Ministry of Fisheries to enforce 
whatever measures deemed necessary to prevent the overexploitation of fish stocks. 
Limited entry regulations were eventually enforced in the herring, capelin and shrimp 
fisheries, and quotas enforced in parts of the cod fisheries (for trawlers). Besides, severe 
restrictions - in force until 1985 - on the building of new offshore vessels (trawlers and 
purse seiners) were introduced. 
 The inshore fisheries - and smaller vessels - largely escaped such measures until 
1983 when the ministry decided to intervene by setting an overall quota for the inshore cod 
fishery. This, however, turned out to be a somewhat symbolic step as the inshore fleet was 
allowed to exceed its quota until 1989. That said, this fishery did not entirely escape the 
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long arm of management as non-fishing periods and weekend stoppages were enforced 
throughout the 1980s. The turning point, however, came in 1989, when - acting on 
recommendations from ICES - the ministry decided to enforce a drastic reduction of the 
TAC for cod. The so-called 'cod crisis' was a fact, generating social and political turmoil 
along the coast as inshore fishermen were driven into a fierce competition for 'their' share 
of the dwindling overall quota (Jentoft, 1993). The crisis - and the measures that followed - 
marked a watershed in Norwegian fisheries management as it saw the extension of 
management by individual quotas to virtually all fisheries and vessels. These quotas are not 
- in theory at least - transferable. In practice, however, there are not many - if any - 
obstacles to them being the objects of market transactions. 
 From this brief and incomplete account one is tempted to conclude that the history of 
Norwegian fisheries management is one of ad-hoc adjustments and incremental change 
rather than long-term planning and grand designs. The Ministry of Fisheries has been - and 
still is - more of a fire department than a Soviet planning bureau. Fisheries management 
has by and large been synonymous with crisis management where conflict and controversy 
- not surprisingly, given the stakes involved - have been the order of the day. That said, no 
management policy would be viable without ways of creating a minimum of consensus and 
legitimacy. This is largely a question of 'due' process and formal organisation - of creating 
decision-making arrangements that allow for representation from stakeholders. Before 
turning to the details of management decision-making, we need to take a brief look at the 
political context and administrative structure of Norwegian fisheries management. 
 
2.1.3 Political context and administrative structure 
 
The process - and organisation - of management decision-making should be seen against 
three characteristics of Norwegian fisheries. First, there is the multitude of conflicts and 
cleavages: regional as between north and south, technological as between off-shore and in-
shore, and economic as between processing and harvesting. These cleavages are sometimes 
mutually reinforcing, they tend to permeate public policy-making from inception to 
implementation, and are easily traced in the multitude of contradictory demands 
concerning the content and timing of regulatory measures. If politics is basically about the 
resolution of conflict, then fisheries are more 'political' than most other sectors of the 
Norwegian economy, making fisheries management a time-consuming process of 
consultation and bargaining. Genuine consensus is hard, if not impossible, to achieve, and 
few policies and decisions are conceived as authoritative and final among all groups 
involved. 
 Second, there is the centralised, or top-down, structure of management decision-
making - vesting the power to make and implement policies in the hands of central 
government, notably the Ministry of Fisheries and the Directorate of Fisheries. The latter is 
essentially a 'professional' or staff agency whose main role is to provide advice and 
expertise to the Ministry. It is one of the oldest institutions within the fisheries bureaucracy 
- established as early as 1900 - and it is generally considered to be more influential than its 
advisory role suggests. However, the continuous growth and increasing complexity of 
regulatory measures, and of tasks pertaining to allocation and enforcement, have been 
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stretching the administrative capacity of central institutions to a point where the concept of 
'overloaded government' catches the essence of contemporary fisheries management. 
 Third, there is the major role played by organised interest groups in public policy 
making - in virtually all sectors of the Norwegian economy. Corporatism is a long-standing 
and pervasive feature of Norwegian politics, providing a multitude of links between the 
state and civil society (Rokkan, 1966; Kvavik, 1976). In the fisheries, interest groups are 
either directly represented in government through a formalised structure of boards and 
committees, or delegated public authority within specific issue areas (Hallenstvedt, 1982; 
Smith, 1979). Power, to some extent, is being shared in order to secure the legitimacy of 
decisions and the compliance of industry. A system that provides for industry input 
through corporatist structures while retaining ministerial control and responsibility is 
probably best characterised as one of 'centralised consultation' (Hoel et al., 1996). How, 
then, is it organised and how does it work? 
 
2.1.4 Formal procedures and the politics of consultation 
 
The first step or stage in the management process involves the setting of the total allowable 
catch (TAC) for a wide range of stocks and species. The TACs are set on the basis of 
recommendations from the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) 
- or, rather, from its scientific and advisory committee (ACFM) - and after bilateral 
negotiations between Russia and Norway in the so-called 'Mixed Norwegian-Russian 
Fisheries Commission' (for shared stocks in the Barents Sea) and between Norway and the 
EU (for North Sea stocks). On the Norwegian side the strategies for these negotiations are 
worked out in a special committee ('Sjøgrenseutvalget'), counting representatives from 
government (several ministries are involved) as well as from industry and science. In this 
sense, the consultative aspect is present from 'day one' as it were. 
 What should be noted, however, is the limited scope of these consultations as well as 
the secrecy of subsequent negotiations. There is no participation from outside the industry, 
and both the elaboration of Norwegian strategies and the deliberations within the 
Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission are conducted in considerable secrecy. 
Preparatory documents are not publicly available, nor are the minutes (Aasjord 2001, 205-
207). Worth noticing is also the fact that parliament is conspicuously absent from the 
policy-making process. While the bilateral negotiations between Norway and Russia have 
been going on since 1976, it was not until 1995 that parliament asked to be briefed on this 
process. However, these briefings seem to be a mere formality as they generate little, or no, 
debate among representatives (Aasjord 2001, 213-215). 
 The TAC agreed on through these bilateral negotiations, which may or may not be in 
accordance with ICES' recommendations, serve as the starting point for the consultative 
process at the national level. At the core of the domestic process is the 'Management 
Council' ('Reguleringsrådet'), an advisory committee to the Ministry of Fisheries chaired 
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by the Director of Fisheries and counting representatives from both harvesting and 
processing.1 The council usually meets twice a year - in June and December. The chair, 
and his staff at the Directorate of Fisheries, prepare the agenda and also work out a fairly 
detailed proposal for the management of different stocks and fisheries. Within a few weeks 
the council meets to discuss the Director's proposals, and although the council has no 
decision-making power, its word carries considerable weight - provided it speaks with one 
voice as it were. There is, thus, a certain pressure to reach a consensus, but a vote is always 
cast when there is disagreement. We shall return to this part of the process, and the work of 
the council, later. Following the deliberations, the Director - as chair - informs the ministry 
about the council's recommendations. Although the ministry is free to disregard these, the 
advice of the council is usually the backbone of next year's management plan. 
 
Preparing the agenda: the role of the Directorate of Fisheries 
 
The council's agenda is, as already noted, prepared by the Directorate - with its economics 
department and legal division as key players. There are no formal procedures for how to go 
about this work. It usually starts with an 'in-house' meeting where upcoming issues are 
identified, problems anticipated and a preliminary agenda for the next council meeting is 
set. There are, during this preparatory stage, informal contacts with the fishermen's 
associations, and officials spend considerable time attending annual meetings up and down 
the coast as part of a 'sounding out' process. In this way they get first hand knowledge of 
what 'fishermen like or do not like' as one official put it. Agenda setting and advice aside, 
another important task of the Directorate - as seen by its current head - is to ensure that the 
TAC is not exceeded. In this sense, this particular institution plays an important role in 
enforcement and control - a point to which we shall return. The directorate tries not to get 
involved in problems of allocation, leaving the issue of quota shares to the Fishermen's 
Association and the ministry.2 However, on certain occasions, interference in issues of 
allocation cannot be entirely avoided. In the words of one official: 
 
'We leave the sharing as far as we can to the fishermen themselves, but we do know 
that some of these decisions are taken at three o'clock in the morning. We know there 
are groups that are not present at the table, so we have to make sure that these are 
treated fairly'. (Apostle et al., 1998, 141) 
 
 The Directorate, then, does not necessarily refrain from interfering in issues of 
allocation, although this - strictly speaking - is 'politics'. 
                                                 
1 The following organisations and institutions are represented on the council: The Norwegian Fishermen's 
Association (5), the Norwegian Federation of Fish and Aquaculture (processors) (2), the Norwegian 
Seamen's Association (1), the Norwegian Union of Plant Workers (1), the Directorate of Fisheries (1), the 
Saami Parliament (1). Representatives of the Directorate for the Management of Natural Resources and 
Friends of the Earth, Norway - among others - meet as observers, i.e. they can take the floor, but are not 
allowed to vote or table proposals. 
2 Since 1989 the respective shares (of the TAC) of off-shore and in-shore vessels have been set according to a 
predetermined scheme (the so-called 'quota ladder'), where the percentage of the TAC for each group - r 
'sector' - is susceptible to variations in the size of the TAC. Although this scheme has been challenged on 
several occasions, it is generally considered as the 'best' there is - given the circumstances. 
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The consultative process: the Management Council 
 
The council, set up in 1983, is part of a long-standing tradition of consultation in 
Norwegian fisheries management. It was established through an amendment to the 
aforementioned Salt Water Fishing Act and replaced two other 'management' committees 
set up during the early 1970s. As such, the council represents a continuation of a policy of 
consultation initiated by the appointment of industry representatives to the so-called 
'Trawler Council' in 1951. Its members were supposed to be consulted before trawler 
licenses or permits were issued. The basic idea behind these and similar 'institutions' has 
been to provide arenas for the exchange of information and advice - and for the 
clarification of problems and positions. From the government's point of view, committees 
and councils of this ('corporatist') type strengthen the legitimacy of management decisions; 
for the industry, participation represent an opportunity to keep abreast of developments and 
to wield influence over decisions ranging from 'technical' measures pertaining to gear, 
fishing periods and areas to the allocation of quotas among groups and vessels. 
 As for the council's work, it has already been noted that it meets twice a year - in 
June and December. The most salient issues such as the detailed allocation of quotas 
among the various fisheries and categories of fishing vessels, are usually dealt with at the 
December meeting when the recommendations from ICES, and the proposal for next year's 
management plan, are available. Most issues - 'technical' as well as 'political' - are dealt 
with on a stock-by-stock basis. The June meeting is usually devoted to debates on the 
managing of stocks such as mackerel where decisions do not have to be taken as early as 
December. There are in-between meetings devoted to particular stocks from time to time, 
but no special sessions to analyse and discuss either long-term priorities or the current state 
of affairs. 
 As for the composition of the council (see footnote 1), two aspects are worth 
noticing: First, there is the comparatively strong representation of the Fishermen's 
Association. If we include processing, the industry as such holds 9 out 11 seats on the 
council. This may not be of any great political consequence as the fishing industry - due to 
internal conflicts and cleavages - seldom operates as a unified coalition. Second, there is 
the inclusion - albeit only as observers - of environmental organisations and institutions. 
Whatever the effects of this inclusive approach on management policy, it has a certain 
symbolic significance in that it reflects a growing awareness of environmental (and public 
interest) implications of fisheries management. Worth noticing is also the fact that the 
ministry does not have a seat; its officials only meet as observers. The reasoning behind 
this is that it would not be appropriate for ministry officials to sit as full members of a body 
whose main task is to advice the ministry (or rather, the Minister) on matters of 
management. Ministry officials are, of course, allowed to take the floor, and they are 
frequently called upon to do so -usually to clarify facts and questions of policy. This lack 
of (direct) ministerial representation may have to do with the official definition of the 
council as a 'professional', non-political body rather than a policy-making arena. 
 However, a closer look at council membership should suffice to convince any 
observer that this is not a body of neutral, disinterested experts - which it was probably 
never intended to be. Rather, it comes across as a mixture of the purely professional and 
the overtly political; a body of knowledgeable people with (economic) interests at stake. 
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According to council members interviewed for another project (Apostle et al., 1998), this is 
also reflected in deliberations. There is - in meetings - relatively little controversy on the 
scientific data presented. Although stock estimates are sometimes challenged, 
recommendations from the scientific community are generally accepted. In this sense there 
is, at the core of the advice offered, a pool of knowledge or information considered as 
fairly accurate and objective. 
 On the other hand, the weak representation of science as compared to that of industry 
suggests a certain ambiguity as to the exact role and (professional) significance of the 
council. It is, in most circumstances and on most issues, difficult to draw a straight line 
between science and politics, between professional advice and political preferences -in 
particular when the livelihood of larger groups is at stake. The fact that even scientists, 
when arguing their case in the council, normally seek to strike a balance between what is 
biologically defensible and what is politically feasible, testifies to this. Also, the fact that 
the representatives of the Fishermen's Association in particular, are directly instructed and 
closely supervised by its national executive, is an indication of the overtly political nature 
of the council's work. On the whole, the representatives of the association tend to have 
little leeway for compromise on specific issues. They usually meet with a 'fixed' mandate 
in that they are bound by instructions from the national executive. This, of course, is due to 
the fact that the association is a fragile coalition of groups with strongly conflicting 
interests where policies and demands are carefully worked out compromises that seldom 
give much room for manoeuvre (Hallenstvedt, 1982; Jentoft and Mikalsen, 1987). This 
spills over into the council where, in order to reach a decision on what advice to give, a 
vote often has to be taken. According to those involved, voting is a major form of decision-
making; compromise and consensus tend to be the exception rather than the rule. This, of 
course, goes somewhat against the 'logic' of corporatism and policy consultation. The 
council is part of a system or chain of decision-making where participants are supposed to 
be moved - at least from time to time - by the sheer force of the argument, and thus engage 
in compromises that may not meet the ultimate demands of their own group. There is a 
dilemma here for any group or organisation seeking political influence by way of 
participation in government: should representatives be instructed to toe the organisational 
line, or should they be able to exercise personal discretion in order to break a stalemate and 
reach viable compromises? 
 What should be noted, however, is that the work of the council is but one - although 
crucial - part of a more comprehensive process where the annual meetings of the local and 
regional branches of the Fishermen's Association are the starting point. At these meetings 
management issues always loom large - with debates usually concluded with a wide array 
of demands for changes in, or additions to, the management 'menu'. Although most of these 
are shelved by central office, some may end up on the table of the association's executive 
board for further consideration. The board, we should hasten to add, is an important actor 
in the management process - for several reasons: its deliberations are decisive for the 
association's position on key issues, some of its members also sit on the Management 
Council, and there is a regular exchange of information between the association and the 
Directorate of Fisheries prior to council meetings. In addition, the leadership of the 
association takes an active part in preparing for the annual negotiations with Russia and the 
EU. There is, in fact, a continuous exchange of information between the association and 
 34
the ministry during the days and weeks prior to the annual meeting of the 'Joint 
Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission'.1
 
The Management Council: powerful but irresponsible? 
 
As already pointed out, the council deliberates and offers advice. The ultimate decision on 
any issue lies with the ministry. The overall impression, from interviews and documents, is 
that the ministry - in most cases - follows the advice of the council. In cases where the 
council is split, the ministry tends to side with the majority. This suggests that the council, 
or even a tiny majority of its members, may wield more influence than its advisory status 
suggests. In that case, we may be dealing with a management system where one of the key 
players is an 'institution' with considerable power but no responsibility. The ministry's - or 
rather the Minister's - position is unambiguous: he or she is accountable to parliament - and 
eventually to the public. Not so with the council, even though its (public) position has 
become somewhat tenuous as management problems have mounted. Although the ministry 
has taken most of the beating, the council has been criticised for failing to give sound 
advice, and its industry members for being too concerned about their economic interests. 
Industry representation, it is argued, is tantamount to letting the fox into the henhouse - or 
putting the goat in charge of the oatmeal sack - as there is a strong temptation to capture 
immediate benefits (i.e. larger quotas) at the expense of long-term conservation of the 
stocks. On several occasions, the TAC for stocks over which Norway has exclusive control 
- herring and saithe in particular - has exceeded the recommendations by ICES. In 1990 for 
example, ICES recommended a ban on the herring fishery. The Management Council, on 
its part, proposed a quota of 60,000 tons which the Minister accepted - probably with a 
view to protecting market shares. The same year, the council also endorsed a saithe quota 
that exceeded ICES' recommendations by as much as 70,000 tons (Hoel et al., 1996). 
 We do not contend that these and other 'excesses' are the sole cause of recurring 
crises in the fisheries. Rather, the point is that decisions of the kind referred to above have 
tended to undermine the authority of the council, and the legitimacy of management policy 
among the public. Issues of fisheries management are increasingly catching the public eye, 
and the present system of 'centralised consultation' is being criticised for favouring the 
economic interests of the fishing industry - at the expense of conservation. The lack of any 
formal responsibility for policy may thus be compensated by an increasing public 
awareness of the council's work and decisions. An interesting question then - and one to 
which we shall return shortly - is whether 'corporatist' arrangements have become 
politically unacceptable and 'obsolete', and should be replaced by more transparent and 
democratic institutions. 
                                                 
1 The commission was established as part of an agreement between Norway and the Soviet Union in 1975. 
The commission - where the Norwegian Fisherman's Association is also represented - meets once a year to 
set TAC for shared stocks - cod, capelin and haddock - and to decide the allocation of the TAC between 
Norway and Russia, and the shares of 'third parties', notably the EU. 
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Enforcement and monitoring 
 
The growth in both the number and complexity of regulatory measures has made 
enforcement and monitoring crucial aspects of the fisheries management regime. While the 
formal responsibility for enforcement lies with the Ministry of Fisheries, the Directorate is 
- for all practical purposes - the key player through its division of control and surveillance. 
At the core are nine regional offices (soon to be merged into five) whose main task is quota 
control through dockside monitoring. Spot checks are important here as are inspections at 
sea within the 4-mile zone. While major violations are usually a matter for the police - and 
eventually the courts - directorate officials are authorised to confiscate the catch that 
exceeds the quota. 
 The Norwegian Coast Guard - a part of the Ministry of Defence - is the second major 
player within enforcement. It is responsible for a wide range of tasks within the Norwegian 
200-mile zone - from the control of catches to the enforcement of gear restrictions. Its 
monitoring authority also includes foreign vessels. The scale of its fisheries related 
operations is illustrated by the fact that in 1999 it carried out close to 2,000 inspections on 
Norwegian and foreign vessels. 
 The mandated cooperative sales organisations of raw fish, six in all, also play an 
important role in enforcement - mainly by collecting and checking sales slips and through 
dockside monitoring. The ultimate purpose of this is to check catches against individual 
vessel quotas. The data thus collected - ranging from information on species landed and the 
size of the catch to data on catching area and gear types. This information is shared with 
the directorate as it comes in. 
 
A note on local-level management 
 
While fisheries management is largely about setting national priorities and policies, a not 
insubstantial number of rules and regulations pertain to geographically defined areas such 
as particular fjords and inlets. These rules and regulations constitute an intricate network of 
restrictions on the use of 'active' gear such as trawl and seine - often implemented in 
response to demands from local fishermen, and on the basis of advice from a management 
committee at the county level. This is not the place for a detailed account of these 'local' 
arrangements, but a couple of points should be noted. 
 First, local regulations have a long history in that they were based on so-called 
'Regional Fisheries Acts' originating in the late 19th century. With the introduction of new 
harvesting technology such as trawl and purse seine shortly before and after World War II, 
there was a steady stream of demands from local fishermen for restrictions on trawling and 
purse seining in the fjords. Although the Ministry of Fisheries was less than enthusiastic, 
procedures were eventually set up for handling cases of local 'competition' between users 
of different gear - the most significant being standing advisory committees on local 
regulations (Jentoft and Mikalsen, 1994). 
 Second, the policy of these advisory committees - whose membership includes 
representatives of most gear groups - has been rather restrictive in that most demands for 
closures of fjords and inlets have been rejected. The tenor of the debate on local 
regulations has been that one should be careful in setting up restrictions for the simple 
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reason that once in place, they will be impossible to ease or abolish. There is currently a 
consensus between the ministry and the Norwegian Fishermen's Association to this effect. 
However, demands for the strengthening of the present system - with stronger representa-
tion from local government - have been gaining in credibility as marine scientists have 
demonstrated the existence of local cod stocks in several fjords along the coast of northern 
Norway. The issue, which remains unsolved, is whether these stocks should be managed 
locally - and not as a part of the management system established for the Barents Sea stock. 
 
2.1.5 Reforming fisheries management: from user-groups to stakeholders? 
 
Corporatism, even in its more 'benign' versions, implies privileged participation and less 
than transparent decision-making. As demonstrated above, Norwegian fisheries 
management has largely been a question of close collaboration between central 
government and representatives of industry - notably from harvesting. User-group 
participation has been facilitated by the creation of the Management Council - itself a part 
of a long-standing tradition of functional representation in Norwegian politics (Kvavik, 
1976; Nordby, 1994) - often at the expense of other 'interested parties'. 
 Management has been the domain of a relatively coherent policy community of 
government officials and industry representatives, its legitimacy sustained by history and 
tradition - and by the fact that it has produced viable compromises. The challenge to this 
particular type of co-management - and an impetus for reform - is the claims currently 
being made by other groups for a stake in fisheries management. 
 
Why reform? 
 
While there is a lot to be said for involving users in fisheries management, current 
arrangements do put representatives of industry in a privileged position compared to other 
stakeholders. Due to perennial problems of resource depletion and mismanagement - and 
with fisheries management increasingly conceived of as environmental politics - these 
privileges are increasingly being questioned. 
 Consumers seem to take a more active interest in the availability and quality of fish 
products. Regional and local authorities - particularly in North Norway - have come to take 
a keen interest in the effects of management policy on the viability and welfare of local 
communities. The so-called 'cod crisis' of the early 1990s had elected officials stop and 
think about the significance of a viable fishery for local economies (Jentoft, 1993), and 
there has since been much talk about the prospects of sharing management responsibilities. 
Environmental groups have increasingly turned their attention to fisheries (mis-)-
management - targeting the conservation of fish stocks and the protection of vulnerable 
ecosystems. Finally, representatives of ethnic groups, notably the Saami, argue that 
management institutions and practices should acknowledge historical rights and cultural 
diversity -and recognise the need for more decentralisation. Although environmentalists 
and Saami representatives have been recognised as legitimate participants as observers in 
the Management Council, they can hardly be considered core members of the management 
policy community. 
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 Co-management that involves only fishermen and fish processors can hardly be 
justified when there are such broader interests at stake. From a democratic point of view, 
then, there is much to be said for more inclusive and transparent institutions - given that 
the group of legitimate stakeholders is far wider than that of resource users, and the fact 
that there is a genuine public interest involved; that of, say, consumers, citizens, local 
communities and future generations. The challenge raised by the demands for more 
transparency and broader stakeholder involvement raises the question of who should be 
considered legitimate stakeholders and how these should be involved. Or to paraphrase 
Robert A. Dahl (1989): how do we define the constituency - or 'demos' - of fisheries 
management, and how can we make sure that all constituents are 'heard'? Direct 
participation - although a democratic ideal - is hardly feasible given the sheer number of 
interests involved. Provided that some form of representation is indispensable, the crucial 
issue becomes one of institutional design: how can all legitimate stakeholders be 
represented without undermining the need for efficient decision-making? 
 
Towards more inclusive institutions? 
 
The debate on Norwegian fisheries management has always, it seems, been more about 
policy than institutions. The question of who should have a say seems to have been less 
pertinent than the issue of how 'shares' or quotas should be allocated among groups and 
individuals. In this sense key stakeholders - once they were given a seat at the table - 
became preoccupied by management practices rather than how these practices were 
decided upon. Understandable, perhaps, as government frequently invites stakeholders to 
have a say on management instruments, and only rarely seeks to elicit their views on 
decision-making arrangements. In current debates on management reform, the question of 
how to adjust regulatory instruments takes precedence over issues pertaining to 
institutional change. 
 That said, the downturn of key stocks - and controversy over the choice of regulatory 
instruments - have turned the attention of stakeholders towards decision-making 
arrangements. In an industry characterised by a multitude of groups and 'segments', 
conflicts are rife and outcomes often the result of logrolling and successful coalition 
building. This raises the question of whose (economic) interests are being served by 
present arrangements. The Norwegian Fishermen's Association has long enjoyed 
privileged access to government while, say, processors and plant workers have had less 
political 'clout' in management issues. This is reflected in the composition of the 
Management Council as well as in participation on more informal arenas. 
 However, the fact that the fishing industry - and fishermen in particular - take part in 
management policy-making does not necessarily imply that all fisheries groups and 
interests are given a fair and proper hearing. The Fishermen's Association, for example, is 
a fragile coalition of big players in offshore and small-scale operators in inshore fisheries, 
of boat owners, crewmembers and independent operators - groups whose economic 
resources, administrative capacity and political 'clout' differ considerably (Jentoft and 
Mikalsen 1987). Consensus has proven hard to reach, and internal opposition to 
management decisions and policies is frequent, particularly among the smaller inshore 
operators who claim that their interests are sometimes ill served by present arrangements. 
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The most dramatic outcome of this has been the formation of a breakaway organisation 
- the Norwegian Association of Inshore Fishermen. A key question here is how to make 
institutions more inclusive and representative of the various voices within the industry 
itself. If compliance with management rules and regulations depends - in part - on 
representation, one need to look for reforms that can open up the management policy 
community to all stakeholders in the industry. 
 The fact that fisheries management has become part of the environmental agenda 
also raises the question of how to accommodate a wider set of stakeholders - for example 
environmental groups and agencies - in management decision-making. There is a growing 
sense that both the activities of environmentalists and the obligations that follow from 
international agreements and conventions, are bound to have an impact on how decisions 
are made; on who should participate, why and how. So, although the debate on institutional 
reform in Norwegian fisheries is still fairly muted, it is increasingly being nurtured by 
perceptions that fisheries management is basically about protecting vulnerable ecosystems 
- and thus an integral part of the wider field of environmental politics. 
 One question - raised by the close collaboration between government and industry, 
and debated for quite some time - is whether corporatism and co-management favour the 
economic interests of fishermen at the expense of those of other stakeholders. Although it 
is a central tenet in democratic theory that those directly affected by government decisions 
should have a say (confer Dahl 1989), co-management - as hitherto defined and practised 
in the Norwegian fishery - tend to facilitate user-group influence at the expense of 
government control. Giving industry the opportunity to (co-)manage the fisheries may be 
tantamount to letting the goat guard the oatmeal sack - providing a powerful incentive to 
capture immediate benefits (for example larger quotas) while disregarding the long-term 
effects on the stocks. The general conception, perhaps a little unfair, has been one of an 
industry easily tempted and a government only too willing to oblige. The key issue here is 
not just how to strengthen the steering capacity of government, but also whether the power 
to manage should be transferred to agencies with fewer ties to the fishing industry such as 
the Ministry of the Environment. 
 The current system of centralised consultation, then, reflects a 'trade-off' between 
special interests and public concerns that is not to everyone's taste. Corporate arrangements 
imply selective representation, and an 'institutionalised disregard' for the fact that wider 
groups may have a stake in management decisions. A commendable policy, in this context, 
is one to which those directly involved can agree - or one that is favoured by a winning 
coalition. In the context of management reform, the key question here is whether corporate 
arrangements like the Management Council should be replaced by a system of broader 
consultations that will include all relevant stakeholders. The problem, of course, is how to 
broaden participation without undermining the need for efficient decision-making. 
Inclusive institutions may well facilitate 'rational discourse' and democratic deliberation, 
but prove unwieldy tools for solving pressing management problems. 
 
2.1.6 Conclusion 
 
While management reform in Norwegian fisheries has been more about adjusting 
instruments than changing institutions there are pressures - domestically and 
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internationally - for broadening participation in management decision-making. The 
Ministry of Fisheries has not been unwilling to listen to such demands. From 2002 
representatives of regional authorities are allowed to join in on the deliberations prior to, 
and the negotiations in the Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission. Whatever the 
merits of corporatism, the problem of democracy and transparency remains: why should 
user groups enjoy a privileged position when management decisions may eventually affect 
us all? This question is particularly pertinent in a country such as Norway, where fisheries 
play an important role in the national economy and constitute the economic backbone of 
numerous coastal communities. 
 Participation, of course, is often restricted for reasons of efficiency; broadening 
participation will - almost inevitably - delay the process of decision-making. In this sense, 
selective consultation - as in the Norwegian system - is a strategy for streamlining 
organisational choice while preserving an element of 'popular' involvement. As such, 
involving user-groups in policy-making has been the standard response to problems of 
legitimacy and compliance. Centralised consultation - as practised in Norwegian fisheries 
management - has made it possible to combine the 'functional' needs of managers (for 
information and advise) with the democratic aspirations of politicians and user groups (for 
support and representation respectively). 
 However, groups and voices with no ties to central government or to the fisheries are 
challenging this conception of democratic participation as well as the definition of what 
fisheries management is really about. Given that fisheries management is environmental 
politics, who is entitled to participate? To borrow a phrase from Martin Harrop (1992, 270) 
there is a trend towards a 'crowding of the policy environment' as new groups are 
challenging customary practices and the autonomy of the fisheries policy community. The 
increase in public attention directed at fisheries issues may, of course, prove temporary, 
generated and sustained by the dismal state of most management regimes. It may, on the 
other hand, also reflect genuine and lasting concerns, and a growing perception that 
fisheries are too important to be left to industry and government. This is a point argued by 
environmentalists in particular, but one that is gaining support in wider circles, and not 
only in Norway. The key issue, given that there are limits to participation, is what 
institutional arrangements that are appropriate in settings where the concept of 'stakeholder' 
rather than 'user-group' is increasingly being used to define the legitimate members of the 
management policy community. The current system of centralised consultation - based on 
a direct economic stake in the fishery, as by far the most important criterion for 
representation - may be inadequate once we acknowledge the public interest nature of 
fisheries management. If the legitimacy of management decisions has come to depend on 
whether they can be argued and justified in public, there is much to be said for institutions 
that facilitate transparency and public scrutiny without necessarily undermining the need 
for efficiency in management decision-making. 
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2.2 Local Participation in the Management of Marine Resources in Norway 
 
2.2.1 Introduction 
 
The issue of user participation in the management of marine resources has been a much-
debated topic in fisheries management for the past 20 years. In the wake of this discussion, 
several concepts have been introduced that are claimed to conceptualise the many different 
ways that users may be involved in the management process, i.e. fisheries co-management, 
co-governance, and so on. In this paper, some of the different ways that users may be 
involved in the management of marine resources are discussed using the involvement of 
fishers in the management of marine resources in Norway as a case. A central case is the 
so-called Lofoten case, which received international attention after the publication of 
Jentoft and Kristoffersen's: Fisheries Co-management: The Case of the Lofoten Fishery 
(...). Using this and some other cases, the paper focuses on the issue of participation, and 
how participation may be institutionalised. 
 First, some of the different concepts that are being used is the discussion concerning 
user involvement in fisheries management, are discussed especially dissecting the idea of 
fisheries co-management. After this, I elaborate some of the most important cases of user 
involvement in Norwegian fisheries, emphasising the Lofoten case. Thirdly, some of the 
most significant findings from the Norwegian cases are compared to the concepts 
discussed. 
 
2.2.2 Blame it on the little guy: User-involvement in the management of marine 
resources 
 
At a general level, there are several reasons for involving users in the management of 
natural resources. At a higher level, user involvement may be regarded as a fulfilment of 
the basic functions of a democracy as the primary users of a resource should have voice in 
its management. In this fashion, those affected by changes in the management structure of 
any given industry are also consulted during the creation and implementation of changes 
and changes to the management structure can hence incorporate the specifics of the 
stakeholder groups. While there are many ways that fishermen may be involved in any 
given fishery, one may differentiate between at least two different types of management 
institutions. Firstly, there are a variety of institutional arrangements that are intentionally 
made in order to manage a given resource. In this case, institution is made with intention of 
representing stakeholders, for example the public or fishermen, in the management of a 
given resource. In this case, one may call the institution resource management institutions. 
Secondly, there are a variety of institutions that are part of a fishery, but which are not with 
the intention of managing a given resource. Examples include sales organisations and the 
different welfare institutions of fishermen. In general, one may call institutions such as 
these supportive institutions. While such institutions are not made in order to manage a 
resource, they may however have an effect on the management. For example, sales 
organisations have definite influence on the establishment of prices for catches, and prices 
may have a direct effect on the manner of which fishermen harvest. In the next turn, the 
manner in which the fishermen harvest, for example by using overly efficient gear, will 
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affect the instruments used for managing the fishery. From an analytical point of view, this 
is an important difference because the institutional landscape in which a fishery is 
embedded, including all the institutions which may have an effect on the management of 
fishery, is crucial for understanding the economic and legal behaviour of fishermen. 
 In the fisheries management literature there appears to be general agreement that 
fishermen should become involved in the management of the fisheries in which they 
participate. The agreement ends here, as there are many different options open for the 
entrance of this user in the management process. The analytical argument made above may 
help differentiate between two types of current involvement in fisheries management. In 
some cases, fishermen are active participants in management institutions and are part in the 
process as members of management boards or as having extended tasks relating to the 
enforcement of regulations. In some cases, a fishery is 'self-managed', that is, the fishermen 
have assumed total control of the fishery and are given the authority to manage it 
according to their own will. However, it is a fact that most fisheries are managed by the 
state. In these cases, the state has assumed total control over a fishery, however, user 
groups such as fishermen may be involved in a consultative role. This is the case in 
Norway, as fishermen are represented during the establishment of regulations through 
attendance at bi-annual meeting where quotas are distributed among user-groups. 
 A rather large portion of the literature argues that different institutions exists that 
may assume management authority of they granted this particular legal role. Thus, it is 
argued that supportive institutions can be transformed into management institutions. If it is 
the case that supportive institutions may assume the role as resource management 
institutions, one may firstly differentiate between two principally different legal roles. 
Firstly, such institutions may become involved in the management process as an advisory 
institution. In this case, the knowledge and skills that is part of the cultural capital of the 
institutions is put into use in the management process. Needless to say, this may be a form 
of involvement that everybody will benefit from because it will increase the precision and 
size of the knowledge basis on which the management is based. Secondly, such institutions 
may become the sole manager of a fishery. In such cases, the supportive institution 
assumes a role that is quite different from its origin, and special functions may be 
established in order to make it a fully functional management institution. For example, the 
legal requirements of a management institution need to meet and the assumption of 
regulatory authority may also require the expansion of the knowledge base onto which the 
institution is to create sound management. However, from a both a theoretical and practical 
point of view one may observe some problems with both these types of involvement of 
supportive institutions in the management of a fishery. Some of these problems may be 
listed as follows: 
- the instruments by which the supportive institution is accomplishing its goals may be 
negative for management purposes; 
- the supportive institution may be established on an ideological and normative 
foundation which may come in conflict with the legal requirements of a management 
system; 
- the knowledge basis for the supportive institution may not be relevant for 
management purposes; 
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- the specific form of representation in the supportive institution may not be valid for 
management purposes; 
- the supportive institution, while valid as such, may not be considered legitimate 
- generally and specifically - as a management institution. 
 
 The instruments by which supportive institutions is accomplishing its goals are 
usually intrinsically tied to the tasks that it is designed to take care of. 
 
2.2.3 Local participation in Fisheries Management in Norway 
 
In general, marine resources in Norway are governed by the state through a consultative 
system. Laws are established on the political arena with the Norwegian parliament having 
the judiciary power needed in order to pass new laws for legislation. However, behind the 
processes in where a new is established, a long political process is carried out. In this 
process, the organisations of fishermen in Norway, notably the Association of Norwegian 
Fishermen, play an important role. 
 Also, most Norwegian political parties have fisheries committees that have input in 
the political processes that lie behind the parliamentary processes. It is also the case that 
the different regional subdivisions of the political parties that are located in fisheries 
dependent regions also participate in this process. Finally, new laws must go through a 
final phase of public hearings, and the different user - and regional groups that are affected 
by the new law is generally one of the hearing instances. The regulatory process is formed 
as a process where fishermen, with their main organisation The Association of Norwegian 
Fishermen, participate in the formation of new regulations. This is carried out through 
biannual meetings between the different user groups that the state considers having a stake 
in Norwegian fisheries. In this case, the participation of fishermen in the regulatory process 
is purely consultative. While one may argue that there is an element of authority nested in 
this role, it remains very limited as all final decisions are reached at the discretion of the 
Ministry of Fisheries. 
 In spite of having a relatively centralised management structure, a few institutions 
exists in where fishermen participate in both the formation and establishment of 
regulations and the execution of the regulations. These institutions are founded on the Salt 
Water Fisheries Act paragraph 33 and 36, and updated in regulations J-54-1994 and J-2-
1995 from the Director of Fisheries of the Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries. In this 
regulation, a system of control committees is established. These committees exist in a total 
of five counties and include 14 municipalities.1 Within the municipalities and areas defined 
in the regulation, the Directorate of Fisheries defines a fishing district in which the control 
committee have jurisdiction over all commercial harvest. In each district, the fishermen 
elects control officers within their own tool group, that is, those using gillnets choose their 
officers, those using hand line their officers, and so on. The amount of officers within each 
                                                 
1 In Finnmark county the included municipalities are Vardø and the area of Breivikfjorden, in Troms the 
municipalities of Tromsø, Lenvik, Berg and Torsken and the area of Svensgrunnen, in Nordland county the 
municipalities of Andøy, Øksnes, Bø, Træna and the Lofoten fishing area, in Nord-Trøndelag county the 
municipalities of Vikna, Fosnes, Namsos and Namdalseid and finally in Sør-Trøndelag county the 
municipalities of Åfjord, Roan, Osen, Bjugn and Frøya. 
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tool group amounts to one per tenth vessel, and the total group of officers elect two 
representatives who meet in a control committee. This committee elects one chair of the 
control committee. The chair has the right to divide his own district into several smaller 
districts, each with their own control committees. Elections are held as soon as the current 
control committee decides that a sufficient amount of fishermen are present, and the old 
committee is replaced with the new one as soon as elections are carried out. Fishermen 
cannot choose to not serve on this committee, unless they have served for a total of two 
years previously. There is no pay for serving as a control officer. 
 These committees are established in order to make sure that the fishery is run in an 
orderly fashion. The reason is that all these fisheries include different user group including 
those using long lines, nets and jigs. The committee has the legal mandate to temporarily 
exclude certain user group from the fishery, however, such decision must be confirmed 
from the Ministry of Fisheries who arrives at a final decision. The mandate of the control 
committee mostly concerns area regulations. In most cases, user groups are temporarily 
excluded from certain areas in order to avoid gear conflicts. In such cases, the regulation 
must be made published by public notices, and enters into force after 48 hours. In addition, 
the control committees must adapt to the different particularities that may occur in their 
district, and the institutional traditions that have developed for the different control 
committees may differ. The most well-known of the control committees is probably the 
Lofoten committee, which also has been the object of a debate concerning the use of 
supportive institutions in the management of a fishery. It is therefore of interest to examine 
this case more closely. 
 
2.2.4 The Case of the Lofoten Control Committee 
 
The Lofoten area consists of a several island located in a string going southwest from the 
mainland of Nordland county in Norway. The area is a significant tourist attraction, mainly 
due to the fantastic scenery. However, the area is most known for its abundance of cod 
during the winter season. During the winter season, Norwegian Arctic cod migrates from 
the Barents Sea towards the Norwegian mainland in order to spawn. Numerous spawning 
grounds are located throughout the coastline, however, the spawning grounds located in 
proximity to the Lofoten islands are the far most abundant ones. Due to the fact that this 
phenomenon has been well known for over 300 years, a longstanding tradition exists in 
Norwegian fisheries in which fishermen from all corners of the country travel to Lofoten in 
January to be a part in the hectic but very lucrative fishery of the area. Fishing grounds 
tends to be crowded, and fishing gears often become entangled. 
 In 2000, catches amounted to 18,939 tonnes gutted weight. This represented a slight 
reduction compared to 1999, when the gutted weight amounted to 19,918 tonnes. These 
catches are low as compared to 1997, when the gutted weight amounted to 37,728 tonnes. 
However, in 1952 the same weight was 115,964 tonnes. Catches have also been lower than 
currently, in 1988 only 11,533 tonnes was landed. Catches may vary considerably, often 
dependent on when the cod arrives and where it arrives. Normally, the cod arrives 
sometimes in the period from mid-January to mid-February, however, some years it has 
arrived in April. In cases of such late arrivals, most fishermen will be gone from the area 
and landings will consequently be reduced. The number of fishermen participating in the 
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fishery has decreased steadily during the past and current century. In the beginning of the 
1950s, over 20,000 fishermen participated in the fishery. The majority of these fishermen 
come from Nordland county (2,280 fishermen in 2000), while the counties of Sogn og 
Fjordane, Møre og Romsdal and Troms where represented by approximately 200 
fishermen each. During the 1980s less than 5,000 fishermen found their way to Lofoten, 
and since the introduction of the vessel-quota system in 1990, the yearly participation 
ranges between 3,500-4,000 fishermen. The catch per unit effort (CPUE) measured as the 
number of kilos landed per fisherman has ranged between 5,689 (2000) and 11,219 (1994). 
 It is in this setting that the Lofoten Control Committee is carrying out its tasks. The 
committee is appointed for two years at a time, but is chaired by a local officer from the 
Directorate of Fisheries. As is the general procedure with the control committees, each of 
the user groups gillnets, jigs, long line and Danish seine selects two representatives that 
meet in the control committee. However, the fishermen arriving to Lofoten do not appoint 
these. Instead, the Nordland division of The Association of Norwegian Fishermen appoints 
them. The Lofoten area is subdivided into four areas, each with its own control committee. 
Those appointed select one chair, which acts under the supervision of the officer from the 
Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries. The committees arrive at regulations for their own 
districts. These regulations only consist of tool specifications for the different user groups, 
and the amount of fishermen allowed into each area. They also regulate when the different 
tools may be set in the sea, and when it needs to be pulled. Thus, each control committee 
divides its own district into several smaller parcels, and regulates the tools and fishermen 
allowed into each parcel. Over the whole period of the Lofoten fishery, all user groups and 
user will be allowed into the best fishing parcels, but the committee is in change of 
regulating the access in an orderly fashion. In order to carry out its tasks, each of the 
committees has their own inspection vessels. In 2000, the control committees utilised five 
different vessels for control purposes. These vessels are used for moving the officers 
between the different parcels in its own district, where they control that the fishermen 
follow the area regulations. In 2000, a total of 33 violations were recorded, of which five 
resulted in charges. In short, the Lofoten control committee is a formal body that regulates 
access to the many different fishing grounds located in the Lofoten archipelago. The next 
question is whether this can be considered a fisheries management institution or a 
supportive institution. 
 
2.2.5 Much Ado About Nothing: Is this Fisheries Management? 
 
In 1989, Jentoft and Kristoffersen published and article called 'Fishermen's Co-
Management: The Case of the Lofoten Fishery', in which they argue that the Lofoten 
system represents an example of how an institution which is developed within the private 
sphere of the resource users may be used for resource management purposes. While they 
do not argue that the Lofoten system consisting of control committees is a resource 
management system, they argue that it may considered used for this purpose due to the fact 
that it has proved its value as a regulatory system. 
 Regulatory forms that seem good in theory often prove ineffective in practice 
because fishermen find ways to bypass them (...). In Lofoten it is noteworthy that 
violations are few in comparison to the number of fishermen. It may be that competition is 
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fierce at sea, but so is cooperation in making and following the rules. Contrary to the 
standard assumption in the Common Property theory, the Lofoten fishermen have been 
able to settle their differences. Indeed, no quota regulations have been enforced in the 
Lofoten fishery. However, conflicts over space can be quite as intense as conflicts over fish 
quotas. (...) In conclusion, we propose that fisheries co-management in general and as it 
has been demonstrated in the case of Lofoten, is superior to other management forms in the 
fishery in some respects. Regulations which the fishermen themselves consider illegitimate 
will be ineffective because they will tend to be resisted and bypassed by other fishermen. 
We argue that legitimacy is not just a result of the management decision itself, for instance 
its distributive effects, but also how it is reached. It also matters whether or not the 
decision making process is considered to be just and fair (Jentoft and Kristoffersen 1989, 
363-364). 
 The point made by Jentoft and Kristoffersen is that the Lofoten case shows that the 
participation of fishermen in the making of regulations will contribute to solve the control 
problem that most fisheries management systems must struggle. Because fishermen are 
allowed to impact the decision making processes behind new regulation, regulations 
become more legitimate, and the fishermen are more apt to comply with regulations. They 
also argue that the Lofoten case shows that while fishermen may compete at sea, they are 
also able to settle their differences when realising the mutual benefit of a collective 
agreement. In this respect, Jentoft and Kristoffersen conclude that fisheries co-management 
systems are superior to many other forms of fisheries management systems because it 
founded on a social basis that is consistent with the fishermen's concept of fairness and 
justice. This line of argumentation has been disputed among other Norwegian scientists 
interested in fisheries management systems. In an article from 2000, Holm, Hersoug and 
Rånes argue that the Lofoten system cannot be meaningfully labelled a fisheries 
management system. 
 
'We think that the co-management concept should be reserved for institutional 
arrangements that entail quite intensive user participation. Further, we believe that it 
is important to specify exactly what is managed within a co-management 
arrangement. In this way, co-management models specifically designed for the 
management and conservation of fishery resources should be explicitly labelled 
fishery resource co-management.' (Holm, Hersoug and Rånes 2000, 362) 
 
 The point made by Holm, Hersoug and Rånes is that the Lofoten system of control 
committees is not a resource management system, but a management system. Therefore, 
they argue, it was incorrect by Jentoft and Kristoffersen to infer that the system could be 
considered a direct alternative to conventional state based management systems. It can be 
questioned whether the interpretation put forward by Holm et al. is correct, because the 
article by Jentoft does not claim that the Lofoten control system is in fact a resource 
management system. As shown above, they argue that an important feature of the system, 
its democratic mechanisms, provides a solution to some of the problems of legitimacy that 
many fisheries management systems combat. Whether this is the case is an empirical 
question, and the number of violations of regulations that Jentoft and Kristoffersen utilise 
to give this argument weight does not appear valid. Records only show recorded violations, 
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but nobody knows how many violations that actually escape the attention of the 
controllers. Thus, the use of recorded violations does not prove anything vis-à-vis the rate 
of compliance to regulations in the fishery. 
 Holm, Hersoug and Rånes make the argument that the concept of fisheries co-
management is too all inclusive, as it does not contain the necessary conceptual room to 
pinpoint the subclass of management institutions that are actually designed with the 
intention to manage resources, that is resource management systems. Indeed, this appears 
as a valid argument because not all the institutions present in a fishery are constructed with 
the intention of managing a resource. Whether this critique represents a valid argument the 
article of Jentoft and Kristoffersen is another issue, but it does represent a valid argument 
against the liberal use of the concept co-management. In order to illustrate some of the 
difficulties of the use of the concept of co-management, a further analysis of the Lofoten 
control committees may be in order because none of the articles cited above do analyse 
what the ultimate intention with the control system is. 
 It remains clear in both articles that the system as such is designed in order to prevent 
and regulate crowding in the fishing spots. Because fishermen with different gear are 
allowed into different spots, and to some extent are allowed to rotate among these spots, 
one can manage gear conflicts in a predictable and efficient manner. However, the 
management of gear conflicts is not the goal of the institution. The decrease of gear 
conflicts it is a means for increased efficiency and profitability for the fishermen. Needless 
to say, the prospect of increased profitability is a tremendous incentive for the fishermen to 
participate in the regulatory system, not to say that it is the only viable option for the 
fishermen as a collective. If no system was in place, the outcome would be entangled gear, 
decreased catches and ultimately reduced or no profit. It is also the case that most users, 
once a system like this is in place, have few incentives to break the rules of the system. 
There are considerable risks involved in mixing gears, and the likely outcome for the 
fisherman violating the regulations would be loss of fishing gear. In sum, the optimal 
collective solution is apparently also the optimal individual solution. In addition to this 
issue, one may also ask why it is the case that one establishes a system based on private 
arrangements in a country where there is a tradition for centralised management. Part of 
the explanation is that the private incentive, both on the collective and individual level, to 
participate in both the creation and carrying out of the system is of such strength that it is 
rational for the state to leave the management to the users. In that fashion, the state saves 
the costs of establishing their own system, at the same time as the revenues of the state 
from the fishermen increases because the profit of the fishermen increases. Thus, the 
system of control committees constitutes a network of supportive institutions, not resource 
management institutions. 
 The issue of class struggle between Danish seiners and the rest: a fictious problem 
that has never existed in this fishery. 
 
2.2.6 Conclusion 
 
The debate concerning the relevance of the Lofoten case for the debate concerning 
fisheries management systems may be carried out at several levels, and it is important to 
keep these levels apart when relating this empirical case to a theoretical debate. Seemingly, 
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the article by Jentoft and Kristoffersen is relevant for the documentation of how private 
institutions may play an important role as supportive institutions in a fishery. The control 
committees can also represent a seed that can grow into a resource management institution, 
however, there are obstacles to such a transfer of authority. The system of incentives of an 
institution which is designed to take care of the interest of a third object, the resource, 
needs to have some distance to the interests of the users. While it is not necessarily the case 
that all resource users will become involved in behaviour of the type that will generate a 
tragedy of the commons process, the possibility that some resource users will put their own 
short term interest before the interests of the resource suffices to install some precautionary 
principles in the resource management scheme. This means that the resource management 
institution must be sufficiently solid to put regulations in effect that may be devastating to 
users. This scenario is different from the basis of the Lofoten control committees, which 
never put regulations that have such devastating consequences in effect. In case such 
decisions need to be made, they must be made by the ministry. Jentoft and Kristoffersen do 
not go into this issue, which is crucial for grasping the complexity of transfer of authority 
from one of the many supportive institutions of a fishery the resource management 
institutions of the same fishery. However, this does not mean that it is irrelevant to discuss 
the Lofoten case in this regard, because it shows how a functional and efficient 
institutional arrangement between users and the state may be organised. 
 In this regard, the critique presented by Holm, Hersoug and Rånes seem to be based 
on a misinterpretation of Jentoft and Kristoffersen. On the other hand, it is easy to agree 
with them that the concept of fisheries co-management is imprecise because it fails to 
differentiate between what has been called supportive institutions and resource 
management institutions. While they hold that the intensity of user involvement is the 
crucial variable for the labelling of the system, it appears more relevant to focus on the 
structure of incentives and intentions behind the evolvement of private institutions in 
fisheries. The Lofoten case shows intense user involvement, but none of the fishermen 
participate with the intention of preserving the resource. In fact, the opposite is the case, 
because this institutional arrangement does increase catches as compared to a laissez faire 
situation. 
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3. Spain 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The first part of this report is divided into two parts: 
a. concepts and terminology related to decentralisation and participation; 
b. the general political and administrative structure of fisheries management. 
 
 The aim of both parts is to set out the general framework which underpins the model 
of the decentralised State, as constituted in Spain from 1978, and from which the current 
political and administrative form of managing fisheries derives. 
 Concepts on decentralisation relevant to Spanish legislation found in the list drawn 
up by D. Rommel are analysed and accompanied by examples that can be found in Spanish 
casuistry. Furthermore, other terms are included which, while not having any direct legal 
or political correspondence within the Spanish framework, do have some equivalence with 
concepts that are gaining relevance in political literature, and which imply ways of 
advancement or progress in the fields of representation or participation. 
 In section 2, together with a description of the fisheries management political and 
administrative system, the mechanisms and institutions with decentralising functions are 
analysed and appraised, as are the relationships between them, and procedures for dialogue 
and co-ordination, as it is in this area that the main problems occur that the decentralising 
structures have to face within a unitary State. 
 
Abbreviations 
 
AA.CC.: Comunidades Autónomas: Autonomous Communities 
AI:  Aguas Interiores: Inland Waters 
CICEM:  Centro de Investigación y Cultivos de Especies Marinas: Centre for Marine 
Species Research and Farming 
DAP:  Empresa Pública de Desarrollo Agrario y Pesquero: Public Sector Company 
for Agricultural and Fisheries Development 
DGP:  Dirección General de Pesca y Acuicultura: General Directorate for Fisheries 
and Aquaculture 
EEZ:  Exclusive Economic Zone 
EPPA:  Empresa Pública de Puertos de Andalucía: Public Ports Authority 
EU:   European Union 
FEABP:  Federación Española de Armadores de Buques de Pesca: Spanish Fishing-
Vessel Owners' Association 
FIFG:  Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance 
FNCP:  Federación Nacional de Cofradías de Pescadores: National Federation of 
Fishermen's Guilds 
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FROM:  Fondo de Regulación y Organización del Mercado de los Productos de la 
Pesca y Cultivos Marinos: Fund for the Regulation and Organisation of the 
Fisheries and Fish-Farming Products Market 
IAM:  Instituto Andaluz de la Mujer: Andalusian Institute for the Advancement of 
Women 
IEO:   Instituto Español de Oceanografía: Spanish Oceanography Institute 
IFA:   Instituto de Fomento de Andalucía: Institute for Andalusian Economic 
Development  
ISM:  Instituto Social de la Marina: Marine Welfare Institute 
JACUMAR:  Junta Nacional Asesora de Cultivos Marinos: National Advisory Committee 
on Marine Cultures 
TS:   Territorial Sea 
UGT:  Unión General de Trabajadores: General Workers Trades Union 
 
 
3.2 Concepts and terminology related to decentralisation and participation 
 
3.2.1 Political and administrative framework 
 
The Spanish Constitution of 1978 is founded on the recognition of the right to autonomy of 
the nationalities and regions which comprise the nation and the solidarity among all of 
them. 
 The consequence of the right to exercise this right to political autonomy is that, 
territorially speaking, Spain is organised into seventeen Autonomous Communities, ten of 
which are coastal, with two of these being insular. Thus, a decentralised model was 
constituted that was radically different to that which had been in existence prior to 1978, 
which was based on a unitary and heavily centralised State. 
 The 'State of the Autonomies', as it is known, originally devised to satisfy the 
demands for autonomy of a few regions and 'historical' nationalities, has gradually grown. 
The regime spread to other regions whose citizens likewise wished to have their own 
administrative authorities, better placed to deal with their problems. Nevertheless, the 
building of the 'State of the Autonomies' has been a source of tensions and imbalances, 
with the proposals for institutional reform failing to gain the required consensus, as a result 
of which this process has not as yet been completed. 
 The Constitution forbids Autonomous States to create federations, although it does 
allow them to enter into agreements with one another, with the proviso that said 
agreements have been authorised by the central government. 
 Whereas the autonomous State responds to a process of decentralisation, the Federal 
State takes as its starting-point the prior existence of independent states. 
 In other respects, the structure of the Spanish State is defined by a combination of 
two types of legislation, the Constitution and the Statutes of Autonomy, and it is this, 
above all, that differentiates our State from the Federal State. 
 The Autonomous Community is a decentralised political unit of the State. The link 
that exists between the Constitution and the Statutes of Autonomy means it is impossible to 
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have knowledge of quite important aspects of the workings of the State without studying 
the Autonomous Communities as authorities of the former's political decentralisation. 
 The political units of the Federal State have a high degree of self-government.1 In 
effect, the constitution of a Federal State either completely disregards the form the 
constitutions of member-states take, or confines itself to the establishment of some very 
generalised principle in order to guarantee uniformity between federal political 
organisation and the territorial units of which it is comprised. But that is as far as a federal 
constitution goes. It neither states what the procedure for approving the constitution is to 
be, nor how a member-state should be organised. 
 The distribution of competencies follows the same model. The federal constitution 
concerns itself with defining which issues are to come within the powers of the Federation, 
with all those issues that are left unmentioned becoming the responsibility of the member-
states, who shall exercise their competencies in these fields in whichever way they see fit 
through their own constitutions. 
 In short, the federal constitution concerns itself with the Federation and not the 
member-states. There is no link at all between the federal constitution and the constitutions 
of member-states. 
 Conversely, this is not possible with the Spanish Constitution, which not only 
includes very precise rules on the creation of Autonomous Communities and the drafting 
of Statutes of Autonomy, but also contains relatively detailed laws regarding the internal 
political organisation of the Autonomous Communities and the issues over which they can 
assume competencies. 
 The Autonomous Communities, as State units of political decentralisation, are 
defined within the Constitution. All the essential elements for the definition of the 
Autonomous Community as a State territorial entity are defined within the Constitution, 
and not within the Statutes of Autonomy, which complement the Constitution. 
 It could be stated that the distribution of competencies is the very core of any 
politically decentralised State's judicial system. Although the Spanish Constitution leaves 
the demarcation of competencies between the State and the Autonomous Communities to 
the Statutes of Autonomy, it does give indications as to the basis on which this distribution 
of responsibilities should be structured (article 148-149). Which issues are in all cases the 
total, non-compatible and exclusive2 responsibility of the State must therefore be 
determined, as must those for which the Autonomous Communities can assume 
competency. 
 A case-in-point would be the way competencies for fisheries affairs are divided 
between the State and the Autonomous Communities: the competency for fisheries is 
structured in a centralised way (with the State having sole competency) and yet there is a 
process of decentralisation in fisheries management, as the competency for fisheries in 
inland waters corresponds to the Autonomous Communities.3
 One of the explanations for current fisheries structures in Spain is the way the State 
is politically and territorially organised into Autonomous Communities. 
 The Autonomous Communities do not have territorial competencies for the TS nor 
                                                 
1 In Conceptos Fundamentales de Ciencia Política, pub. Alianza Editorial, Madrid, 1988. 
2 Through interpretation of Art. 149 of the Spanish Constitution. 
3 Vid.: section 2.2. 
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the EEZ, and are only qualified to exercise certain specific responsibilities with respect to 
the marine environment.1 This therefore imposes an administrative limitation on the 
decentralisation of fisheries management. 
 Another limitation for Autonomous Communities in fisheries affairs is their inability 
to conduct foreign relations, as this is the sole capacity of the State.2
 Nevertheless, there are some means by which the Autonomous Communities may 
participate in the European Community in a consultative role, whether this be as delegated 
agents sent by the State Authorities to attend sectoral meetings on fisheries affairs, through 
the Offices for Regional Representation that can be found in Brussels, or as members of 
the Bodies for Regional and Municipal Representation that have been established in 
Europe. 
 
3.2.2 Concepts within the Spanish legislative framework relevant to decentralisation3
 
Democracy 
 
'A form of government in which people govern themselves or elect representatives to 
be governed by (quote Rommel, D.). 
 
Democracy is a political regime whose workings are governed by the relationships 
that exist between society, the political system and the State, in a given social 
formation and at a specific moment in history' (Touraine, 1995). 
 
 Said types of relationship constitute the structural background within which specific 
means of expressing this kind of representation are developed. 
 
'Direct Democracy 
 
Refers to government of the people by the people. It is when citizens act in public 
life or in the formulae of representative democracy without intermediaries, when a 
number of players intervene in the name of all their compatriots' (Encinar, J.J., 1986: 
47). 
 
 Over the last twenty years there has been an evident trend towards demanding the 
participation of individuals in public affairs through the debate about participatory 
democracy or direct democracy. The latest currents in social sciences highlight the 
importance of participation in social movements and in voluntary action networks as one 
of the elements that develop the capacity of individuals to assume self-government.4
 Spanish democracy is not direct, it is representative (through political parties, outside 
of which participation is almost impossible), and is formalised as such within the Spanish 
                                                 
1 Vid.: section 2.2. 
2 Vid.: section 2.2. 
3 According to the scheme devised by Dominique Rommel. 
4 Self-government means the freedom to govern through the absence of control Vid.: self-government. 
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Constitution, although both the referendum and popular initiative are accepted for the 
representation of Parliamentary Bills. 
 An example of direct democracy in Spain might be the Works Committees (favoured 
by Trades Unions1 during the nineteen-seventies) which have strong links with workplaces 
and whose main role is to watch over the production process. 
 
Autonomy or self-government 
 
 Self-government, independence, freedom through absence of control (Encinar, J.J., 
1986: 9). 
 
As far as Spain is concerned, the 1978 Constitution recognises the right of those adjoining 
provinces with common historical, cultural and economic features, of island territories, and 
of provinces with historical regional entity, to accede to autonomy. To exercise this right 
requires their being constituted as Autonomous Communities (also referred to as 
'Autonomies'). 
 In this way, an important decentralisation process has been carried through in which 
an attempt has been made to enable the coexistence of regional variety and the indissoluble 
unity of the Spanish nation. 
 The way the Autonomies are organised, and the competencies they have, are defined 
by the Constitution and their respective Statutes of Autonomy.2 Autonomous Community 
institutions are structured in the following way: a legislative Assembly, elected by 
universal suffrage, with a governmental Council and a Higher Court of Justice. The 
competencies that the Autonomies may assume in accordance with the Constitution and 
their Statutes of Autonomy can be either exclusive or shared with the State, and may 
consist of nothing more than enforcement within the regulations of basic State legislation, 
or even in legislation governing affairs that are within the bounds of their sole competency. 
 With regard to fisheries affairs, the Autonomous Communities (Andalusia included) 
hold sole competency as far as inland waters are concerned.3
 
'Subsidiarity 
 
Within the context of the European Union this means that central institutions (in this 
case, the European Union) should intervene only when the aims of intended actions 
cannot be sufficiently achieved by member States and, consequently, can be 
effectively achieved at Community level'. (Barrio, García, Gonzalo, A., 1998:117) 
 
 On the one hand, the principle of subsidiarity signifies the primacy of member-states 
as a rule or general supposition (as far as the exercising of concurrent competencies is 
                                                 
1 Direct democracy, through popular participation, has been advocated by socialist doctrines as part of the 
democratisation process, with the ensuing control of power by the grass-roots. 
2 The Statute of Autonomy is the basic institutional set of rules and regulations of each Autonomous 
Community within Spanish legislation. 
3 Vid.: Section 2.2. 
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concerned) and, on the other, a legitimate right for Community intervention, insofar as the 
suppositions that prescribe the above precept concur. 
 In other respects, this principle is generally aimed at guaranteeing a degree of 
independence to a lesser authority vis-à-vis a higher one, or to a local power with regard to 
a central one. It deals, therefore, with the way competencies are divided up between 
different levels of power, and is the principle upon which Federal State institutions are 
based. 
 When applied within the framework of the European Community, the principle of 
subsidiarity involves member States maintaining those competencies they, themselves, are 
able to most effectively manage, whilst the Community assumes those competencies that 
they cannot exercise in a satisfactory way. 
 Paragraph 2 of Article 5 of the EC. Treaty states that three conditions have to be 
fulfilled for the Community to take action in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity: 
- it cannot be applied to a sphere of competence that is exclusive to the Community; 
- the aims of the action in question cannot be sufficiently achieved by member-states; 
- as a consequence, the actions, due either to their magnitude or their effects, can be 
better implemented at a Community level. 
 
 The principle of subsidiarity obtains for all Community bodies. This rule takes on 
special importance with respect to the Council, the European Parliament and the 
Commission. 
 The application of the principle of subsidiarity involves a certain degree of difficulty 
due to the ambivalence and opaqueness of the term, and fisheries policy are not unaffected 
by this. This is due to the fact that the majority of the competencies are defined as 
exclusive, either by the European Community, or to the benefit of the member States; as a 
result, the implementation of this principle in fisheries affairs is complicated. 
 Nevertheless, there are certain sole responsibilities in fisheries affairs where an 
attempt is being made to apply subsidiarity, even though there are a great number of doubts 
about its use on account of the diverse interpretations that can be found in judicial practice. 
 An example of this controversial application of the principle of subsidiarity is the 
power over checks and controls. It is the Community that exclusively bears this power, but 
this does not stop member States exercising certain functions. 
 As far as Spain is concerned, these functions are limited to the sphere of meting out 
fines where, due to the close proximity of state sovereignty and the problem in question, 
both the legislation and its application remain in the hands of the Spanish State, although it 
might be understood that this proximity could lead to discrimination and inequalities in 
dealings due to national interests. The inability for this principle to operate could be rooted 
in the lack of material means and staff found in the Spanish State's check and control 
systems. 
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Decentralisation 
 
A process in which certain parts or sectors of governmental power, as well as the 
responsibility for its workings, are transferred from the central, national level, to 
municipal and/or state1/provincial levels (Baca Olamendi, L. et al., 2000: 180). 
 
 Traditionally-speaking, decentralisation is identified with the local community, but it 
is really a form of organisation that can be employed at all levels of government. 
 In the Anglo-Saxon world, the word decentralisation indicates a process of change or 
transformation that can take on connotations that may be political (devolution2) or 
administrative (deconcentration3) in nature, depending on the way the process evolves. 
 Decentralisation refers to the transfer of services, powers and responsibilities and 
resources, from the national level to the level of communities and regions, and involves the 
permanent assignation of duties to a variety of judicial bodies. The Fisheries Departments 
of the Spanish autonomies4 are a good example of decentralisation, inasmuch as they have 
had powers that stem from the central authorities permanently conferred upon them. 
 A similar example of decentralisation can be found at the European Union level 
regarding the FIFGs which finance Common Fisheries Policy ancillary measures and 
which are applicable in Spain. 
 A large degree of decentralisation in the management of Structural Funds can be 
inferred for the new 2000-2006 period from the rules and regulations governing these 
funds. This signifies a greater number of responsibilities for local and regional authorities 
and likewise involves a number of clear and standardised management regulations. 
Member-states no longer receive annual payments in advance for which they have to 
produce receipts several years later, but instead receive a first advance payment for each 
programme that is dependent on the Structural Funds. This is followed by part-financing 
after proof has been presented of specific applications for payment. 
 It is the Autonomous Communities' 5 obligation to implement and manage the Single 
Multi-region Programme which comes under the framework of the Structural Funds. 
 
Deconcentration 
 
A process of transfer in which the national government is present in local and 
regional units through its own administrative bodies (Baca Olamendi, L. et al., 2000: 
180). 
 
This term is similar to the concept of delegation, but involves tighter control by the higher 
authority. An example of deconcentration in Spain can be found in the so-called Coastal 
Demarcations, which are public bodies dependent on the central Authorities, in this case, to 
be specific, on the Ministry of the Environment. 
                                                 
1 In Federal States. 
2 Vid.: Devolution. 
3 Vid.: Deconcentration. 
4 Vid.: Autonomy. 
5 Vid.: Autonomy. 
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Delegation 
 
The temporary assignation of duties to a body that is lower in the hierarchy within 
the same legal entity (Encinar, J.J., 1989: 42). 
 
Delegation consists of transferring authority or limited responsibility for decision-taking in 
a given matter. For the term 'delegation' to be defined, a distinction must firstly be made 
with regard to the concept of decentralisation. In delegation, the transfer of authority is 
made temporarily, whereas in decentralisation this transfer is permanent. 
 In the case of Spain, an obvious example of delegation in fisheries affairs would be 
Fishermen's Guilds,1 where, amongst other things, they have been delegated the 
management of fishing within their corresponding spheres of action. 
 
Centralisation 
 
The assumption by public power of faculties attributed to local bodies (Dictionary of 
the Spanish Language). 
 
In the sphere of fisheries, the Common Fisheries Policy has involved a process of 
centralisation of fisheries management which was previously carried out by the State. 
 
Regionalisation 
 
The following have been the traditional fishing areas in Spain: the Bay of Biscay, the 
north-west, the South Atlantic, the South-Mediterranean, the East Coast, the north-east, the 
Balearics and the Canaries. Nevertheless, according to the Regional Socio-Economic Study 
on Employment and the Degree of Fisheries Dependence, the following are considered to 
be fishing regions in Spain: Andalusia (Atlantic coast), Andalusia (Mediterranean coast), 
Murcia, Valencia, Catalonia, the Balearic Islands, the Canary Islands, Extremadura, Ceuta 
and Melilla. 
 In current times, any reference to regionalisation in the sphere of Spanish fisheries 
involves the conferring of specific powers and obligations in fisheries affairs on the 
Autonomous Communities2 (Suárez de Vivero, J.L. and M. Frieyro de Lara). As such, 
fisheries regions in Spain would equate to the present-day Autonomous Communities. 
There is a second meaning of the regionalisation concept in the wider field of fisheries 
which has originated from within the European Community. In this other sense, 
Regionalisation involves a transformation of the current fisheries management system, 
with the establishment of specific fisheries regional management systems defined outside 
the national limits of member States. In short, regionalisation implies a greater degree of 
decentralisation of functions connected with the regulation of the fisheries sector. 
                                                 
1 Fishermen's Guilds are associations, drawn up in public law, with legal entity and the capacity to work 
towards the fulfilment of their ends, which act as consultative and collaborative bodies alongside the 
Administration in promoting the fisheries sector representing professionals in the fisheries sector, both 
employers and employees, without prejudice to other associations and bodies that represent the sector. 
2 Vid.: Autonomy. 
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Emerging concepts1
 
Apart from the above-defined concepts2, there are others that could be described as 
emerging and which, although still not legally recognised within the framework of Spanish 
legislation, do have correlation with existing political terms directed at greater participation 
and a degree of decentralisation, especially at a local level. 
 
The Transfer of Powers or Decentralisation with Political Connotations (Devolution) 
 
The transfer of power from a central government to a regional or local authority. 
This Includes the transfer of more power than is involved in decentralisation. In a 
State that transfers, the regional authorities are more autonomous (Collin, P., 88). 
 
This is a transfer of power where the powers transferred are not subject to any control by 
the institution which devolves the power. This term is not easily translated into Spanish. In 
principle, it refers to the political or administrative decentralisation of State structures, but 
is associated with new trends in management and administrative organisation, both in the 
private sector and in public bodies: deconcentration, delegation, making personnel 
accountable for an organisation, etc. In this regard, it is evident that it is linked with the 
idea of empowerment.3
 The use of this word could only be applied with difficulty to fishing policy within the 
framework of the Spanish nation where there are no examples in existence due to the term 
only having been defined in recent times. 
 
Involvement 
 
 A process of decision-taking that consists of a lesser type of participation (Rommel, 
Dominique). 
 
An example of this term applied to the sphere of fisheries management in Spain might be 
the participation of a number of environmental groups in fisheries committees.4
 
Contribution 
 
Contributing to a decision means making an participatory effort which may or may not 
have an impact on the decision. 
 
Empowerment 
 
Empowerment is the granting of power to the people, the learning of new roles, a 
change in values, attitudes and types of behaviour so as to make them more 
                                                 
1 Especially those that represent advances or progress in representation or participation. 
2 Vid.: Section 1.2. 
3 Vid.: Empowerment. 
4 Vid.: Fisheries Committee. 
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appropriate for the solution of personal and group needs; as far as the 
Administration is concerned, this consists of eliminating rigid dependencies in such a 
way as to take into account and appreciate the human being, with his experience and 
learning, as an organisation's greatest asset. Empowerment should be implemented 
at all levels as it requires from each and every one of the people who make up an 
organisation, the will and ability to assume responsibilities through technical 
knowledge and personal growth (Stein). 
 
Empowerment is a broader term than the traditional terms of delegation, decentralisation 
and participative management, as it involves the establishment of tasks and the knowledge 
of how the development of participation fits in with the aim and the action to be 
undertaken. 
 
Participation 
 
 This refers to the effort made by participants in decision-making processes (Rommel, 
Dominique). 
 
An example of how this term is applied to the sphere of fisheries management in Spain 
might be the participation of different agents, such as the scientific community, in the 
implementation of the Andalusian Fisheries Sector Modernisation Plan. 
 
Sharing Responsibilities 
 
 Refers to an equal relationship between participants (Rommel, D.). 
 
Partnership 
 
 This alludes to a structure within which participants are equal (Rommel, D.). 
 
Distribution of responsibilities or the drawing of the lines of joint-responsibility 
 
 This type of distribution involves giving without restriction or control (Rommel, D.). 
 
3.2.3 Discussion 
 
- Evolution towards a decentralised State in Spain has involved the creation of a new 
political model, the State of the Autonomies, and this model is not, as yet, totally 
accomplished. The present model demands a new way of envisaging political and 
administrative organisation which takes into account the pull in opposing directions 
exerted by territorial decentralisation on the one hand and, on the other, the building 
of the European supra-state. As such, the present model for fisheries management is 
not a finished article, but still allows room for extending the decentralising process; 
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- Amongst others, the following advantages that decentralised institutions offer in the 
sphere of fisheries in Spain should be highlighted:  
 1. they are much more flexible than centralised institutions, as a result of which they 
are able to respond much more quickly to changing circumstances; 
 2. they are more effective, given that they are in closer proximity to problems and 
have greater knowledge of them; 
 3. they foster participation, due to the fact that a greater number of interests in the 
sectors involved are represented; 
 4. municipalities are better catered for on a national scale than in a centralised State; 
- When mention is made of extending the decentralisation process, it should be clearly 
stated which political and administrative level, or levels, are to be earmarked for 
decentralisation: 
 a) decentralisation from the central authorities to the Autonomous Communities. 
 This is the type of decentralisation that has resulted in the new model of State 
organisation. The broadening or extending of this process is limited by the 
absorption of areas of responsibility by the State, such as fishing outside of 
inland waters, relations with the EU, and international relations. As far as 
relations with the EU are concerned, the creation of a regional fisheries 
consultative committee1 would guarantee the participation of regions (such as 
the Mediterranean) in debates on fisheries at a much earlier stage; 
 b) decentralisation from the Autonomous Communities to local authorities. 
 This aspect of decentralisation is new within the Spanish political and 
administrative system. Participation of the local level in fisheries management 
should be implemented in accordance with the kind of fishing concerned, 
bearing in mind that certain types of fishing involve more than just the local 
area. The question must also be considered whether developing local levels of 
management to a high degree might excessively fragment fisheries 
management in matters which undoubtedly are of a certain nation-wide nature; 
- The decentralisation process must find the point of balance between suitable 
participation at a regional level and, also, at local level, in order to reinforce the 
cohesion that the fishing sector must show in certain cases in order to be able to 
compete on an international scale; 
- To conclude, the fisheries management decentralisation process in Spain has a 
bearing on two areas, the relationship between the State and the Autonomous 
Communities, and the connection between the Autonomous Communities and local 
areas. In the first instance, decentralisation involves the continuation of a process that 
began with the establishment of the State of the Autonomies and the transfer of 
powers; in the second case, it involves the creation of a brand-new system, where 
local areas would take their place within the management system, making a direct 
contribution to affording the system greater responsibility and cohesion. 
                                                 
1 In the European Commission Green Paper on Fishing, Vol. 1, European Community, 2001: 37-38. 
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3.2.4 Examples of decentralisation 
 
These are different examples of decentralisation in Spain, among others: ISM1 and 
Fishermen's Guilds. 
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Figure 3.2 Fisheries organisations and institutions, structural organisation 
 
 
ISM 
 
The ISM is a State body with a peripheral structure, i.e.: it is decentralised, with provincial 
and local offices. 
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Figure 3.4 Fishermen's Guilds. National structure 
 
 
3.3 General political and administrative structure of fisheries management 
 
3.3.1 Areas of state authority 
 
The whole administrative framework has become more and more complex as new 
authorities and structures have emerged with responsibilities in the sphere of fishing that 
differ from those of the State; to be specific, in the first instance, autonomous authorities 
and, secondly, Europe. To this framework must be added corporate and private 
organisations which carry out specific functions that have a direct impact on fishing. In 
reality, the fact that this involves a sharing of responsibilities which were previously totally 
borne by the State, implicitly entails a risk of tasks overlapping and/or administrative 
bodies being duplicated. 
 The organisation of the Spanish State into Autonomous Communities has led to a 
high level of self-government by these, given that they have the capacity to pass their own 
legislation and to implement and apply basic State legislation. As far as fisheries are 
concerned, Article 149.1.19 of the 1978 Spanish Constitution attributes to the State sole 
competency for sea fisheries affairs1 in external waters2 (Territorial Seas and the Exclusive 
Economic Zone), without prejudice to waters for which the management of the sector is 
attributed to the Autonomous Communities. Moreover, the State is assigned the drafting of 
basic legislation for the management of the fisheries sector.3
                                                 
1 De facto extraction, including the regulation of features and conditions. 
2 According to Fisheries Law 3/2001, concerning State Sea Fisheries, external waters are those sea waters 
under Spanish jurisdiction or sovereignty which are situated outside straight base lines, as envisaged by Law 
20/1967, of 8th April, on maritime jurisdiction extending to twelve miles for the purpose of fisheries, and by 
Royal Decree 2510/1977, of 5th August, on jurisdictional waters and their delimiting straight base lines. 
3 Regarding the economic or production sector. 
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Figure 3.5 Exclusive State competencies 
 
 
SEA FISHING IN EXTERNAL WATERS (TS and EEZ) 
Resources: access to resources, the regulation of fisheries activity, the regulation of the fishing effort, 
catch limits, fishing gear, size or weight of species, closed seasons, fisheries protection zones and 
activities capable of altering fishing resources; Management of fisheries activities: fishing permits, 
temporary change of fishing activity, special fishing permits, specific censuses, fishing plans, fishing 
logbooks, landing statements; Recreational fishing in external waters; Monitoring and inspection; and 
International Relations. 
 
MANAGEMENT OF THE FISHERIES SECTOR 
Agents in the Sector: the management of professions within the sector, the accreditation of professional 
training and the registration of professionals in the sector; The fishing fleet: The registration of fishing 
vessels; building, modernisation and  rationalisation plans, fleet adaptation, calling a halt to sailing, 
mixed companies; Ports of operation and change of home port; Landing ports and first sales of fish 
products; Marketing and processing; Fisheries and Oceanographic Research; and Infringements and 
Sanctions 
 
Figure 3.6 State competencies 
 
 
3.3.2 Areas of autonomous community authority 
 
The coastal Autonomous Communities' Statutes of Autonomy1 expressly embrace the sole 
responsibility that they assume in fisheries affairs, that is, fishing in inland waters2, shell-
fishing (marisqueo)3, aquaculture4, and river and lake fishing, in accordance with article 
148 of the 1978 Spanish Constitution. The area to which the Andalusian Fisheries Law can 
be applied covers inland waters, territorial seas, and the Exclusive Economic Zone adjacent 
                                                 
1 Eight on the mainland (Galicia, Asturias, Cantabria, the Basque Country, Catalonia, Valencia, Murcia and 
Andalusia) and the two archipelagos: the Balearics and the Canaries. 
2 According to Law 1/2002, of 4 April, concerning the Management, Development  and Control of Sea 
Fishing, shell-fishing, and Marine Aquaculture (Andalusian Regional Government), sea fishing in inland 
waters is understood as that which is done in the waters that lie within the straight base lines as established 
by Royal Decree 2510/1977, of 5 August, as their outer limit, and, as their inner limit, the coast and, in the 
case of estuaries, the boundary that is established in accordance with the provisions of the First Extra Article. 
3 According to Law 1/2002, of 4 April, concerning the Management, Development  and Control of Sea 
Fishing, Shell-Fishing, and Marine Aquaculture, 'shell-fishing' (marisqueo) is understood as the undertaking 
of the activity that is the exclusive extraction with specially-selected and specific fishing gear of one or 
several species of molluscs, crustaceans, tunicates, echinoderms and other marine invertebrates. 
4 According to Law 1/2002, of 4 April, concerning the Management, Development  and Control of Sea 
Fishing, Shell-Fishing, and Marine Aquaculture, marine aquaculture is understood to be the group of 
activities directed at the controlled reproduction, pre-fattening and fattening of marine flora and fauna species 
in facilities with links to salt sea waters that can be exploited in a commercial or recreational way. 
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to the shore as far as shell-fishing and aquaculture, and the implementation and 
enforcement of basic State legislation on the marketing and management of the fisheries 
sector, are concerned. Furthermore, the clause 'without prejudice to' in article 149.1.19 of 
the Constitution also enables Autonomous Communities to assume responsibility for the 
implementation and application of basic legislation in the fisheries sector. At the same 
time, they have sole responsibility for internal trade, Fishermen's Guilds (within the 
framework of the Basic State Legislation that regulates Corporations governed by Public 
Law), and the regulation and administration of all ramifications of teaching and training. 
Finally, they have sole responsibility for research, although general co-ordination for this 
corresponds to the State. 
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Figure 3.7 Exclusive CC.AA. competencies 
 
 
Fishing in inland waters 
 
The Autonomous Communities' authority over fishing in inland waters, which derives 
from the far from legal criterion of the geographical contour of the coasts, allows them to 
adopt their own policy as regards the management and control of the fish resources found 
in the marine area between straight base lines and the coast. As regards fish that may be 
found in the fictitious division between the inland waters and the seas, it would be for the 
State and the Autonomous Communities to draw up agreements to standardise the regime 
for the legal protection of these species, and to contribute towards a better coexistence of 
legislation. 
 
Shell-fishing and aquaculture 
 
The Autonomous Community has sole legal authority over shell-fishing and aquaculture 
and this is only limited when there is State concurrence, which can happen under other 
epigraphs, as in the case of maritime and territorial public domain. In this case, the specific 
powers attributed to the Andalusian Department of Agriculture and Fisheries can be seen 
in the following table. 
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 Figure 3.8 Fishing in inland waters 
Functions transferred to the Autonomous Communities include: 
- authorisation to allow the undertaking of fishing activities; 
- regulation of different types of fishing, as well as of nets, instruments and gear to be used; 
- demarcation of fishing zones, determining of open seasons and minimum sizes; 
- establishment of norms to regulate inspection and sanctionsl; 
- regulation of recreational fisheries activities issued by State Authorities and other territorial bodies 
 (respecting Autonomous Community regulations); 
- the Official Registry of activities, means and people employed in fishing. 
  
- The granting of permits to undertake marine aquaculture. 
- The establishment of the technical conditions for fish-farming establishments. 
- The legalisation or prohibition of species to be farmed in Andalusia and farming systems in given 
 areas. 
- The inspection of aquaculture installations. 
- The regulation and authorisation of the submergence of species to be marine farmed. 
- The drafting and passing of Integrated Exploitation Plans for marine aquaculture in given geographical
 areas. 
Figure 3.9 Shell-fishing and aquaculture 
 
 
Basic legislation on management of the fisheries sector 
 
The implementation and enforcement of State Basic Legislation on the management of the 
fisheries sector corresponds to the Autonomous Communities. The ultimate aim of this 
function-sharing is the creation of a common and uniform area, which provides a certain 
equality amongst those Communities with a coastal shore, but which, at one and the same 
time, allows a certain amount of room for action. 
 
Concurrent State-Autonomous Community powers 
 
The very nature of sea fishing leads to a concurrence of powers between the State and the 
Autonomous Communities, as a result of which sole powers are not absolute but can be 
limited. 
 
Fisheries statistics 
 
With regard to fisheries statistics, the Spanish Autonomous Communities have a great 
degree of autonomy. On the basis of information that fisheries organisations provide them 
with, all coastal Communities can collate their own statistical data which they then pass on 
to the State1 and which the State, in turn, passes on to the European Commission. In 
Andalusia, the implementation of a new computerised tool (Id@pes.web) must be taken 
into consideration. Devised and implemented by the Public Corporation for Agricultural 
and Fisheries Development (DAP), it is aimed at administering data on fish production for 
all the Andalusian fresh fish markets, facilitating the processes of data reception and 
inputting data onto a large-scale database of fisheries statistics. However this computer 
                                                 
1 The State maintains the Operative Fishing Fleet Census but the data is provided by the regional authorities. 
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application seems to have had little effect on the fisheries sector as yet. Amongst the 
reasons for this might be the lack of interest in providing data shown sales data operators, 
given the fact that their interests and those of Brussels do not concur (which calls into 
question the reliability of fisheries statistics), the lack of coverage given to the tool, and/or 
the operators' lack of familiarity with present-day communications systems. 
 
3.3.3 State administration 
 
At present, sea fishing activity still lacks the necessary importance to have a whole 
Ministry to itself, sharing, as it does, the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food 
(MAPA) with other activities and economic sectors. As such, there is still no single 
administrative department that covers all fisheries affairs, although there is a specific 
majority administrative body called the General Secretariat for Sea Fisheries, which holds 
the rank of Under-Secretariat.1 As far as the name, General Secretariat for Sea Fisheries, is 
concerned, it might be appropriate to raise its status to that of State Secretariat, as this 
would help contribute to an increase in its importance within the Ministerial set-up and, 
consequently, lead to a greater importance afforded to the treatment of fisheries affairs. 
Furthermore, it would also serve to reactivate administrative action on fisheries, and 
likewise allow attendance at cabinet meetings and at Executive Committees of the 
Government, not to mention permitting the Minister to take part in sessions of the 
European Community Council of Fisheries Ministers and, more to the point, participate in 
the voting process. 
 There are also important functions related to fishing which are still carried out by the 
Ministries of Employment and Social Affairs, Science and Technology, of the 
Environment and Development, and the Ministry of Health and Consumer Affairs. 
 As far as the internal structure of State fisheries administration is concerned, the 
General Secretariat of Sea Fisheries undertakes the implementation of the Department's 
responsibilities concerning the planning and implementation of sea fishing policy, the 
management of the fisheries sector, aquaculture, the marketing of fish products in the area 
of responsibility pertaining to the General Administration of the State, as well as the 
drafting and application of legislation related to said issues, without prejudice to the 
responsibilities held by the Ministry of Health and Consumer Affairs in the area of hygiene 
and safety of fish products. It will, furthermore, carry out functions regarding fisheries 
agreements between the European Union and non- EU countries, as well as agreements 
deriving from Spain's membership of, or involvement in, international fishing 
organisations, international co-operation in fisheries affairs, and the planning of fisheries 
research policy, in co-ordination with the Ministry of Science and Technology. At the 
same time, it is also entrusted with determining the criteria for the establishment of Spain's 
posture vis-à-vis the European Union in the aforesaid matters. 
                                                 
1 Ranking: 1st. Ministry, 2nd. State Secretariat, and 3rd. Under-Secretariat. 
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Executive centres dependent upon the General Secretariat for Sea Fisheries1
 
a)  The General Directorate for Fisheries Resources2, whose main duties are the 
protection, conservation and sustainable exploitation of marine resources, the 
inspection and monitoring of extraction, the co-ordination of activities related to 
European Community fisheries policy, fisheries agreements with non-EC member 
countries, international fisheries and aquaculture organisations, in the area of the 
responsibilities that pertain to the General Administration of the State, without 
prejudice to the responsibilities that correspond to the General Secretariat for 
External Trade regarding European Community trade policy and international 
negotiations in the World Trade Organisation, and without prejudice to the 
responsibilities attributed to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 
b)  The General Directorate for Fisheries Markets and Structures3, which has 
responsibility for the management of the fisheries sector, more specifically, for 
general economic planning, the management of the Financial Instrument for 
Fisheries Guidance (FIFG) structural funds, the planning, renewal, restructuring and 
modernisation of the fishing fleet, the marketing of fisheries products in the area of 
the responsibilities pertaining to the General Administration of the State, professional 
organisations in the sector, and nautical and fisheries training. 
 
 An Autonomous body, 'The Fund for the Regulation and Organisation of the Fish 
Product and Marine Cultures Market' (FROM) is attached to the General Directorate for 
Markets and Structures, whose main functions are proposing promotional campaigns for 
the consumption of fish products, the drafting of planned regulations for granting national 
and European Community aid, and the undertaking of studies and reports on the economic 
plans for national fisheries production. 
 
The Spanish Oceanographic Institute (IEO) 
 
This autonomous body is attached to the Ministry of Science and Technology through the 
General Secretariat for Scientific Policy, and ranks as a Public Research Body. Sectoral 
and multidisciplinary in nature, it serves State scientific and technology policy in the field 
of oceanography and sea fishing. Amongst the IEO's functions are the drafting, co-
ordination, management and reporting on, of research programs of a multidisciplinary 
nature and, more especially, on living marine resources which are of interest to the Spanish 
fisheries sector. 
 
Social Institute for the Navy (ISM) 
 
The Social Institute for the Navy is dependent on the Ministry of Employment and Social 
Affairs, and is attached to the State Secretariat for Social Security. As far as the 
responsibilities that correspond to the Social Institute for the Navy are concerned, as the 
                                                 
1 Vid.: organisational chart. 
2 Vid.: organisational chart. 
3 Vid.: organisational chart. 
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body that manages the Special Welfare Scheme for Seafarers (REM), it is entrusted with 
the management, administration and recognition of the right to state benefit afforded under 
the REM. Apart from this, as the body responsible for social affairs in the maritime and 
fisheries sector, it is responsible for health care and checks (hospital ships) for seafarers at 
sea and their beneficiaries on national land, training, and the promotion of professionals' 
welfare, as well as the management of unemployment benefit and other actions related to 
the employment of seamen, through the Offices for Maritime Employment. 
 
3.3.4 The Autonomous Communities' administration 
 
The organic structure of the various Autonomous Communities is very similar to that of 
the State. If we take Andalusia as an example, fishing comes under the Department of 
Agriculture and Fisheries ('Consejería de Agricultura y Pesca')1 (the department which 
equates to a Ministry, but on a regional scale) with the rank of General Directorate of 
Fisheries, and it assumes the powers and responsibilities in the field of fisheries that have 
been transferred to the Andalusian Autonomous Community. In order to carry out these 
responsibilities it has a number of administrative entities and executive centres at its 
disposal (confer: organisational chart): 
a. The General Directorate for Fisheries and Agriculture2, whose main functions are: 
 - the search for and protection of Andalusian fish resources; 
 - the management, development, inspection and monitoring of fishing, fish-farming 
and shell-fishing activity; 
 - the planning and development of the Modernisation Plan for the Andalusian 
Fisheries Sector; 
 - the keeping of a census of Andalusian vessels; 
 - the regulation of fish marketing; 
 - to promote fisheries associations and, more especially, producer organisations;  
 - the co-ordination, evaluation, monitoring, management and  implementation of 
programs established by the European Union related to the functions described 
above. 
b. The General Directorate for Agricultural and Fisheries Research and Training3 is 
responsible for: 
 - the planning, monitoring and implementation of programs for agricultural, 
fisheries and fish-farming research that are conducted by the Department of 
Agriculture and Fisheries; 
 - all training in the field of fisheries and fish-farming for which the Department is 
responsible; 
                                                 
1 The Department of Agriculture and Fisheries is the department of the 'Junta de Andalucía' (Andalusian 
Autonomous Government) charged with the proposal and implementation of the Ministerial Council's 
general directives on agriculture, fisheries and food. 
2 To the end of carrying out its aforementioned duties, this executive centre has at its disposal three Services 
which deal with the Management of Fisheries Resources; the Management of Fish Markets; and Fisheries 
and Aquaculture Structures. 
3 This General Directorate relies on the Fisheries and Aquaculture Technology and Training Service to carry 
out its functions. 
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 - the conveyance of technological advances in fisheries production processes to the 
sector; 
 - national and international co-operation in the fields of research, training and the 
conveyance of technology. 
c. The Provincial Branch Offices of the Department of Agriculture and Fisheries, one 
of which can be found in each of Andalusia's coastal provinces, act as political and 
administrative representatives of the Department in their respective areas. 
 
3.3.5 Co-ordination and co-operation between the State and the Autonomous 
Communities 
 
Sectoral Conferences and agreements on collaboration 
 
Spain's joining of what is now the European Union affected the structure of powers and 
responsibilities as laid down by the Constitution and added to its complexity. It is 
reasonable for the Autonomous Communities to be interested in activity undertaken by the 
European Union, that is, in contributing to the forming and creation of European intent, 
inasmuch as the interests that they administer are at stake. The channelling of this 
Autonomous Community participation in EU affairs is done through the Sectoral 
Conferences. These are of legal rank1, being created by the State and made up of 
administrative officers from the State and the Autonomous Communities, in order to '... 
exchange points of view, examine together the problems the different sectors face, and the 
planned measures designed to deal with or solve them'. 
 What is certain is that, to date, these Sectoral Conferences have been unable to fulfil 
the Autonomous Communities' expectations, given that, as yet, one question that has still 
not been resolved is their inclusion in State representation on EU bodies. Neither has the 
role that the State is to play in the European Communities been defined. This is in part due 
to the non-permanent nature of the Sectoral Conferences. 
 Other types of participation that can be highlighted are the Collaboration 
Agreements, which can be signed by the Government of the Nation and the Autonomous 
Communities' Governmental departments in their respective areas of responsibility. 
 
Co-ordinating and Consultative Bodies: The National Fisheries Council and the Fisheries 
Sector Consultative Committee 
 
The way the fisheries policy has evolved and the dynamic nature of the sector, which have 
led to a permanent updating of both national and EU regulations, together with the 
importance of being aware of the opinion of the sector as a whole, have resulted in the 
need to create two Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food co-ordinating and 
consultative bodies to manage its affairs connected with its responsibilities in marine 
fisheries, the management of the fisheries sector, and aquaculture. 
 a) The National Fisheries Council, was created as a body to act as a direct link 
between the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and the Autonomous 
                                                 
1 Law 30/1992, of 26th November, regarding Public Administration, Authorities and Procedures.
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Communities in issues regulated by the Fisheries Law 3/2001 of 26th March, and is made 
up of the General Secretariat of Marine Fisheries (central authorities) and a representative 
from each of the Autonomous Communities responsible for the subject. The functions of 
the Council and the way it works will governed by a number of regulations, although no 
regulations have been drawn up to date (June 2002). 
 b) The Fisheries Sector Consultative Committee1, is a Ministry of Agriculture, 
Fisheries and Food consultative, deliberative and advisory body for issues related to its 
responsibility in the field of marine fisheries, the management of the sector, the 
management of fish product marketing, and research into fisheries and aquaculture. The 
Committee is to be presided over by the General Secretary of Marine Fisheries (central 
Authorities) and it is also made up of representatives from the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Fisheries and Food and from the most widely-established employers' and employees' 
organisations and associations in the fisheries sector. Representatives from then 
Autonomous Communities can also take part in Committee meetings when the nature of 
the affairs being dealt with warrants it. Similarly, well-known and prestigious experts can 
be called upon to take part in meetings when required. Said body is to work in Plenary 
Sessions and also in specialised Works Commissions with a view to affording its workings 
a certain degree of agility. 
 
 
- Chairman (General Secretary for Marine Fisheries). 
- Four members representing the General Secretariat for Marine Fisheries. 
- Four members representing national fisheries sector public law corporations. 
- Four members representing the national employers' sector.  
- Four members representing national fisheries sector Trades Union organisations.  
- Four members representing the national processing and marketing sector. 
- Two members representing the national aquaculture sector. 
- Two members to be freely designated by the Chairman and chosen from among professionals with 
recognised prestige. 
- One Secretary, who is to be the Deputy General Director for Support and Co-ordination of the General 
Secretariat for Marine Fisheries. 
Figure 3.10 Make Up of the Consultative Committee 
 
The National Advisory Body for Marine Cultures (JACUMAR) 
 
Another communications body between central State and Autonomous Communities 
authorities is the National Advisory Body for Marine Cultures (JACUMAR), which was 
created by Law 23/84. The main mission of this Body is to facilitate co-ordination and co-
operation between the public Administrations and the production sector in matters relating 
to aquaculture. The out-of-date Advisory Body for Marine Fisheries (JAPEMAR), which 
was created to facilitate collaborative and co-ordinating tasks between the State Authorities 
and the Autonomous Communities and included representatives from all the coastal 
Autonomous Communities, has become defunct, as have the local Fisheries Committees, 
and all their powers and responsibilities have now been taken over by the Fisheries 
Sectoral Conference. 
                                                 
1 State Order of 10 June 1998 for the creation of the Fisheries Sector Consultative Committee. 
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Provincial and Technical Committees 
 
These Committees are temporary and are usually made up of representatives from the 
Fishermen's Guilds, Ship-Owners' Associations, Producers' organisations, Trades Unions 
or employers' organisations, and fisheries experts. Committee members put their 
suggestions down in writing and these are then debated at a later date at the appropriate 
meetings. 
 
3.3.6 Co-ordination between Autonomous Communities 
 
There is no permanent co-ordinating body for the Autonomous Communities, although 
they meet sporadically to look at specific questions (always with the presence of the State 
authorities). The exception is for matters related to aquaculture (which is the sole 
responsibility of the Autonomous Communities) for which they have the National 
Advisory Body for Marine Cultures (JACUMAR) at their disposal, and which allows them 
to take part in the whole aid management process, and to be involved in the drafting and 
selection of sectoral plans, and to have control over subsidy payments. 
 
3.3.7 Phases in decision-taking and participating actors 
 
Phases in decision-taking 
 
Since Spain joined the present-day European Union in 1986, Spanish sovereignty in 
fisheries matters has, to a great degree, come to depend on the Common Fisheries Policy, 
and, as such, the central1 and autonomous2 governments have to comply with a number of 
obligations concerning the adoption of legislation. Generally-speaking, the bodies which 
have sole authority over determined aspects of fisheries are the ones charged with taking 
the corresponding decisions, although they are always required to report back to the 
European Commission, which will then analyse their proposals and inform them of any 
objections they have, which the government in question is compelled to accept. In the case 
of fisheries sector management responsibilities shared between the State and the 
Autonomous Communities, the State is responsible for basic legislation and the 
Autonomous Communities are responsible for its implementation and enforcement (under 
the supervision of the central Government).3 From this it becomes apparent that, to become 
effective, any decision on fishing has to wade through an administrative structure with so 
many levels, and that this is such a slow process, that, in the end, any measures taken are 
seen as something distant and alien by the actors in the Spanish fisheries sector. This could 
be overcome by allowing agents who represent the sector to participate in the current 
                                                 
1 The central Administration, as the main axis of fisheries management, is charged with adapting EU policy 
to the reality of Spanish circumstances, implementing  it and guaranteeing compliance with it. 
2 To date, regional authorities have not formed part of the EU decision-making process, and have only had 
responsibility for managing funds and the implementation of measures passed by the upper echelons of the 
administration. 
3 The various regional fisheries sectors are always dependent on directives laid down by the State 
Administration. 
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decision-taking process in a proper way, and through a greater rapprochement between 
them and the different levels of administration, in order for the necessary channels of 
communication to be established (despite the fact that, when a law or regulation is laid 
down, the authority responsible is compelled to raise an audience - organisations in the 
sector - although, in practical terms, the sector's opinions normally carry little weight). 
Political decisions are often based on recommendations made by scientists without the 
sector or any social, economic or political agent being involved. On top of this there is a 
serious lack of fisheries statistics for scientists to base themselves on. 
 Not only is the sector, to all intents and purposes, left out of the decision-making 
process, but the public Authorities are also reticent about allowing them to take part, 
perhaps because they feel that a greater involvement of the sector would threaten their 
status in the way responsibility, authority and power are distributed. The Public 
Administration, on both central and Autonomous Community levels, have lost political 
capacity in decision-making and have redirected their political potential towards the 
administration of measures and funds received from Brussels. We are not so much 
witnessing a process of real participation by fisheries organisations, as the strengthening of 
institutional relations between representative organisations and the Administration. 
 
Participating Actors 
 
The ever greater complexity of the associative fabric of the fisheries sector has led to new 
organisations, such as Trades Unions and producers' organisations (OPP) taking their 
places alongside the organisations that were part of the old structure, and which were based 
on professional and artisanal guilds; the fishermen's guilds and small boat-owners' 
associations. As a result of this, traditional organisations and new associations and forms 
of representation exist side-by-side to respond to trends in the sector and other factors such 
as the current make-up of the European Union, which is what shapes the new political 
frame-work which has to be complied with. In Spain, there is a distinct pre-eminence of 
the extractive sector and, consequently, this new form of understanding representation, 
which accommodates new interest groups, is considered to be contrary to their interests. 
 
The Processing Industry 
 
There are a high number of associations dealing with a variety of activities that are of great 
importance both within the sector and the Administrations. The services they offer are 
related to: internal and external trade, training, economic and financial services, labour 
relations, research into legal affairs, and documentation services. Amongst their main 
weaknesses, their low degree of participation in the management of the sector can be cited, 
as well as their weak relationship with the extractive sector. 
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Aquaculture 
 
There are no nation-wide organisations that bring together aquaculture producers.1 Their 
main weaknesses are: the lack of a marketing policy, the small size of aquaculture 
workings, and the small degree both of the use of new technologies and of product 
diversification. 
 
 
Fisheries Organisation Functions  
Fishermen Guilds a): Public rights corporations. 
They are consultative bodies for the preparation, 
application and drafting of regulations which affect 
matters of general fisheries interest. They are also 
collaborative bodies for actions or reforms for the 
development and improvement of the extractive 
fishing industry. b) 
 
Functions: 
- Marketing. 
- Welfare. 
- Technical, economic and legal advice. 
- Training. 
- Mediation between fisheries guild members and 
authorities. 
- Statistical information. 
- Sea areas. 
Ship-owners' Associations c): Are associations with 
legal entity made up of businessmen in the sector 
(both individual owners and fisheries companies 
with a different legal basis).  
Functions: 
- Marketing. 
- Technical and legal advice. 
- Statistical information. 
- Ports and harbour services. 
Producers' Organisations (OPP d)): 
Officially-recognised bodies created on the initiative 
of producers with a view to guaranteeing the 
rational practice of fishing and an improvement in 
terms of sales of their produce.  
Functions: 
- Marketing. 
- Distribution. 
- Ports and harbour services. 
- Technical and legal advice. 
- Statistical information. 
Trades Unions e): Representative bodies for the 
purpose of voicing workers' interests in the sector, 
and collaborating in the taking of decisions which 
might affect their interests.  
Functions: 
- Information on labour affairs. 
- Transformation of traditional fisheries structures. 
- Collective bargaining. 
- Defence and improvement of labour conditions. 
- Social affairs. 
Figure 3.11 Extractive fisheries organisations and functions 
a) There is a National Federation of Fishermen's Guilds (FNCP) which Fishermen's Guilds and their 
Federations can join (Fisheries Law 3/2001, of 26th March). The ability of the FNCP to act as a pressure 
group or to have any influence on decision taking on an EU-scale is virtually non-existent, except for 
whatever might be achieved through the Administration; b) From the Trades Unions' point-of-view, it is 
contradictory that the Guilds should jointly include both employers and employees; c) One of the main 
organisations within the extraction sector is the Spanish Fishing Vessel Owners' Federation (FEABP); d) 
These types of organisations are being promoted more and more over Fishermen's Guilds, given that their 
activity is not limited to resource extraction, but also aims to benefit consumers. One of the main challenges 
currently facing the Spanish Authorities is, without doubt, finding suitable ways of reconciling the 
development of OPPs with the existence of Fishermen's Guilds, which have a great tradition in the country; 
Despite the fact that the Trades Unions try to defend and improve seamen's work conditions, there is only a 
low level of affiliation. 
                                                 
1 Vid.: Section 5.3. 
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Environmental Organisations 
 
There are no environmental associations specifically linked to the fisheries sector. To date, 
environmental groups have directed their actions at fisheries activities through global 
associations such as Greenpeace and ADENA (an independent NGO in the public interest). 
Moreover, associations of this type are not traditional in Spain, and to this must be added 
their lack of political, institutional and economic weight, and a lack of support, bordering 
on rejection, from the extractive sector. 
 
Other Organisations 
- Banks: their activity is restricted to the processing of aid determined by the 
Administrations but there are no banks created strictly to deal with fisheries affairs; 
- Consumers: there are no specific consumer associations involved in the fisheries 
sector. Consumers act through large associations within which matters related to fish 
products only receive an insignificant amount of attention; 
- Wholesalers and Retailers: neither are there any nation-wide fisheries sector retailer1 
or wholesaler2 associations; 
- Ancillary Industries (nets and fishing gear): these are not organised into associations 
and their dependence on the fisheries sector is of an indirect nature, as they are 
suppliers of products which have greater links with the naval sector. 
 
Appraisal of the strategic capacity of extractive fishing organisations 
Fisheries sector organisations in Spain are characterised by their great variety and by being 
wide-spread, which affects their strategic capacity for influencing the design of fisheries 
policy both on a national and regional scale. 
 
 
3.4 Conclusions 
 
Any possible evolution towards a model that further decentralises fisheries management 
administrative structures and leads to a greater development of the fisheries sector structure 
for participating in the management of the sector must, inevitably, have as its basis the 
present structures and the possibilities the legal framework offers. Although not yet 
completed, the reform of the legal framework, which is controlled by the Constitution and 
the Statutes of Autonomy within a system that has already seen a certain amount of change 
since 1978, does offer a small margin for further development in all directions. On the 
other hand, however, the participatory system has stronger links with the political culture 
of both the administrative superstructure and the political organs (parties), and, especially, 
 
                                                 
1 There are associations in some provinces only, but the size of these and their organisational abilities can be 
seen to be weak. 
2 There is 'MERCASA' (a nation-wide association which draws together all the great fresh-produce markets, 
or 'MERCAS') which, nevertheless, includes the food industry. 
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 Strengths Weaknesses Opportunities Threats 
FNCP - Brings together all the 
professionals in semi-
industrial and 
traditional fishing. 
- Represents all the 
organisations with long 
traditions and social 
bearing in the sector. 
- Is the Federation that 
groups together the 
highest number of 
organisations. 
- Does not have many 
Central Government 
powers. 
- The organisation does 
not have a pyramid-like 
structure. 
- Represents a nume-rous 
group of people but has 
no economic power. 
- Low level of tech-
nology. 
- The Central 
Government relies 
on their opinion on 
subjects affecting the 
extractive sector. 
- Representatives on 
European manage- 
ment committees. 
- Does not obtain trade-
related aid from the 
EU. 
FEABP - Pressure group with the 
single aim of obtaining 
fishing licences, 
especially in non-EU 
countries' fishing 
grounds. 
- The FEABP is directly 
related with 
restructuring and 
modernisation 
measures for the 
Spanish fleet. 
- Has representation on 
international com-
mittees. 
- Does not have many 
resources. 
- Has lost a large number 
of vessels in the past 
few years. 
- Is not representative of 
areas outside the 
Northern Regions of 
Spain. 
 
- To improve man-
agement skills in 
small and medium-
size companies. 
- Greater participa-
tion in negotiating 
fisheries agreements 
with non-EU 
countries. 
- To achieve a larger 
grouping of ship-
owners' associations. 
- Restructuring of the 
fishing fleet. 
OPPs - Receive all EU aid 
directed at market 
activities. 
- Have a number of 
functions also catered 
for by Guilds. 
- To become a 'PO' it is 
necessary to have 
achieved a minimum 
number of catches. 
- These organisations are 
used to obtain all the 
aid possible envisaged 
by the EU. 
- To eliminate sales 
stocks in order to  
progressively take 
charge of the sale of 
members' produce. 
- Do not have sufficient 
influence to carry out 
functions for which 
they were created. 
UGT - Plays a very important 
social role in those 
Fishermen's Guilds 
where workers 
sometimes lack 
protection due to the 
presence of ship-
owners in the same 
organisations. 
- Does not participate in 
the management of 
Fishermen's Guilds' 
social funds. 
- The existence of a 
share basis income to 
pay sea workers. 
- There is no unity of 
action and workers are 
unable to press for any 
demands.  
- The UGT plays a 
distinct social role 
defending workers' 
interests. 
- In some Guilds, 
some committee 
members are UGT 
representatives, a 
situation which is 
helping Trades 
Unions to gain 
access to the sector. 
- The level of affiliation 
is very low in the 
fisheries sector due to 
ship-owners having a 
negative attitude 
towards a Trades 
Union presence in 
Fishermen's Guilds. 
- Share payments 
system. 
Figure 3.12 Swot analysis 
FNCP: Federación Nacional de Cofradías de Pescadores: National Federation of Fishermen's Guilds. 
FEABP: Federación Española de Armadores de Buques de Pesca: Spanish Fishing-Vessel Owners' Federation. 
OPP: Organización de Productores Pesqueros: Fish Producers' Organisation. 
UGT: Unión General de Trabajadores: General Workers Trades Union. 
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of civil society.1 As such, there is a much greater margin for developing and perfecting 
means and systems of participation, and, in a society that is still lacking in political 
development, this is one of the ways of promoting what is reflected in both the public and 
the private spheres. 
 
 
3.5 The Consortium for Fisheries Management and the marketing of the Striped-
venus clam in the Gulf of Cadiz 
 
3.5.1 Justification 
 
This case - study revolves around the so - called 'Striped Venus Consortium', which is an 
example of one of the few initiatives that fosters the participation and co-responsibility of a 
given fishermen's collective through administrative formulae that allow for self-regulatory 
mechanisms. Although it is not a model system and it is still very much in its infancy, it 
does nevertheless allow the trends in management systems and the directions these are 
taking to be observed, as well as illustrating what possibilities and limitations there are, as 
can be seen in the following. 
 
3.5.2 Definition 
 
The Consortium is an officially recognised permanent consultative body made up of 
Fishermen's Guilds and Boat-Owners' Associations from five towns on the Gulf of Cadiz 
(Ayamonte, Isla Cristina, Lepe, Punta Umbría and Sanlúcar de Barrameda) for instigating 
self-control measures and improving the marketing of the striped-venus clam in the area. 
The Consortium is made up of approximately 120 vessels and 360 crewmen. The 
Consortium comprises the following bodies: General Committee2, Permanent Commission, 
Chairman and Secretary. Each of these has been assigned specific duties. 
 
3.5.3 Background 
 
The dredging sector3 is the most controversial and the one where the greatest number of 
problems arise on the whole fisheries scene. This can be explained in the main-part by the 
existence of a quota which, although a positive and necessary self-regulatory measure if 
the fishing grounds are to be conserved, is still a bone of contention amongst fishermen on 
a daily basis (both at sea and on the quay) as not everybody observes the total permitted 
catch amount (150 kilograms/day). The fact that hydraulic-dredging vessels and traditional 
                                                 
1 Understood as the public sphere outside the direct control of the government apparatus, such as the markets 
or voluntary associations (Molina, I. et al., 1998: 122). 
2 With ten members, who are the chairmen of the fishing-vessel owners' associations and the major skippers 
in the fishermen's guilds in the Consortium  (vid.: section on 'Internal Structure'). 
3 Traditional towed dredging is understood to be a system of shell fishing that employs a semi-circular iron 
frame with a flat base, also called the plate, or rake, through which spikes or teeth of adjustable length are 
pushed. Tied to the frame is the cod or bunt, which is a bag-like net with a mesh of a certain size. A mesh 
size of not less than 21 mm allows shells smaller than the regulated size to pass through the net. 
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dredging vessels fish side-by-side, and that everyone also has to observe the same time-
table for fishing, also generates problems. 
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Figure 3.13 Geographical localisation 
 
 
 There are also problems between fishermen arising out of off-market sales of the 
striped-venus clam; an unofficial parallel market has sprung up that is not subject to any 
checks or controls.1
 The origins of the Striped-Venus Consortium2 can be traced back to the unregulated 
introduction of the hydraulic dredger3 in the port of Punta Umbría (province of Huelva). 
As the regional (autonomous community) authorities was aware of how badly the use of 
this type of fishing gear had affected the fishing sector in Italy due to its great 
                                                 
1 In this respect, the Consortium insists on the need for much tighter surveillance by the autonomous 
authorities' fisheries patrol service in collaboration with the Nature Protection and Inspection Service 
(SEPRONA). 
2 Venus gallina. 
3 Hydraulic dredging is understood to be the system of shell fishing that employs a metal frame positioned at 
the bows of the vessel. The frame or dredge is pulled along by the prow at the same time that it is being 
pulled in the opposite direction by a winch which is hauling in a cable tied to an anchor that had been 
previously paid out over the stern, and which marks the fixed point for fisheries manoeuvres. 
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effectiveness, this led to a provisional ban being placed on the use of this type of gear in 
the Gulf of Cadiz. 
 This decision by the autonomous authorities was nevertheless appealed against by 
the fisheries sector, as the use of the hydraulic dredger means better-quality products are 
obtained and there is an increase in the cost-effectiveness of fishing vessels. When the 
authorities recognised that the hydraulic dredger did represent a qualitative change in 
fisheries trends, the only alternative left for authorising its use was to apply tight controls. 
But the regional authorities do not possess the necessary infrastructure to undertake the 
thorough monitoring required, whereby the only solution is support from the sector itself 
through its self-regulation and direct participation in the management of this type of 
fishing. From this, a joint idea emerged between the fisheries sector and the authorities for 
creating a body representing fishermen to work in strict collaboration with the authorities. 
This initiative therefore came simultaneously from the fisheries sector and the authorities, 
and must be seen as a convergence of interests of both parties as, on the one side, the sector 
wanted the hydraulic dredger to be authorised on account of the greater profits its use 
brings, and, on the other, the authorities, which also agree with giving the introduction of 
this type of fishing-gear the go-ahead, have taken advantage of the sector's predisposition, 
to obtain its co-operation and involvement. 
 Apart from this, in general terms there was a basic need to regulate the marketing of 
the striped-venus in order to stave off strong competition in the South Atlantic Andalusian 
fresh-fish markets1 coming from, above all, Italian products. 
 A collateral effect of the Consortium, and one which is perhaps one of its greatest 
achievements in such an individualistic society as that of seamen, has been a greater 
cohesion between the Fishermen's Guilds and the Boat-Owners' Associations, given that 
representatives from the various ports who are on this consultative committee, all sit down 
around the same table to look at and discuss striped-venus- related issues and to make a 
unified proposal to the Authorities. A new framework has been opened up by the creation 
of the Consortium since it is a body through which all the related problems can be 
channelled, thus facilitating the decision-taking process and constituting a platform for 
carrying certain policies through. In the same way, the degree of acceptance of the 
regulations and the extent to which they are adhered to both increase, due to the fact that 
the fisheries sector has taken part in their drafting. 
 
3.5.4 Legal framework 
 
From a legal and administrative point-of-view, this is very basic legislation as it is dictated 
by the regional head of the Fisheries Department. These are not laws passed by the 
regional Parliament. 
                                                 
1 Prices are currently improving as the offer has been reduced. There is now only minimal competition from 
the Italian striped-venus, which is of a much poorer quality than that found in the fishing grounds in the Gulf 
of Cadiz. 
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- Agriculture and Fisheries Department Order of 24 June 1996, concerning the provisional regulation of 
striped-venus fishing with hydraulic dredgers in the Gulf of Cadiz. 
- The signing of an Agreement between then Fishermen's Guilds and the Boat-Owners' Associations 
representing the Shell-Fishing sector in the Gulf of Cadiz with the ultimate aim of bringing the creation 
of the Consortium about in order to encourage self-control measures and to improve the marketing of 
the striped-venus. 
- On 3rd September the General Fisheries and Aquaculture Directorate passed the Statutes regulating the 
way the Consortium works, and this is conferred the name of the Consortium for the Management and 
Marketing of the Striped-Venus in the Gulf of Cadiz, with the Statutes being undersigned by all 
members. 
- The Consortium members draw up a Plan of Action in collaboration with Agriculture and Fisheries 
Department staff in which self-control measures are proposed along with improved conditions for the 
sale of produce. 
- This Plan is passed at a general meeting of the Consortium and ratified by the regional government's 
General Fisheries Directorate. 
- Elaboración de la normativa, tomando como referencia dicho Plan, para regular dicha actividad (Orden 
25 de marzo de 1999, por la que se regula la pesca de la chirla en el Golfo de Cádiz). 
 
Figure 3.14 Administrative Procedure for the Creation of the Consortium 
 
 
3.5.5 Consortium objectives and duties 
 
- Collaborating with the Authorities in issues related to extractive shell-fishing activity 
(facilitating the monitoring of the fisheries system and product sorting, the monthly 
remittance of catch reports to the Authorities, undertaking research studies, and 
drafting proposals and ensuring they are complied with). 
- Undertaking self-control in striped-venus fishing grounds in order to guarantee 
compliance with legislation in force with regard to structures, resources and 
marketing (minimum size, closed seasons, fishing in off-limit areas and/or reserves, 
days and times fishing is allowed, quotas, the landing of catches in authorised ports, 
registries and labelling, control of port registry documents and schedules for sales at 
fresh-fish markets. 
- The proposal of specific norms to the Agriculture and Fisheries Department which 
differentiate striped-venus marketing and improve its terms of sale. 
- Fostering support measures for Hydraulic Dredger Co-operatives with regard to their 
own marketing aims, as well as for other co-operatives that might be created amongst 
shell-fishing vessel owners in order to improve the marketing conditions of their 
produce. 
- The Consortium's duties are more corrective than preventative. There is a scant 
forward-looking approach that diminishes its possibilities. 
 
 On the basis of interviews that have been conducted, it can be stated that the 
regulations are properly complied with in 80% of cases in all their facets (resource 
management and conservation, structures and marketing), whereas the remaining 20% are 
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associated with illegal vessels that observe neither quotas nor minimum sizes1 and which, 
furthermore, are those that conduct sales outside the fresh-fish markets. 
 One of the aspects over which the Consortium has a greater decision-taking capacity 
is the establishing of quotas. This is a factor which, without doubt, constitutes one of the 
body's biggest steps forward (along with a heightening of the sector's awareness as far as 
protecting fishing grounds is concerned). In this regard, it must be remembered that in 
accordance with the Order of 25 March 1999, concerning the regulation of striped-venus 
fishing in the Gulf of Cadiz, an upper-limit of 300 kg per day and ship was established. On 
the initiative of the Consortium, this amount has been reduced to 250 kg in the first 
instance, and subsequently to 150 kg. This measure was deemed an appropriate measure to 
counteract the excess fishing effort brought about by an increase in the number of permits 
for this type of fishing-gear in recent years. The Consortium also usually agrees on selling 
times at fresh fish markets. 
 As far as research studies on the state of the striped-venus are concerned, these are 
carried out by biologists working for the authorities, and the results are conveyed to the 
Consortium so they can be used at a later date (as an example, the authorities have banned 
striped-venus fishing in some areas due to a high concentrations of toxins). 
 
3.5.6 Internal structure 
 
An equal number of representatives from Fishermen's Guilds and Boat-Owner 
Associations is duly observed in the make-up of the Consortium's bodies. Nearly all 
members attend meetings, and each has a vote. 
 
 
General Meeting 
Permanent Commission  
Chairman 
Secretary 
Fishermen 
(360) 
Boat-Owners 
(120) 
Fishermen's Guilds ( 5) 
 
Boat-Owners' Associations  
 (4 )
( ) Number 
Bodies 
Authorities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.15 Internal structure 
                                                 
1 The minimum size for striped-venuses caught in the Gulf of Cadiz has been set at 24 mm for traditional 
towed dredging vessels and 26 mm for hydraulic dredger vessels, when measured along the front-to-back 
axis, and any specimen that is undersize must be immediately thrown back after being sorted through a sieve. 
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 In general terms, the duties allotted to each post are carried out. Posts last for two 
years and are unpaid. 
 One of the biggest disadvantages is that almost all the representatives hold their posts 
because they are, first and foremost, the most important skippers within the Fishermen's 
Guilds, or the Chairmen of the Boat-Owners' Associations, and as such they do not 
necessarily have anything to do with striped-venus fishing, which means their role as 
representatives is less effective. Neither has the striped-venus fisheries collective been 
given the chance to propose and/or elect the people on the Consortium (who are designated 
by the authorities). Although there can be seen to be a good relationship between the 
authorities and the Consortium representatives, the same cannot be said about the 
relationship between the latter and the seamen, at least as far as the port of Punta Umbría 
(province of Huelva) is concerned. The fishermen's collective there states that it is only 
consulted about something when the decision has already been taken by the Consortium 
General Committee and the authorities. Knowledge of the Consortium is greater amongst 
ground-roots seamen in the other ports, Isla Cristina (province of Huelva) and Sanlúcar de 
Barrameda (province of Cadiz), and they have closer relationships with their 
representatives and consider the Consortium to be a positive body offering good support to 
the striped-venus sector. 
 Nevertheless, it would be important for both the Consortium and the authorities to be 
able to have the use of a legal advisor so that all their proposals might fall within the 
bounds of the law. 
 As far as the consultative procedure and attendance at Consortium meetings are 
concerned, it must be stated that there is no ad hoc consultative body apart from the 
Consortium itself. The participation of shell-fishing vessel co-operatives for the marketing 
of their produce is allowed for, but no co-operatives of this type have as yet been created. 
Consequently, despite what is laid out in the regulations, the attendance of these co-
operatives' chairmen at the permanent Commission meeting or the Committee meeting is 
an impossibility. 
 
Consortium bodies 
 
Decision-taking 
The Consortium's articles permit its members greater autonomy for making proposals, but 
less when it comes to making decisions, given that the Authorities have the last word. 
Nevertheless, the mere fact that there is a Consortium means that initiatives can be directly 
and openly channelled for defects in striped-venus clam fishing to be corrected. 
 Depending on the port they originate from, the fishermen do have a say in this type 
of participation and/or involvement (although not as great a say as they should have), 
whereas some representatives (the chairmen and major skippers from their fisheries 
organisations) call meetings1 so they can have the chance to put forward their interests and 
opinions on issues related to the striped-venus. Depending on the circumstances, the 
 
                                                 
1 The representatives convene the fishermen through letters or notices placed on notice boards at fresh-fish 
markets. 
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Make-Up 
10 members (5 designated by the Fishermen's Guilds and another 5 designated by the Boat-Owners' 
Associations) 
Duties 
- To establish the directives for the objectives commended to the Consortium to be achieved. 
- To designate the members of the Permanent Commission, the Chairman and the Deputy Chairman. 
- To issue any reports requested by the regional Autonomous Authorities.  
- To pass annual action and management programmes. 
- To hear and resolve any issues that the Consortium bodies might put before it. 
- To obtain from the Consortium bodies any information about the Consortium it might think fitting.  
Figure 3.16a Consortium bodies: General Committee 
 
 
Make-Up 
6 members (The Chairman, the Deputy Chairman and four members designated by the General Committee 
from amongst its members, two designated by the Boat-Owners' Associations and another two by the 
Fishermen's Guilds) 
Duties 
- To direct and undertake the appropriate activities in order to achieve the aims of the Consortium and to ca
- To propose to the General Committee annual action and management plans and to co-ordinate them. 
Figure 3.16b Consortium bodies: Permanent Commission  
 
 
Observations concerning the Post 
- The Chairman is designated by the General Committee on an annual basis. 
- The Deputy Chairman is the Chairman's replacement, and is named in the same way. 
- When the post of Chairman falls on a member from the Boat-Owners' Associations, the post of Deputy 
Chairman is held by a member of the Fishermen's Guilds, and vice-versa. 
Duties 
- To preside over any Consortium body meetings  
- To convey to the Public Authorities all agreements, reports and proposals adopted by the bodies of the 
Consortium. 
- To designate the Secretary.  
- To supervise the Acts 
Figure 3.16c Consortium bodies: Chairman 
 
 
Observations concerning the Post 
- The secretary is chosen by the Chairman from amongst the Secretaries of the Boat-Owners' Associations 
and the Fishermen's Guilds that make up the Consortium, for the period of his mandate. 
Duties 
- To provide the Consortium with technical advice. 
- To attend meetings of all the bodies and to write up the corresponding Acts and to issue certifications of 
any agreements reached. 
- To keep Consortium documents and Acts in his care. 
- To notify the Chairman of any requests for convening the Consortium bodies.  
- To give notice of the Consortium bodies' acts and agreements.  
Figure 3.16d Consortium bodies: Secretary 
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initiative for holding a given meeting has on occasions sprung from the group of 
fishermen, who gather informally to give voice to their feelings about some specific 
problem or other. The results of these participatory sessions are passed on by the 
fishermen's associations' representatives to the Consortium General Committee (vid. 
section on 'Internal Structure'). 
 
3.5.7 The Consortium-authorities relationship 
 
Tutelage by the authorities. Reporting back 
 
In general terms, communication between the Consortium and the Authorities could be 
said to be fluent, there being both formal and informal relations between the two. The type 
of tutelage that the Authorities exercise over the Consortium is based on the convening of 
meetings at which its presence is required and/or in the monitoring of the sessions that the 
Consortium itself organises from time to time. It also supervises the fisheries statistics 
(regarding catches, species, size, etc.) that the fisheries organisations within the 
Consortium are required to submit to the General Fisheries and Aquaculture Directorate on 
a monthly basis. There is no doubt that the authorities are regularly informed of all the 
issues that are touched on in the General Meetings, but it cannot be said that the sector 
reports to the authorities in the strict sense of the word as it is autonomous. Moreover, it 
does not receive any money from the authorities' exchequer, it has no executive power, and 
neither can it impose sanctions. What is more, the fisheries associations within the 
Consortium go as far as to point to the lack of funding from the authorities as one of the 
reasons why said consultative body does not work as well as it might, as whether it works 
at all depends on the good intentions of the people who represent it.1 Although it is a fact 
that the Consortium is not funded by the authorities, one answer to the problem could be 
the fishermen's associations which are in it, putting aside for it a certain percentage of the 
money that they receive from the authorities for carrying out said consultative body's 
duties. The management of its own financial resources could contribute to an increase in 
the levels of responsibility and commitment to striped-venus regulations in the fisheries 
sector. 
 If the Consortium were financed by the authorities, its representatives' interests might 
grow, but there is no doubt that there would be a change in the Consortium's philosophy, 
inasmuch as the authorities would then play a more active role in supervision and 
budgetary control. 
 
Subjects for consultation 
 
The subjects that consultations are made about are diverse, but they are nearly all related to 
resources (quotas, sailing times, etc.) and/or fisheries structures (applications to replace 
traditional dredgers with hydraulic ones, for example). 
 The only proposals related to marketing that the Consortium has put forward thus far 
are connected with an improvement in the infrastructure at the fresh-fish markets, 
                                                 
1 These demands are part and parcel of the fishing sector's ways as its prime motive seems to be the gaining 
of subsidies. 
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specifically with the installing of a sieve and packing machine for sorting clams (this 
would facilitate the checking of minimum sizes and standardise labelling and packing, 
which would provide added value).1
 
Check mechanisms and sanctions 
 
There  are check and sanction mechanisms but these  are under the sole control of the 
Autonomous Authority bodies that have responsibility in the matter. All the Consortium’s 
demands to have the capacity to impose sanctions have been turned down by the 
authorities thus far. In practice, self-surveillance by the Consortium would not work due to 
all the family ties involved. 
 
3.5.8 Appraisal 
 
It is the Consortium members' opinion that their proposals are taken into account and this 
can be seen in the way the authorities proceed. It has to be said that some of the proposals 
are rejected by the authorities because, objectively-speaking, they are unfeasible, either 
because they could have a negative effect on other types of fishing, or because they are 
incoherent. From the authorities' point-of-view, the Consortium is an important support 
body but it has still not reached expected levels of effectiveness (this opinion is also shared 
by Consortium representatives). For example, the Consortium has not put forward any 
proposals aimed at an improvement in marketing. Neither has a Producers' Organisation 
officially been set up, and it is not expected that this will happen in the near future. This 
can be explained by the fact that most fisheries' associations in the Consortium are only 
licensed dealers on the fresh-fish markets, and as such receive a fixed percentage for the 
sale of their produce. The setting up of a Producers' Organisation would mean the loss of 
this income. It can therefore be seen that Consortium representatives' personal interests 
usually take precedence over the fishermen's well-being. In spite of the fact that the 
extraction sector is aware that its involvement in the marketing of the product would bring 
it in greater profits, in practice this is rather complicated, as there is the person of the 
middleman or buyer (an agent with no connections with fisheries activity), who has a 
monopoly on the market, to take into account. The buyer even goes so far as to become a 
moneylender to the fishermen, whereby there is a strong inter-dependency between them 
that aborts any possible solution to this question. On top of this, it has to be said that the 
extraction sector has little or no business acumen, and neither does the Consortium itself, 
as it is made up of the chairmen of the boat-owners' associations and the major skippers 
from the fishermen's guilds. One piece of unfinished business as far as the Consortium is 
concerned is, without doubt, an improvement in marketing. 
 Even though there are lots of gaps, and there is still a long road to go down before a 
high degree of effectiveness can be achieved, the fact that a Consortium has been created 
specifically to improve striped-venus fishing and marketing in itself represents a 
qualitative change in trends for this type of fishing. Although the Consortium is more 
ambitious in theory than in practice, it is a wager on greater cohesion and participation of 
the fisheries sector in the decision-taking process regarding the striped-venus clam. What 
                                                 
1 The introduction of new machinery of this type has been granted by the regional Autonomous Government. 
 84
is even more important is the fact that the authorities value the sector and show 
consideration for its opinions. 
 In conclusion, when compared with management models and terms that are being 
coined in scientific fisheries literature, the Consortium is a hybrid. It responds to the 
consultative type of management because there are mechanisms for consultation in place 
between the authorities and the fishermen, with the sector's more or less implied 
involvement, even though final decisions are taken by the authorities. At the same time, a 
kind of advisory type of management could also be alluded to, as the Consortium advises 
the authorities on decisions it should take or endorse. In this respect, the fisheries sector 
makes an effort to participate in decision-taking, whether or not it has an impact on that 
decision (Contribution). Nevertheless, it is common knowledge that the Consortium has a 
role to play in decisions on the striped-venus, and so the professional seaman's experience 
is appreciated and shown due consideration, a circumstance which to a certain extent 
brings him nearer to 'Empowerment'. 
 In short, the Consortium marks a watershed, and represents a glimpse of greater local 
participation in the decision-taking process. And even though delegation of power can still 
not be talked about, nor decentralisation in its strict sense, nevertheless the Consortium is, 
to a certain extent, responsible for compliance with the self-regulatory measures that have 
been established, and for the duties it has been assigned being worked towards (Sharing 
Responsibilities). It has been proved that proximity to the sector's problems contributes to 
an increase in managerial efficiency. 
 
3.5.9 Swot Analysis 
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Figure 3.17 Swot analysis 
a) Actions and omissions contrary to that which is set out in the Order will lead to the imposition of sanctions 
by the competent bodies of the regional autonomous government in accordance with the articles of Law 
14/1998 of 1 June (Official State Gazette No.131 of 2 June 1998), concerning the establishment of a scheme 
for monitoring protection of fisheries resources and any other concurrent legislation. 
 
 
3.5.10 Geographical and statistical data 
 
a) Ayamonte: 
- the municipality of Ayamonte is located in the western coast of Andalusia, on the 
Guadiana river mouth (Portugal border); 
- 16,000 inhabitants; 
- high fishing and transforming tradition; 
- fishing fleet: 75 vessels (10 corresponds to hydraulic dredger gear); 
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- TRB: 1.573; 
- regarding the level of dependence on fishing activity, Ayamonte occupies the fourth 
place in the Andalusian ranking. 
 
b) Isla Cristina: 
- the municipality of Isla Cristina is located in Andalusian western coast, in the 
province of Huelva, more especifically on the Carreras river; 
- 18,000 inhabitants; 
- fishing fleet: 195 vessels (45 corresponds to hydraulic dredger gear); 
- regarding the level of dependence on fishing activity, Isla Cristina occupies the 
second place in the Andalusian ranking. 
 
c) El Terrón: 
- El Terrón fishing port is located in the municipality of Lepe (Huelva) on the Piedras 
river mouth; 
- 18,000 inhabitants; 
- fishing fleet: 92 vessels (15 corresponds to hydraulic dredger gear); 
- the level of dependence on fishing fleet is low. 
 
d) Punta Umbría: 
- the municipality of Punta umbría is located on the Odiel river mouth; 
- 11,170 inhabitants; 
- fishing fleet: 113 vessels (50 corresponds to hydraulic dredger gear); 
- regarding the level of dependence on fishing activity, Punta Umbría occupies the 
third place in the Andalusian ranking. 
 
e) Sanlucar de Barrameda (Bonanza): 
- inner fishing port, located on the left side of Guadalquivir river, next to Doñana 
National Park; 
- 60,604 inhabitants; 
- fishing fleet: 161 vessels (15 corresponds to hydraulic dredger gear); 
- level of dependence on fishing activity: medium. 
 
 
3.6 Barbate; Participation processes in a fishing locality in crisis 
 
3.6.1 Introduction 
 
Barbate is located 64 kilometres (40 miles) from Cadiz, the provincial capital. The 
municipality covers an area of 142 km2 (55 mls2), and is 10 metres (33 ft:) above sea-level. 
It is flanked by the municipalities of Conil de la Frontera, Vejer de la Frontera and Tarifa. 
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Figure 3.18 Fishing grounds of Barbate fishing fleet 
 
 
The town of Barbate has been chosen to illustrate the mechanics of the Spanish 
fisheries decentralisation process. The fact that the Barbate fishing fleet is one of those 
affected by the break-down of fisheries agreements with Morocco means that the town can 
be included in the expansion of the fisheries management decentralisation process, and has 
become a laboratory for experiments into new forms of sector participation in this process. 
These forms of participation favour the widening of responsibilities to include the local 
level and the putting of local-area proposals into effect as one means of finding a solution 
to a critical situation. 
 
3.6.2 Delegation-decentralisation up to the break-down of the fisheries agreement with 
Morocco (1980-1999) 
 
There were two prime decentralisation development processes in fisheries management 
during this period: 
- on the one hand, the process favoured by the authorities, which employed official 
participation instruments, on which all the organisations and agents in the sector are 
represented, to direct the fisheries management policy towards the implementation of 
localised fisheries plans, having realised what the consequences would be for local 
communities if the international law of the seas were applied. The participation of 
fisheries sector organisations as consultative agencies was to be included in the 
design process of these plans, although they were not to take part in any decision-
taking. This shows that during this period decentralisation was still incomplete, as 
said organisations had not been included as co-participants in the implementation of 
the plans; 
- on the other hand, the process put forward by Barbate fisheries organisations 
supported the greater involvement of local agents in decision-taking, i.e. a move 
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from the role of consultants to one where they carry out co-determination duties. 
This process manifested itself in the great number of proposals that sector 
organisations made to the authorities in almost all areas of fisheries management and 
resource protection and also for an improvement in fisheries structures and greater 
transparency in the marketing process. 
 
 
Organism Instrument 
Sectoral Fisheries Conference  
Central Authorities  
National Fisheries Committee 
Morocco Agreement Work Group  
Regional Authorities  
Regional Fisheries Committee 
Provincial Authorities  Provincial Fisheries Committee 
Local Authorities  Local Fisheries Council 
Platform for the Fisheries Agreement with Morocco  
Organisations in the Sector 
Local Fisheries Committee 
Figure 3.19 Fisheries Management Instruments in Barbate 
Source: Compiled by author from Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and Andalusian Regional 
Government data, and press. 
 
 
The role of the Authorities 
 
During this period, the authorities made an effort to include local organisations in the 
fisheries affairs policy design process, either through their representation in established and 
official instruments (Figure 3.19), or through their consultation on specific aspects for 
planning design: 
- the central authorities made use of official participation instruments and even created 
participation platforms, such as the National Fisheries Committee, at certain times. In 
this regard, mention must be made of the criticism that came from the sector, which 
called for the optimum qualitative and quantitative use of these platforms, given that 
they were not convened often enough, and that they constituted, as far as the 
authorities were concerned, merely an example of political instrumentalisation (the 
fact that different political sides held sway in different authorities distorted the ends 
of these instruments, turning them into knocking-shops where all sides vented their 
frustrations at each other); 
- the Andalusian regional authorities (the autonomous regional government of the 
Junta de Andalucía) made use of a variety of platforms on which the sector had 
representation (figure 3.19) and to this the proposals put forward by the Morocco 
Agreement Work Group bear witness. The requirements laid down by the authorities 
for the organisations in the sector to take part in discussions on planning policies that 
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affected them were also complied with (figure 3.20). As it did with the central 
authorities, the sector also criticised the way the regional government acted, as none 
of the proposals it put forward it were accepted. 
 
 
Organism Plan 
Regional Authorities  
(Junta de Andalucía) 
Plan for the regulation of the Cadiz fishing grounds. 
Plan for the modernisation of the Andalusian fisheries sector. 
Figure 3.20 Fisheries Plans in Barbate 
Source: Compiled by author from Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, Andalusian Regional 
Government, and Barbate town council data. 
 
 
The role of organisations in the sector 
 
The eagerness of organisations in the sector to broaden their role in the decision-taking 
process in recent decades has manifested itself in the great number of proposals that they 
have put forward to both the regional and central authorities. The context these proposals 
are made in swings back and forth between critical and stable periods, and, depending on 
the moment in time, they can either be seen to be conflict-solving strategies (during critical 
periods) or proposals connected with the sector's normal participation practice regarding 
policies that affect its activities. 
 In this regard, the prediction that the fisheries agreement with Morocco would break 
down had the effect of acting as a catalyst or a reagent for expressions within the sector, as 
a result of which it proposed initiatives with hindsight. Such was the case of the creation of 
the Platform for the Defence of the Agreement with Morocco. 
 
 
3.6.3 Delegation-decentralisation after the fisheries agreement with Morocco had come 
to an end (2001-2002) 
 
As a result of the ending of the fisheries agreement with Morocco on 1999, the fisheries 
policy decentralisation process has grown over the past year. The need to comply with a 
solution that the critical climate in Barbate would favour has driven this process towards 
greater decentralisation, as it has been recognised as one of the possible alternatives. This 
could be seen in the way the State tried to justify itself by seeking legitimacy at the lowest 
levels of political representation, ie: at a local level (after its apparent lack of effectiveness 
as one of the parties involved in the negotiating process) and, in the case of organisations 
in the sector, it has become a demand through which they can channel their attempts to 
broaden their role in decision-taking. 
 
The role of the Authorities 
 
During this short period, the automatism developed by the authorities in earlier encounters 
has continued by perseverance with officially established participation bodies, although 
critical events considerably increased the number of times they were convened. The fact 
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that there were concurrent Fisheries Committees at all levels of administration (national, 
regional, provincial and local) bears witness to this. 
- with regard to the central authorities, although both the increase in aid to compensate 
for the Barbate fishing fleet being tied up in port1 and the convening of the National 
Fisheries Committee after the break-down of the fisheries agreement were a speedy 
response, these facts disguised the need for the urgent inclusion of fisheries 
organisations in the sector in the decision-taking process. This can be seen through 
the current ineffectiveness of swift solutions proposed on the committee, which 
ranged from the search for alternative fishing grounds, to support for a stronger role 
for mixed-economy companies, where the sectors involved would play a more active 
management role (if the organisations in the sector had been co-determiners, other 
kinds of alternatives would have been introduced that were better adapted to the 
sector and which, on some occasions, would have gained time and a greater say in 
problem-solving); 
- on the other hand, and in a greater bid for decentralisation, the central and municipal 
authorities have signed a joint agreement for implementing a town development plan 
(which includes lines of action that had previously been agreed upon with fisheries 
organisations in the sector in Barbate); at the same time, the central authorities have 
also secured the direct involvement of the extraction sector in the marketing and 
sales process which involves a broadening of its responsibilities; 
- on the regional authorities level, an effort can be seen to move fisheries management 
closer to the local level, both by maintaining already existing bodies (the Morocco 
Agreement Work Group continued to meet even after negotiations had failed), and 
through the creation of others which were, in some cases, even based in the towns 
themselves (Offices for processing aid applications for the fisheries fleet affected by 
the break-down of the fisheries agreement with Morocco). This corresponds to a 
process of deconcentration by the authorities; 
- as far as planning is concerned, the Andalusian regional government is currently 
appraising a Ports and Harbours Plan drafted by the organisations in the sector. This 
affects the extension of the decentralisation process by the management body in 
question. 
 
The role of organisations in the sector 
 
As has previously been pointed out, the Barbate fisheries organisations' demands for a 
greater role in management are triggered during this critical period of time. In some cases, 
greater participation is achieved, as proposals ranging from planning to marketing are 
accepted by certain authorities. 
 Nevertheless, the end of the road to decentralisation is far from having been reached; 
no heed has been paid to organisations' demands for resolving certain aspects that have a 
direct effect on the way they conduct their activity and, even more seriously, on resource 
                                                 
1 The province is the administrative unit immediately superior to the municipality (which are the smallest 
cells of territorial division in the Spanish State). A region may include a number of provinces. In our case, the 
municipality of Barbate comes under the province of Cadiz which, along with seven other provinces, makes 
up the region, or Autonomous Community, of Andalusia. 
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breeding. This has been demonstrated by the authorities rejection of the control of illegal 
fishing and of a greater transparency in the marketing and sales process, and even by the 
central authorities' refusal to grant aid to ancillary firms that depend on fishing and that 
have also been affected by the terms of the fisheries agreement (a fact which has, 
nonetheless, been recognised by regional authorities). 
 It would be wrong to state that the Barbate fisheries organisations only start making 
demands during critical periods of time. On the contrary, the fact that they are more 
apparent during such periods is due to their being able to gain the acceptance of the 
authorities more swiftly by using this channel of action (as the authorities use critical 
periods as a crutch for their legitimacy). This fact will become more evident in the 
following, in which actions and initiatives, both on the part of the authorities and 
organisations in the sector, are set out. 
 
3.6.4 Mobilisation by the Authorities and organisations in the sector 
 
The degree of decentralisation experienced in fisheries management from the nineteen-
eighties to the present day can be deduced from the wide array of initiatives that have 
sprung from all the actors involved in the Barbate fisheries sector. The study of the way 
these initiatives have developed from their beginning to their final achievement throws 
light on the mechanisms that are emerging to help in advancing the decentralisation 
process. The following chart can be used for clarification. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MECHANISM 
CONTENT
MECHANISM
CHANNEL
CONTEXT 
RECEIVER ACTOR 
 
ACTOR:   
Barbate Fishermen's Guild 
Andalusian Association of Fishermen's Guilds 
Producer's Organisation 
Barbate Boat-Owners' Association 
Andalusian Boat-Owners' Association 
Local Government:  Mayor 
Local Political Party Groups: PSOE, IU, PP, et 
cetera 
Brussels Trade Unions: CCOO, UGT 
Andalusian Autonomous Regional Government 
Barbate Regional Office of Andalusian Regional 
Government 
Barbate Branch Office of Regional Office of 
Andalusian  Regional Government  
MECHANISMS: Institutional New types of 
collaboration                     
CHANNEL: Following autarkical hierarchy 
CONTEXT: Before agreement with Morocco 
 After non-agreement with Morocco  
Reform of CFP 
RECEIVER: Private Companies    
Brussels 
Central Government 
Andalusian Local Government 
Local Town Council                       
Figure 3.21 Model for the Study of Initiatives 
Source: Formulated by H. D. Lasswell and compiled by author. 
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Consultative Committee  Bodies in political 
structure Sectoral Conferences  
Fisheries Committees 
 
Institutional 
Mechanisms  
Less official bodies Work Groups 
Intermediation 
Contribution 
Partnership 
 
Non-Institutional 
Mechanisms 
Co-determination 
Figure 3.22 Mechanisms for collaboration - participation between actors 
Source: Compiled by author 
 
 
 The specification of the channels used to pursue the new initiatives, whether they be 
those established by law or autarkical in nature, will shed light on the recourse to the use of 
new formulas for participation or collaboration by all the actors involved. This will 
indicate the extent to which the use of new, emerging, formulas is a positive move, that is, 
whether they have any effect on the decentralisation process for fisheries management. 
 To pursue said initiatives the actors have made use of both institutional and non-
institutional mechanisms (see figure 3.19), the latter on account of the lack of co-operation 
between the authorities and the organisations in the sector. 
 
Initiatives pursued by the Authorities 
 
The majority of the initiatives described correspond to the use of mechanisms that 
previously existed under Spanish law, i.e. mechanisms described as institutional.  An 
example of this can be seen in the process prior to the drafting of the Plan for the 
Modernisation of the Andalusian Fisheries Sector (1994), where by means of the use of 
consultative mechanisms (works groups, fisheries committees), both the fisheries 
organisations involved and the scientific community were able to take part in the planning 
stage.  
 
 
Establishment of minimum sizes Measures for Managing Fisheries 
Resources 
 Plan for the Future of Fishing 
Plan for Economic Diversification (2002) 
Port and Harbour Plan (2002) 
 
Infrastructure Measures  
Tourism Reclassification Plan (2002) 
Plan for Renewal of Fleet (1999) Fishery Structure Measures 
Plan for the Modernisation of the Andalusian Fishing Sector 
(1994) 
Request for Aid for Ancillary Fishing Industries  
Social and Employment Measures Request for Aid for the sector affected by the Failure of the 
Agreement with Morocco 
Figure 3.23 Initiatives by the Authorities 
Source: Compiled by author. 
 92
 It could be said that the use of these collaboration mechanisms has constituted an 
advance in the decentralisation process in the direction of contribution, i.e.: the appearance 
of new types of participation where the authorities pay heed to the local actors involved.  
 Nevertheless, the authorities have also used non-institutional mechanisms to solve 
specific fisheries management problems. This occurrence was mainly due to the fact that 
the existing collaboration organisms did not work. In this regard, the local authorities 
turned to partnership (figure 3.24) when the crisis occurred in the fisheries agreement 
negotiation process with Morocco. A direct request was made to the Andalusian artesanal 
fishing fleet to accept the Moroccan offer, which was to allow one hundred vessels to fish 
in the Moroccan Atlantic for a period of one year with no financial considerations in 
return. 
 
 
Works 
Commit-
tees 
 
Request for acceptance 
of offer made by 
Morocco 
Partnership
Fisheries agreement 
negotiations with Morocco 
Central 
Government  
Town Council 
and Boat-
Owners 
New types of 
collaboration  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.24 Example of partnership (co-ordination of public and private agents) 
 
 
 In the same way, when the market was lost due to the Barbate fisheries fleet being 
tied up in port during the negotiations, and the failure of existing institutional mechanisms 
had been established, the local authorities played a brokerage role (figure 3.25) in order to 
obtain measures for the management of fisheries markets. 
 
 
CONTACTS WITH 
MARKETING AND 
SALES COMPANIES 
New types of 
collaboration 
Works 
Com-
mittees 
Brokerage 
Loss of market for fish 
products 
   Boat- 
Owners 
Town Council 
and Boat-
Owners 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.25 Example of intermediation 
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 The Andalusian Regional Government has also opened an Office in Barbate to deal 
with applications for aid to the fishing fleet affected by the agreement with Morocco. This 
would seem to be a deconcentration process as far as the authorities are concerned, as the 
management of aid is being put into local hands. 
 In conclusion, it could be said that in Barbate the authorities are making serious 
efforts to include fisheries organisations in decision-making processes and, to be more 
precise, that the local government has actively taken this line. 
 The way to decentralisation has been opened up by the authorities through new types 
of collaboration which are defined as follows: Participation, Contribution, Brokerage and 
Partnership. Nonetheless, until the organisations stop being included in fisheries 
management on an unequal basis with the authorities, sharing responsibility is still a far 
way off.  
 
Fisheries organisation initiatives in Barbate 
 
On account of the unfavourable climate which was brought about by the various renewals 
of the fisheries agreement with Morocco (1983, 1988 and 1992, 1995), the Barbate 
fisheries organisations have been characterised by how dynamic they have been in their 
proposals of measures and tackling of initiatives. 
 
Figure 3.26 Initiatives by fisheries organisations 
Plan for Regulating the Cadiz Fishing Grounds (1984) 
Action Plan. Barbate: a firm commitment for the future 
(2002) 
Reporting of illegal fishing 
 
Fisheries Resource Management 
Measures 
 
Request for Self-Regulation Measures (2001) 
Ports and Harbours Plan (1980) Infrastructure Measures 
Port and Harbour Plan (2002) 
Plan for Renewal of Fleet (1999) Fishery Structure Measures 
Plan for the Modernisation of the Andalusian Fishing Sector 
(1994) 
Review of Retirement Age  
Social and Employment Measures Request for Aid for the sector affected by the Failure of the 
Agreement with Morocco 
Sources: Compiled by the author. 
 
 
 As has been previously pointed out, the opening up of the authorities to these 
organisations having a say in planning can be gauged as a step forward in the fisheries 
management decentralisation process. This can be illustrated by the way the Barbate 
fisheries organisations have collaborated with the authorities as consultative agents for the 
drafting of the following plans: Plan for the Modernisation of the Andalusian Fisheries 
Sector (1994), Action Plan: Barbate, a firm commitment for the future (2002) and the 
Barbate Ports and Harbours Plan (2002). 
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 Despite this, whenever there have been crises as a result of the fisheries agreement 
with Morocco, the Barbate organisations have repeatedly called upon the authorities to 
lend support to the self-regulation measures that the sector has been demanding1 (in such a 
fundamental field as resource policy), which would seem to point fisheries management in 
the direction of co-determination. 
 As such, a Ports and Harbours Plan was drafted in 1980 which included umbrella 
measures: market management, resource management, structures measures and even 
infrastructure measures. In order that it could be put into practice, the plan included the 
Authorities, as a result of which the Fishermen's Guild took it to the Regional Authorities. 
In the end, the plan was not implemented, but if it had been, a situation approaching 
sharing responsibility would have been the result. 
 At a later date, the Plan for the Regulation of the Cadiz Fishing Grounds (passed in 
June 1984), proposed measures for regulating resources and marketing. It was drafted by 
the Barbate Fishermen's Guild and, on this occasion, was supported by the majority of 
local fisheries organisations: boat-owners, exporters and salesmen and fisheries experts, 
which highlights the wishes of these organisations to exercise self-management not only in 
the field of resources, but in the field of markets, as well. 
 A process of empowerment for local fisheries organisations would have emerged 
from the achievement of the two above-mentioned initiatives, together with the numerous 
requests for the control of illegal fishing activities in Barbate; but a shadow has been cast 
over this process not only by the ineffectiveness of the authorities, but also because of the 
various interests that each of the local organisations harbours. 
 A new plan for the Port and Harbour Plan2 has nevertheless arisen from collaboration 
between the central authorities and the Fishermen's Guild. A new plan for the Ports and 
Harbours Plan was drafted for the town in 2002 and includes measures directed at fisheries 
structures by the renewal of the fleet through the construction of smaller vessels that are 
better suited to the fishing conditions in the Gulf of Cadiz fishing grounds. The design of 
this plan is being disputed by a number of associations in the sector: on the one hand, the 
fishermen's guild and the boat-owners' association, and on the other by the CC.OO. Trade 
Union3, which states that it is a copy of that which the Union itself presented to the 
authorities in 1988 (which confirms the conflict between local associations). In any case, 
the plan was put before the Andalusian Government's Department of Agriculture, Fisheries 
and Food and is at present under review by the regional authorities. The joint 
implementation of said Ports and Harbours Plan would serve as an example of shared 
responsibility (figure 3.27) in which all levels involved in fisheries management are 
included, from the authorities to local organisations. 
                                                 
1 As was in done in November 2001 at the end of the Second Conference for Young Andalusian Fishermen 
organised by the Andalusian Federation of Fishermen' Guilds. 
2 This Plan is part of a larger plan driven by the local council called: 'Action Plan. Barbate, a Firm 
Commitment for the Future', which includes measures for economic diversification for the town. 
3 The 'Comisiones Obreras' Trade Union. 
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Figure 3.27 Example of shared responsibility 
a) Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food. 
 
 
 Finally, attention must be drawn to the initiatives taken by the Fishermen's Guild 
regarding measures for employment, specifically the application for aid for the fishing fleet 
affected by the failure of the agreement with Morocco. In a letter to Brussels, a request was 
made for the lowering of the ages of retirement and early retirement required to qualify for 
aid, as well as the modification of certain unemployment protection measures which were 
considered to be ineffective in the context of Barbate and, as a final request, the putting 
into place of an investment plan for the town. 
 In short, it can be seen that the Barbate fisheries sector organisations firmly favour 
greater decentralisation in fisheries management through self-regulation, co-determination, 
empowerment processes, and sharing responsibilities. Of these new types of collaboration, 
the organisations have thus far only achieved contribution and partnership in specific 
aspects of planning, and are currently aiming for shared responsibility in fisheries 
structures measures. With these precedents the authorities are in a position to foster 
effective responsibility-sharing where compliance with fisheries policies would be better 
guaranteed for having been jointly agreed upon with agents in the sector. 
 
3.6.5 Administrative processes associated with conversion 
 
The aim of this section is to examine the degree of decentralisation and participation 
achieved by fisheries organisations and the authorities in the management of aid for the 
conversion of the fisheries fleet affected by the lack of an agreement with Morocco. 
 
EU measures 
 
Contributions made by the EU to the fisheries fleet conversion process are made through 
compliance with a plan passed by the EU on 27 November 2001 to the value of 32,778 
million Euros. The plan includes aid for retirement and early retirement, and includes two 
types of subsidy or incentive to cover diversification and the abandoning of fishing. 
 The process of dealing with aid applications has been delegated to regional 
authorities. Although this process is set out in detail in the following, it can be summarised 
as follows: once all the applications for aid have been received the regional authorities 
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must pass them onto the Central Authorities, who in turn pass them onto the European 
Union for them to be approved. 
 
 
AUTHORITY AID FUNDING 
European Union Aid Plan for the sector affected by the 
Failure of the Agreement with Morocco 
32,778 million Euros  
(for all of Spain) 
Central Authorities Action Plan 32 million Euros for Andalusia 
Regional Authorities Plan for the Diversification of the Fisheries 
Sector affected by the Failure of the 
Agreement with Morocco 
60 million Euros for Andalusia (50% 
each from Regional and Central 
Authorities) 
Figure 3.28 Aid for the conversion of the affected fisheries fleet in Andalusia  
Source: Compiled by author. 
 
 
Measures taken by the central authorities 
 
The measures put into place by the Central Authorities in order to offset the consequences 
of the lack of a fisheries agreement with Morocco for Spanish fisheries fleets were 
basically centred on an Action Plan which was passed by the Cabinet on 2 November 
2001. Funding would be set aside for attending to actions related to the permanent tying up 
of the fleet in port, the modernisation of vessels, economic subsidies and early-retirement, 
as a result of which 13.6M. Euros were to be allocated to the affected Autonomous 
Communities. 
 By the time the agreement with Morocco was finalised in November 1999, an 
agreement had already been reached at the Sectoral Fisheries Conference the previous 
September for this money to be released by the State, who would transfer it to the 
Autonomous Communities, which is where the aid applications would be dealt with. This 
process is detailed in the following. 
 
Measures taken by the regional authorities 
 
The Andalusian Regional Government's Agriculture and Fisheries Department set up local 
offices to support the Andalusian fisheries sector in several municipalities, including 
Barbate, in order to attend to applications for EU aid from boat owners and crewmen. The 
existence of these offices involves the type of administrative deconcentration mentioned in 
section 3.1.  
 These offices were set up as aid management bodies for encouraging the sector to 
accept conversion plans and to provide them with information on other options. The cost of 
starting up these offices to the Andalusian Regional Governement was euro 363,427 for the 
year 2002 and there are plans for them to continue during the upcoming year, as a result of 
which the total investment involved will rise to euro 721,214. 
 Once the agents in the sector put forward their applications for aid in these support 
offices, they are sent on to the regional authorities who, in turn, send them onto the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, from where they are forwarded to Brussels. 
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 Apart from this, the Andalusian Regional Government also passed a Diversification 
Plan for the fisheries sector that was affected by the failure to come to an agreement with 
Morocco. This Plan includes an allocation of 60 million euros for the sector. The Central 
Government contributed to the funding of the plan through the signing of an Agreement 
which stated that it would be jointly financed by the two Authorities, with each providing 
half the funds. 
 
Aid management in Barbate 
 
Of all the aid offered by Brussels for the affected fishing fleets special attention must be 
drawn to the individual incentives offered to crew-members to encourage them to give up 
fishing all together, for which 772 applications had been made in Barbate up to 27th 
August, 2002. Sixteen dossiers for non-renewable incentives for putting plans into practice 
and 76 for early retirement (for over fifty-fives) are also being dealt with. 
 As far as the fishing fleet is concerned, 7 vessels have opted to permanently abandon 
fishing activities (with another application is expected). Of the 37 vessels from Barbate 
that used to fish in Moroccan waters, 30 will continue to fish in Spanish fishing grounds. 
 
 
T
 
able 3.1 EU aid for the conversion of the Barbate fishing fleet 
 
European union aid Funds Applications in Barbate 
 
 
Total individual subsidies 12,020.20 € 772 
Total non-renewable subsidies 60,101.20 € 1 16 
Early retirement 901.50 € 76 
Modernisation 40% of investment subsidisable - 
A
 
quaculture  0 
 
Source: Compiled by author. 
 
 
 It should be pointed out that the sector's associations in Barbate have no room for 
manoeuvre in financial management of the aid, being limited to the presenting of 
applications to receive it. The economic decentralisation of fisheries management has 
therefore not been achieved at the level of sector organisations, something which would 
result in greater autonomy for these organisations. 
 Despite this lack of flexibility, the fisheries organisations and the regional authorities 
have petitioned Brussels for the modification of some of the sections in the regulations 
governing aid. These requests have been rejected by Commissioner Fischler. Yet again 
restrictions have been placed on the enlargement of fisheries decentralisation towards the 
local level. Perhaps the major limitation, economic self-management, is one of the main 
elements in the process towards the sector's maximum autonomy. 
                                                 
1 This is the maximum amount contributed by the EU for implementing conversion policies, and investment 
will be made in accordance with plans and projects. 
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3.6.6 General appraisal. The decentralisation process: limits and opportunities 
 
The non-renewal of the agreement between the EU and Morocco has led the institutions 
(the regional and local authorities) and interest groups to try to broaden their areas of 
competency, in a bid for a greater scope of responsibility in fisheries management and in 
decision-taking. Nevertheless, there are judicial and administrative limits that hinder this 
dual process: i) The regional authorities' demand for greater autonomy from the State; ii) 
The demand from local bodies (institutions and interest groups) for greater autonomy from 
the central and regional levels, with special respect to the following aspects: 
- the legislative framework limits the possibilities for broadening the regional 
authorities' competencies in sea-fishing affairs. The regional authorities only have 
competencies over inland waters. Artesanal and inland fishing in Barbate is done 
outside those waters, and is therefore conducted outside the areas under the regional 
authorities' competency for the overall management of these types of fishing, which 
is an obstacle to decentralisation; 
- the regional authorities not only do not have any competency in foreign affairs, but 
cannot even take direct part in them. As far as Barbate is concerned, it might have 
been useful to be able to have counted on the regional authorities' participation in 
negotiations with Morocco. This puts another brake on decentralisation in fisheries 
management and the more direct participation of local and regional agents; 
- the State bodies for consulting regional authorities are not created on an equal basis, 
i.e.: the regional authorities' opinions are not binding. This does nothing to encourage 
the full identification of the regional authorities with fisheries policies; 
- although local authorities have very limited competency in fisheries management, 
nevertheless in Barbate, due to the critical circumstances, the authorities showed they 
were possessed of sufficient creativity to take initiatives (i.e. brokerage) and, in this 
way, they found solutions to specific problems that directly affected them; 
- the capacity to determine economic funds for fisheries management and the ends to 
which they are devoted lies solely with Brussels. This makes the implementation of 
the CFP less effective, due to the fact that regional authorities perhaps have a more 
precise knowledge of what the needs of the sector are, and of just what funds are 
required to offset those needs. This is perhaps the most important point for extending 
the decentralisation process, as it would involve making the entire sector 
accountable, i.e.: the establishment of administrative co-determination through the 
principle of subsidiarity; 
- the inability of the bodies for collaboration between the regional authorities and the 
organisations in the sector to make these accountable for management matters has 
been manifest. Advances have been made through contribution, partnership and 
participation but, nevertheless, there has not been any real involvement of the sector 
in the decision-making process. In order to achieve a more effective distribution of 
responsibilities, advances towards decentralisation in fisheries management should 
take the road that includes sector associations in the decision-making process. 
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4. United Kingdom 
 
 
 
4.1 Participation in the pelagic fishery 
 
4.1.1 Justification 
 
The pelagic sector offers some interesting aspects of decision-making. By its very nature, 
the pelagic fishery is international because of the movements of the stock. Since pelagic 
fish migrate outside the European waters, an additional management level has been created 
in a multilateral organisation, the North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission. This is an 
extra level of decision-making on top of the European and the national UK level. 
 Because of this three tier system, one would expect to find a sector burdened by 
over-regulation and complicated decision-making. However, market forces have operated 
forcefully in the pelagic sector, resulting in a remarkable concentration with very few large 
vessels, which appear to be very profitable. De facto we have a system of Individually 
Transferable Quotas (ITQs). Stocks are in good condition. Pelagic fishermen's 
organisations have the financial means to organise themselves effectively, not only at a 
national but also at an international level. Through their own efforts, they have achieved a 
high degree of participation. Although most of this participation has grown informally and 
is not codified nor enforceable, it has reached a level from which it can probably not be 
removed. One question which cannot be answered, is whether the stocks are healthy 
because of the participation, or whether there is consensus and friendly participation 
because the stocks are healthy. 
 
4.1.2 Brief description of the pelagic sector in the UK 
 
Landings 
 
The pelagic fishery targets species found mainly in shoals in mid-water or near the surface 
of the sea. These fish behave in typical manner: they swim in large single species shoals 
and they migrate over a wide area, spending for example part of the year in Norwegian 
waters, then migrating through the waters of several EU countries and finally reaching 
Icelandic waters. The UK pelagic fishery is a typical high volume low value sector. Pelagic 
landings in the UK fluctuate around 40% of landings in volume but only around 14% of 
the value of all UK landings. The value of pelagic landings fluctuates up as well as down 
from year to year. 
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Figure 4.1 Value of fish landings in the UK by the UK fleet: 1996-2000 
 
 
 Herring and mackerel are the two main pelagic species landed in the UK, accounting 
for 89 percent of the total pelagic landings. Landings of herring have decreased since 1996. 
Landings of mackerel have tended to fluctuate from year to year. Other pelagic species 
represents only a small share of the fishery. 
 
0
50
100
150
200
x1
,0
00
 to
nn
es
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Volume of UK pelagic landings by species 
Herring Mackerel Other Pelagic
Figure 4.2 Landings of pelagic species by the UK fleet, in the UK and abroad  
 
 
Pelagic Vessels and Gear 
 
The pelagic fleet consists of a very small number (44) of large and powerful vessels which 
account for 1/5 of the registered tonnage of the UK fishing fleet (8,000 vessels). Different 
fishing methods are used to catch pelagic fish: trawling or purse-seining. A trawl is a 
funnel-shaped net which is towed behind a vessel. Purse seining is a method used 
exclusively for pelagic operations. A very large, deep net is shot around a fish shoal and is 
then closed (like a purse) at the bottom to trap the fish. The net is then hauled upwards to 
concentrate the fish near the surface and the fish are taken on board using a separate lifting 
net or a pump. 
 There are two distinct segments in the pelagic fleet: freezer vessels which process the 
fish aboard and 'tank' vessels. The latter keep the ungutted fish aboard in seawater cooled 
below 0ºC and land the fish at a pelagic factory for processing ashore. 
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 Over the years, the number of pelagic vessels has decreased but the average size of 
these vessels has increased. 
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Figure 4.3 UK pelagic fleet 1994-2000 
 
 
Pelagic harbours 
 
The concentration observed in the pelagic fleet, can also be seen in the pelagic harbours. 
Three harbours account for nearly three quarters of all UK pelagic landings. These are all 
located in Scotland: Lerwick (Shetland), Peterhead and Fraserburgh (North East of 
Scotland). This concentration can be correlated to the location of pelagic factories and the 
home ports of the large pelagic pursers. 
 
 
Table 4.1 Main UK pelagic ports 2000 
 
 
 % of total volume of pelagic landings Cumulative (%) 
 
 
Lerwick 28 28 
Peterhead 28 56 
Fraserburgh 16 71 
Plymouth 9 80 
Other ports 20 100 
 
 
 
 
4.1.3 Management of the pelagic fisheries  
 
Graphic representation of pelagic management 
 
The drawing represents the decision-making structures which decide on the UK pelagic 
fishery. Bold lines represent formal, institutionalised interactions, the dotted lines represent 
informal lobbying. The dashed line represents a new relationship, which is official but has 
not yet been institutionalised. Each participant in this process will now be discussed in 
more detail. 
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Figure 4.4 UK pelagic decision-making structures 
 
 
ICES (International Council for the Exploration of the Seas) 
 
ICES (International Council for the Exploration of the Seas) is an inter-governmental body 
with 19 members. Its Advisory Committee on Fishery Management (ACFM) gives advice 
on the status of around 100 fish and shellfish stocks. The Scientific, Technical and 
Economic Committee on Fisheries (STEFC) gives advice on the economic implications of 
the ACFM's proposals. Advice from ICES forms the basis for the management of the 
pelagic fishery. 
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The North Sea Commission Fisheries Partnership (NSCFP) 
 
The North Sea Commission Fisheries Partnership is a group of local authorities that border 
the North Sea. It was established in 2000 to promote co-operation between scientists and 
fishermen in monitoring and managing fisheries in the North Sea. In August 2002 this has 
resulted in a more formal co-operation, whereby the NSCFP organised a meeting with 
fishermen, industry representatives and independent scientists to discuss some of the 
preliminary stock assessments presented by ICES scientists. The future of this partnership 
is viewed with much optimism by all partners involved. 
 
North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC) 
 
This International Fisheries Commission has responsibility for fishery conservation and 
fishery management in the North-East Atlantic outside of the EEZs. 
 
Brief description of NEAFC 
 
In 1963 the North-East Atlantic Fisheries Convention entered into force; it set up the 
North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC) as the successor of a Permanent 
Commission created in 1953. NEAFC thus predates the creation of the European common 
fisheries policy. 
 The NEAFC Convention Area covers the Atlantic and Arctic Oceans from the 
southern tip of Greenland, to the southern tip of Spain, and west of Novya Semlya. The 
Baltic and Mediterranean Seas are excluded. At present, the role of the NEAFC is limited 
to the fisheries beyond the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of the EU and other 
signatories. 
 The activities of NEAFC have evolved over the years. In 1971 the Commission 
agreed to enforce a closed season for the North Sea herring fishery. In 1974 came the first 
quota recommendation on North Sea herring. The year after, NEAFC recommended total 
allowable catch and quota allocations for fifteen stocks. Allocations were initially linked to 
the number of men on board. In 1975 a recommendation to ban directed industrial fishery 
for North Sea herring was agreed. 
 In 1977 the North Atlantic coastal states declared 200 miles EEZs, so that most of 
the area regulated by NEAFC became national zones and NEAFC responsibility for stock 
management was greatly reduced. In recent years fishing activity in international waters 
has increased; NEAFC has become responsible for managing several stocks. Atlanto-
scandian herring and blue whiting are relevant stocks in this context. 
 The NEAFC signatories are: Denmark (in respect of Greenland and Faroe), Iceland, 
Norway, Poland, the Russian Federation and the European Economic Community which 
became a signatory in 1980 when it took over the role of its member states within NEAFC. 
Each NEAFC signatory has two representatives. The EU delegation includes officials from 
the European Commission (both from the Fisheries Directorate and the Directorate for 
External Relations) and does in practice also include 1 or 2 representatives from the 
relevant EU Member States. 
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Decision making within NEAFC 
 
NEAFC receives scientific advice from the International Council for the Exploration of the 
Sea, ICES, under a Memorandum of Understanding signed in 1999. 
 Each Contracting Party has one vote in NEAFC. Decisions are taken by simple 
majority, except for specific cases where a two third majority is required. The exception 
seems however to be the rule: for most important decisions - such as recommendations 
concerning fisheries conducted in international waters - a qualified (2/3) majority is 
required. Moreover, any Contracting Party may, within 50 days object to 
recommendations; as a result it will not be bound by the rules. For example, Iceland is not 
bound by the mackerel management measures for 2002 because it objected. So, in practice, 
a decision cannot be taken or enforced against the wishes of a signatory. NEAFC requires 
consensus. 
 
Observers to the meetings of NEAFC 
 
The NEAF convention doesn't specifically allow for participation by fishermen's 
organisations. However, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) which support 
conservation and optimum utilisation of the fishery resources in the Convention Area, may 
participate as an observer in the plenary meetings of the Commission. The only condition 
is a 100-day notification. Fishermen's organisations regularly attend annual and 
extraordinary meetings as observers. This does not however give them any voting right. 
Neither does it give them the right to attend NEAFC working groups. 
 Fishermen may of course informally lobby the delegation of their Member State or 
the EU delegation. 
 
Assessment of NEAFC 
 
Authors such as Holden state that NEAFC has been ineffective in its management of 
fisheries. The NEAFC Convention doesn't give the possibility to overrule a signatory, 
since all important decisions are to be taken by a 2/3 majority; even these decisions can be 
meaningless since the objection procedure makes it possible for signatories not to 
implement NEAFC decisions. Moreover, control and enforcement are left to the States. 
Finally, the participation of fishermen's organisations in NEAFC is not formally 
guaranteed. 
 
EU-Norway negotiations 
 
Every year negotiations are held between Norway and the European Union concerning the 
management of common stocks. This is highly relevant for the pelagic fishery as most 
stocks are shared between the EU and Norway. Total allowable catches are agreed. Where 
necessary, agreements made within NEAFC can be finalised and detailed during EU-
Norway negotiations. These negotiations are held by officials and do not involve 
fishermen. However, over the years the fishermen have formalised their lobbying efforts 
which now take place through the Northern Pelagic Working Group (NPWG), which will 
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be discussed in more detail below. The NPWG is not allowed to participate in the 
negotiations, but it does try and meet with negotiators before and after the meetings. 
 
Northern Pelagic Working Group (NPWG) 
 
This group has been set up by the pelagic branches of fishermen's organisations of several 
Member States involved in the northern pelagic fishery. These are United Kingdom, 
Netherlands, Denmark, Ireland, and Germany. This group tries to agree a single position 
on behalf of all the pelagic organisations involved, on Total Allowable Catches and other 
management measures. The group lobbies the European Commission, the European 
Council of Ministers and NEAFC. It specifically focuses on the EU-Norway negotiations. 
The group is not allowed to attend the meeting, but it lobbies the negotiators. 
 
European Commission and European Council of ministers 
 
European conservation policies are aimed at regulating the quantities of fish caught, 
through a system of Total Allowable Catches (TACs) based on scientific advice. They are 
complemented by technical conservation measures and seasonal closures. The European 
Council of Fisheries Ministers sets the yearly TACs. The decisions are implemented by the 
European Commission which allocates the TACs as quotas to Member States in 
accordance with fixed keys based on historic fishing rights. The EU Commission 
Directorate for Fisheries (DG FISH) also implements the decisions taken during NEAFC 
negotiations and during EU-Norway negotiations. The final TACs for pelagic species 
allocated to the UK by the Commission take into account the decisions taken in these three 
different fora. In practice, a handful of EU officials from DG FISH are involved in all the 
aspects of the management of pelagic stock. 
 
Management within the United Kingdom 
 
From fishing vessel track record to fixed quota allocation 
The UK pelagic quota has to be allocated to the UK vessels. At first, the distribution of 
quotas was based on the track record of the vessel, calculated as a rolling average of the 
landings of the previous three years. Since 1998, instead of using a rolling average, the 
entitlement of a vessel is calculated on a fixed reference period, namely the landings 
during the period 1994 to 1996. The resulting share in the national quotas is called a Fixed 
Quota Allocation (FQA). FQA are set for specific stocks, such as West Coast mackerel. 
 
Producers Organisations and Pelagic quotas 
Nearly all FQAs and their resulting quotas are grouped within Producers' Organisations 
which monitor their uptake. There are 20 PO's in total in the UK. There is however a 
strong concentration of pelagic quota in the hands of four POs. This concentration is 
correlated to the fact that there are only 44 pelagic vessels in the UK and only three main 
pelagic ports. For example, three POs manage 89% of the West Coast Blue Whiting stock. 
All these PO's are located in Scotland. 
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 Pelagic quota is allocated for the exclusive use by a vessel as if they were 
individually transferable quotas (ITQs). A concentration of pelagic quotas has occurred at 
the same time as large capital investments in vessels and modernisation of the pelagic fleet. 
 
4.1.4 Conclusion: Assessment of the management of the UK pelagic fishery 
 
Assessment of the Pelagic Stock 
 
One could assess the success of a management regime by assessing the state of the stocks 
concerned. Overall, pelagic species are rather in better condition than demersal species. 
For example, it seems likely that the 2003 Herring quotas will be significantly increased. 
 One can of course not state with certainty that the health of the pelagic stock is due to 
the management regime. Several factors may have contributed to the thriving stock. The 
different behaviour of pelagic fish may play a role. We might nevertheless state that the 
management regime in place has not caused obvious deterioration of the pelagic stock. A 
factor not discussed in this article, but which might be relevant to the successful 
management, could be the fact that the UK pelagic sector has had a real system of 
individually transferable quotas (ITQ) for several years. We would however go as far as to 
state that another reason might be the high level of participation in pelagic decision-
making by the fishermen. 
 
Assessment of the participation in the UK pelagic fishery 
 
When looking at the graphic representation of pelagic stock management, one is struck by 
how complicated it all seems to be and how many institutions are involved. 
 Nevertheless, pelagic fishermen seem to be rather more satisfied with the 
management regime than their demersal colleagues. Pelagic fishermen also seem to find 
that the level of participation - although not sufficient yet - is actually not too bad. 
 How have the fishermen achieved efficient participation? 
1. direct representation: the pelagic fishery has very few participants.  This means that 
fishermen are very close to their own organisations. As described before, only four 
Producer Organisations group the whole pelagic fleet of 44 boats. On average, each 
PO represents only 11 boats; 
2. well-organised fishermen: the pelagic fleet has sufficient resources to be able to fund 
their lobbying efforts via well-managed organisations and permanent structures with 
capable, paid staff and representatives; 
3. small number of officials: although pelagic management appears very complex, there 
are in fact very few people involved. The same officials man the various 
organisations; 
4. very regular meetings between key players: informal meetings between the small 
group of fishermen's representatives and of officials take place very frequently, up to 
twice a month that a good working relationship can grow between the key players; 
5. very informal participatory structures: fishermen do not formally participate in most 
of the organisations where decisions are taken. They lobby rather than participate. It 
is unclear whether this has a positive or a negative effect; 
 107
6. formal participation in ICES process: fishermen are very satisfaction about the 
efforts done by ICES to involve them; 
7. fishermen united internationally: contrary to other sectors, pelagic fishermen have 
managed to create cross-border unity. It is undeniable that this will strengthen their 
position during negotiations; 
8. management by consensus in NEAFC: maybe the fact that decisions within NEAFC 
require de facto consensus, ensures a more successful management. 
 
 There are however a number of important proviso's. 
1. no reason for conflict: as the pelagic stock are in good condition, no extremely 
stringent measures are needed and the likelihood of a conflict between the managers 
and the fishermen is greatly reduced; 
2. participation not guaranteed: because the participation evolved via very informal 
structures, the fishermen do not actually formally participate in the decisions. 
Although unlikely, it would be possible for managers to suddenly deny the 
fishermen's input; 
3. no appeals procedure: again because the participation takes more the form of 
lobbying than actual participation, fishermen have no appeal procedure in case they 
are dissatisfied with the decision-making process; 
4. Dependence on individual skills of key players: because the participation structures 
are so informal, much depends on the individual lobbying and networking skills of 
the fishermen's representatives; 
5. Single-species, targeted fishery: because of the behaviour of pelagic fish which swim 
in single species shoals, vessels manage quite easily to catch a single species, without 
much by-catch. 
 
 
4.2 Devolution to the Shetland shellfish management organisation 
 
4.2.1 Justification 
 
Within Scotland legal rights to manage fisheries for specific shellfish species within 
defined areas can be granted by the Scottish government to local organisations by 
Regulated Fishery Orders - commonly know as 'Regulating Orders'. Although a number of 
communities in Scotland have shown interest in the potential of such Orders to improve the 
management of shellfish fisheries only one has been granted to date - covering the waters 
around the Shetland Islands. 
 
4.2.2 Brief description of the Shetland context 
 
Shetland is a group of about 100 islands (15 inhabited) lying some 160 km north of the 
U.K. mainland and about 400 km west of Norway with a population of some 22,500 
people. Administratively Shetland forms an island region (equivalent to a county) with its 
own local authority, the Shetland Islands Council, within Scotland, itself part of the United 
Kingdom. Shetland (with the rest of Scotland) was ruled by the U.K. Parliament in London 
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until 1999 when many (but not all) legislative powers were transferred to the news Scottish 
Parliament in Edinburgh. 
 Shetland lies at the heart of important northern European fishing grounds and fish 
catching has a long tradition in the islands. Today Shetland has a modern and diverse 
fishing industry which forms an important component of the islands' economy. The local 
fishing fleet includes some 250 fishing vessels, ranging from shellfish fishing vessels of 
less than five metres in length to pelagic trawlers of over 50 m, and landings are worth 
more than £20 million per annum (Table 1.2). 
 Although shellfish have been harvested in Shetland on a subsistence basis (and for 
bait) for thousands of years it is only within the last 50 years that significant commercial 
fisheries for shellfish species have developed. The development of these fisheries 
(primarily during the 1960s) provided new opportunities for, and helped raise the average 
real income of, existing local fishermen and also provided additional income for a large 
number of islanders on a part-time basis. 
 Today shellfish fishing remains an important sector of Shetland's fishing industry. 
Although its contribution to the industry in terms of weight or value appears small (Table 
1.2), shellfish species have a relatively high value and shellfish fishing vessels account for 
a high proportion of the local fishing fleet. The shellfish fishery is dominated by small 
boats and by part-time fishermen, and is scattered throughout the islands, wherever a pier 
of harbour suitable for a small boat exists. 
 Since its inception shellfish fishing in Shetland has tended to be viewed by many as a 
'standby' occupation that can be pursued when returns from other fisheries are poor or in 
the absence of other employment. The last few decades have, however, seen a fundamental 
change in the status of Shetland's shellfish fisheries. When they were new and stocks were 
relatively unexploited their capacity to absorb new entrants and increased effort was large. 
Since then a relatively large new permanent shellfish fishing fleet has grown up and stocks 
of the main shellfish species have probably been exploited to, if not beyond, their 
maximum sustainable levels. Given this, the capacity of Shetland's shellfish fisheries to 
absorb new entrants or increased effort must now be all but exhausted. 
 
4.2.3 Legal Context 
 
Regulation of Shellfish Fisheries 
 
Within the United Kingdom shellfish fisheries have been largely unregulated, especially 
when compared to the demersal and pelagic sectors. In particular there are no limits on 
fishing effort. There are, however, minimum landings sizes for some shellfish species. 
Unlike most fisheries, shellfish fisheries are not managed under the Common Fisheries 
Policy. The only shellfish fishery that is fully managed under the CFP is that for nephrops. 
However, Council Regulation (EC) 850/98 laid down minimum landing sizes for certain 
shellfish species as a means of conserving the fishery resources concerned through the 
protection of juveniles. The species covered by this regulation which are fished around 
Shetland are whelks, edible crabs, and lobster. In addition UK legislation imposes a 
minimum landing size for velvet crabs and prohibits the landing of V-notched lobsters. 
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 Shellfish fisheries have been subject to only minimal regulation. Over the last 
decade, however, the national authorities have carried out a series of consultations on 
proposals for tighter national regulation of shellfish fisheries. The most recent proposals 
include the introduction of a national licensing scheme for crustacean fisheries and limits 
on the number of traps that can be used in such fisheries. Proposals for a licensing scheme 
for scallop fisheries are also under development. 
 
 
Table 1.2 Weight and value of shellfish (and fish) landings into Shetland by UK vessels in 2000  
 
 
 Tonnes Value (£) 
 
 
Edible Crabs 431 314,000 
Lobsters 10 100,000 
Nephrops 103 307,000 
Queen Scallops 50 32,000 
King Scallops 327 412,000 
Velvet Crabs 55 78,000 
Whelks 427 102,000 
Other Shellfish 168 514,000 
Total Shellfish 1,571 1,859,000 
Demersal Fish 19,956 12,185,000 
Pelagic Fish 40,178 6,818,000 
otal 61,705 20,862,000 T
 
 
Source: Scottish Sea Fisheries Statistics, 2001, SEERAD. 
 
 
Regulating Orders in UK Legislation 
 
Regulating Orders are granted under the terms of the UK's Sea Fisheries (Shellfish) Act 
1967. Under the terms of this Act such orders were intended to provide for the 
establishment or improvement, and for the maintenance and regulation, of fisheries for 
oysters and mussels. An amendment in 1968 extended Orders to cockles and clams, and 
gave the government the power to include other mollusc species. Regulating Orders could 
be granted to a person or body (the grantee) and would cover fisheries for specific shellfish 
species within a defined area of tidal waters within six miles of the coast. 
 A regulating order grants the right to regulate a fishery, but does not (in general) 
specify the regulations that the grantee intends to implement. In theory an order provides 
the grantee with considerable scope to introduce a wide variety of regulations including 
fishing gear restrictions, minimum landing sizes, quotas, closed seasons, closed areas, etc. 
In practice all such regulations, as well as licence fees, are subject to the approval of the 
government. 
 There are also other limitations of the rights granted by a regulating order. For 
example, while a grantee may introduce a licensing scheme for a fishery, they are normally 
required to issue a licence to anyone that applies. The Minister reserves the right to direct 
the grantee on the implementation of restrictive licensing arrangements. In addition, it is a 
requirement that licence fees and other regulations are applied equally. 
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 Since the Scottish Devolution of 1999, the power to grant regulating orders in 
Scotland lies with the First Minister of Scotland, subject to approval of the order by the 
Scottish Parliament. Although the legislation under which regulating orders could be 
granted came into force in 1967, no Regulating Orders were granted in Scotland, primarily 
due to the lack of significant fisheries in Scotland for the main species to which regulating 
orders could be applied. A small number were granted in England. 
 In 1996 the regulating order system was modified. Most significantly, regulating 
orders could be applied to fisheries for crustaceans (specifically lobsters). This was 
motivated by interest in the potential of enhancing lobster stocks through the release of 
juvenile lobsters into the sea and the desire to control the enhanced fisheries. The act was 
later extended to other crustacean species in response to the application for a regulating 
order by the Shetland Shellfish Management Organisation. 
 
4.2.4 The Shetland shellfish management organisation 
 
Background to the Shetland Regulating Order 
 
As has been noted, Shetland's shellfish fisheries experienced a period of sustained growth 
during the 1980s and 1990s with increased levels of fishing effort and substantial increases 
in landings. This prompted concerns within the local fishing industry about the long-term 
sustainability of these fisheries. In the light of these concerns, and in the absence of any 
significant national regulation of shellfish fisheries, the Shetland Fishermen's Association 
decided that the powers to establish a local management system could only be obtained 
through the granting of a regulating order. 
 
Constitution of the Shetland Shellfish Management Organisation 
 
Recognising that the sustainable management of local shellfish fisheries was an issue of 
interest not just to fishermen but also to the broader local community, the Shetland 
Fishermen’s Association (SFA) brought together a variety of interested local parties to 
develop plans for a local regulating order. This grouping developed into the Shetland 
Shellfish Management Organisation (SSMO), a company limited by guarantee. As 
formally constituted the SSMO joins six local organisations which between them nominate 
a total of ten representatives who act as directors of the company. The main activity of the 
SSMO was to apply for and implement a regulating order for Shetland. 
 The organisations that make up the SSMO are as follows: 
- Shetland Fishermen's Association (4 directors) 
The Shetland Fishermen's Association (SFA) is the representative body of Shetland's 
commercial fishermen. It acts as a pressure group, representing the views of its 
members on fisheries matters to Government bodies at all levels, including the 
European Commission, UK and Scottish governments and the Shetland Islands 
Council. The SFA nominates 4 directors to the SSMO from its Small Boat Sub-
Committee, all of them shellfish fishermen; 
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- Shetland Islands Council (2 directors) 
The Shetland Islands Council (SIC) is the islands local government. The SIC 
nominates two directors, both sitting councillors; 
- Shetland Fish Processors' Association (1 director) 
The Shetland Fish Processors' Association (SFPA) is the representative body of 
Shetland’s fish processing companies. Its primary function is the cooperative 
marketing and promotion of Shetland Seafood. The SFPA nominates one director; 
currently the manager of a shellfish processing factory. 
- Scottish Natural Heritage (1 director) 
Scottish Natural Heritage (SNH) is the government agency with responsibility (in 
Scotland) for natural heritage. SNH has various statutory functions. It provides 
advise to government Ministers, local authorities and the public on matters that affect 
the natural heritage including planning issues and the establishment of terrestrial and 
marine conservation areas. SNH nominates one director; currently the manager of 
their Orkney and Shetland area offices; 
- North Atlantic Fisheries College (1 director) 
The North Atlantic Fisheries College (NAFC) is an independent college that was 
established by the Shetland Islands Council in 1992 to support Shetland's fisheries 
industries. The College provides both vocational and academic training in relevant 
subjects and carries out programmes of research and development in relevant fields. 
The NAFC nominates one director from its academic staff; 
- Shetland Association of Community Councils (1 director) 
Community Councils form part of the system of local government within Scotland, 
representing the interests of local parishes. The Association of Shetland Community 
Council’s (ASCC) is an umbrella organisation formed of representatives from each 
of the 18 community councils in Shetland. The ASCC nominates one director; 
- non-voting attendees: SFA 
In addition to the directors, meetings of the SSMO are normally also attended by a 
number of observers. They have no voting rights at meetings of the SSMO, but are 
allowed to contribute fully to meetings. An executive officer of the Shetland 
Fishermen's Association normally attends in such a capacity, ostensibly to represent 
the interests of the SFA; other members of the SFA's Small-Boat Sub-Committee 
may attend as observers on occasions when one of their nominated directors is 
unable to attend; 
- non-voting attendees: SIC 
The other regular observer is an official of the Shetland Islands Council's Economic 
Development Department. This official was closely involved in establishing the 
SSMO and the Regulating Order but as an SIC official is prohibited from acting as a 
company director. 
- other non-voting attendees 
A fisheries scientist from the North Atlantic Fisheries College often attends to 
provide expert advice. In addition to the partner organisations an observer from the 
Shetland office of the Scottish Fisheries Protection Agency (SFPA) has been invited 
to attend meetings since July 2002 as a means of improving liaison and 
communications between the SSMO and SFPA. 
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Representation of shellfish Fishermen within SSMO 
 
Fishermen are directly represented on the board of SSMO by the directors nominated by 
the Shetland Fishermen's Association. However, the SFA only represents the interests of 
its members. Less than half of the shellfish fishermen licensed by the SSMO are members 
of the SFA. Moreover, shellfish fishermen who are also members of the SFA are the full-
time, professional shellfish fishermen. As a result, at least half of the shellfish fishermen 
licensed by the SSMO have no direct representation on the board of directors. This 
situation has arisen because when the SSMO was being formed the SFA was the only 
fishermen's representative body. Fishermen who were not members of the SFA were not 
organised into any other body that might have been invited to become a partner in the 
SSMO. At the time it was argued that the interests of fishermen who were not members of 
the SFA could be represented through the Shetland Islands Council or the Association of 
Shetland Community Councils. 
 With the establishment of a local shellfish-licensing scheme, there might be a case 
for allowing direct representation of licensed fishermen on the board of the SSMO, rather 
than via the SFA. There has as yet been no pressure from the non-SFA fishermen for such 
a change. 
 
Decision-Making Within the SSMO 
 
Since late 1999 the SSMO has employed a full-time executive officer, responsible for the 
day-to-day running of the SSMO. 
 Decisions on the operation of the SSMO and on the implementation of the regulating 
order are made by the directors who meet every one to two months. Attendance at 
meetings by directors is variable, and usually ranges from four or five directors up to eight 
or nine; full attendance is very rare. The quorum is five directors. The chairman is elected 
annually by the directors. 
 Issues to be considered by the directors come from a variety of sources. Routine 
issues, such as applications for licences, are raised by the Executive Officer, while some 
issues will be raised by the Chairman. Proposals for new regulations usually come from 
fishermen and may be raised by the fisherman-directors, by the SFA's observer, or 
sometimes more formally in writing from the SFA's Small-Boat Sub-Committee. On 
occasion, the chairman may take executive decisions on minor issues, sometimes in 
consultation with one or more other directors. 
 Ideally, the SSMO would wish its decision making process to be informed by 
scientific advise on the status of shellfish stocks and on the likely effects of proposed 
regulations. The SSMO has instituted a logbook scheme to collect data from shellfish 
fishermen and the North Atlantic Fisheries College is committed to providing scientific 
support to the SSMO. However, although the NAFC has instituted a programme of 
research and data collection on local shellfish stocks, this has not yet progressed to the 
stage of formal stock assessments or scientific advice to the SSMO. In the absence of such 
advise the SSMO's decisions are essentially precautionary, with regulations based on 
concerns raised by fishermen. This may be positive as it shows that SSMO is providing a 
means to address fishermen's concerns, and as the regulations are those which the 
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fishermen's representatives want, rather than those which some scientist or civil servant 
thinks should be implemented. 
 The directors of the SSMO come from a wide variety of backgrounds, from 
professional fishermen to elected councillors, and their experience of a formal, collective 
decision making process varies significantly. There is a tendency for the fisherman-
directors to view meetings of the Organisation simply as a forum to debate issues of 
concern, rather than as an occasion when formal decisions have to be taken. This is 
especially apparent in the desire of the Shetland Fishermen's Association to have an 
observer attend meetings in addition to their directors, and for further observers to stand in 
for directors who cannot attend meetings. Such observers can contribute to debates but not 
to the formal decision making process. In general the fisherman-directors appear to be 
much happier talking about issues than actually making decisions, and it can be difficult to 
get meetings to move from general debate to formal decisions. Indeed friction can arise 
when debates are cut short, or if decisions go against their wishes. 
 Although the directors are often able to reach decisions by consensus - and this is 
preferred where possible - it is sometimes necessary, where there are differences of 
opinion, to invoke a formal decision making process such as the proposal of a motion, 
second, counter-motion, second, vote, et cetera. Fishermen-directors are clearly 
uncomfortable - perhaps unfamiliar - with a formal decision making process, while others 
politicians-directors clearly expect a formal process, and may become unhappy if this not 
the case. 
 Associated with the difficulty of reaching formal decisions, it has proven difficult for 
the SSMO to establish and adhere to consistent policies, as fishermen in particular tend to 
prefer to treat each case on its individual merits. For example, one of the most difficult 
issues that the SSMO has faced is whether or not to issue additional licences to allow new 
entrants to enter the shellfish fisheries. It has proved difficult to get some of the 
Organisation's directors to separate the issue of whether new licences should be issued 
from the issue of who should receive any new licences. So their views tend to be strongly 
influenced by the identity of the applicant. This is a particular problem in a small 
community where everybody tends to know everybody else. It is also noticeable that the 
fisherman-directors' decisions on new entrants often appear to be influenced by their 
knowledge of where the particular applicants are proposing to fish. If the applicant’s area 
of operation will overlap the director's, opposition is likely. At first sight this appears to be 
simple self-interest on the part of the fisherman, but in some cases at least their reasoning 
may be more complex. The justification often given for refusal in such cases is that the 
area in question is already subject to a high level of fishing effort. 
 Thus a fisherman-director appears to base his decisions on his knowledge of the area 
concerned and on what appear to be genuine convictions about the ability of the shellfish 
stocks in the area to withstand additional fishing effort. If the applicant is likely to be 
fishing in an area with which a fisherman-director is not familiar, he perhaps does not feel 
in a position to object because he lacks sufficient knowledge of the area concerned. 
 Overall, it is interesting that while all of the Directors are nominated by various 
organisations, once they are on the board of the SSMO they tend to make personal 
decisions on issues rather than seeking the views of the organisations they represent. In 
some cases the directors are effectively granted the power to make such decisions on 
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behalf of the bodies they represent. In the case of the fishermen, however, it is apparent 
that they often tend to take decisions on the basis of how their own interests might be 
affected, rather than in the interests of the broader community of fishermen, who they 
ostensibly represent. 
 
History of the Shetland Regulating Order 
 
The SSMO first formally expressed an interest in obtaining a regulating order in 1995. The 
organisations detailed plans and proposals were developed over the subsequent two years 
in consultation with civil servants. This process was considerably hindered by the fact that 
a regulating order had never previously been applied for in Scotland. As a result little 
detailed guidance was available to the SSMO on how its application should be prepared 
and no detailed policies or procedures were in place. 
 The process was extremely slow. Whenever the SSMO made a proposal, the 
Department had to consider what its position it would be after advice from its legal 
department. By 1998 the SSMO had a well-developed proposal for a regulating order. The 
order, officially called 'the Shetland Islands Regulated Fishery (Scotland) Order 1999 -SSI 
1999/194', was finally laid before the Scottish Parliament in January 2000 and came into 
force that month. It is the first and to date only regulating order in Scotland. 
 As has been noted earlier, regulating orders do not specify the detailed management 
regulations; these are subject to separate government approval. The initial body of 
regulations which the SSMO wished to implement was soon approved. Details of the 
regulations implemented under the Order are given below. 
 
4.2.5 The Government View 
 
A Government press release of 5 January 2000 hailed the Shetland regulating order as an 
example of 'the determination of the Scottish Executive to work with local people in 
fisheries management', claiming that the order 'puts management of a shellfish fishery into 
the hands of local interests'. The Scottish Fisheries Minister stated that the order 'puts 
management of the shellfishery in the hands of the local community… [who] are best 
placed to take up that responsibility' and reiterated that the Executive was 'determined to 
involve local communities in fisheries management as much as possible'. The press 
concluded by claiming that the granting of the order 'illustrates Devolution in action and 
[was] very much in the spirit of the new Scottish Parliament'. 
 
4.2.6 Decisions taken by the SSMO 
 
The Shetland regulating order grants the Shellfish Management Organisation legal powers 
to manage the fisheries for all commercially exploited shellfish species (except nephrops) 
between the low water mark and the six-mile limit around Shetland; an area of about 
60,000 km2. Since the Regulating Order was granted, the Shetland Shellfish Management 
Organisation has implemented a series of regulations intended to improve the protection of 
local shellfish stocks. 
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Local Shellfish Licensing 
 
The centrepiece of SSMO's body of regulations has been the establishment of a local 
licensing scheme for shellfish fishermen. Under this scheme persons may only fish 
commercially for shellfish within the area covered by the Order with a Shetland Shellfish 
Licence issued by the SSMO. Licences are annually renewable on payment of a licence fee 
set at £100, but a significant increase is being considered by the SSMO. From an early 
stage the SSMO was keen to avoid any trade in Shetland Shellfish Licences, and especially 
the escalation in licence values that has been seen in the demersal and pelagic sectors of 
the fishing industry. The Shetland Shellfish Licence is non-transferable and has no inherent 
value. 
 The SSMO was initially required to grant a licence to all applicants with a track 
record of fishing for shellfish around Shetland, but thereafter the issue of new licences was 
at the discretion of the SSMO. It was intended that the licensing scheme would allow the 
Organisation to control future expansion in the level of fishing effort by controlling access 
by new entrants to the shellfish fisheries. It was also intended to limit access by large 
vessels from outside Shetland. 
 Just over 160 licences were granted by the SSMO in 2000, the first year that the 
Regulating Order's was in force, but this fell to about 130 in 2001 and 2002. Most of the 
fall between 2000 and 2001 is believed to have resulted from the non-renewal of licences 
by non-active fishermen who had initially applied for a licence but who did not 
subsequently feel that it was worth their renewing it because they were not fishing, or not 
enough to justify the £100 fee. 
 
Other Regulations 
 
In addition to the local licensing scheme the SSMO has also introduced a variety of other 
regulations, which are summarised below. As was mentioned above, in the absence of 
stock assessments and scientific advice on the status of shellfish stocks, the SSMO's 
regulations to date have been based on fishermen's concerns. 
 
Regulations Approved in March 2000 
- no vessel may be used to fish for shellfish if it exceeds 17 metres in overall length, 
unless it is used solely to dredge for scallops; 
- no vessel used to dredge for scallops may use more than two tow-bars each with a 
maximum length of 5.85 metres, or more than 14 dredges; 
- the use of any form of hydraulic or suction dredge, or any similar type of fishing 
gear, is prohibited; 
- the use of French dredges is prohibited; 
- the buoys attached to static fishing gear must be clearly marked with the vessels 
name and registration number; 
- the minimum landing size for whelks is 75 mm overall length (confer EU 45 mm). 
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Regulations Approved July 2001 
- fishing for velvet crabs (Necora puber) is prohibited from 1 May to 31 August each 
year; 
- the minimum landings size for velvet crabs is 70 mm carapace width (confer UK 
65 mm); 
- the minimum landings size for lobsters is 90 mm carapace length (confer EU 85 mm; 
87 mm from 1st January 2002). 
 
Regulations being processed 
- no vessel used to dredge for scallops may use more than two tow-bars with a 
combined maximum length, or a single tow-bar with maximum length, of more than 
8.80 metres, or more than 10 dredges (amendment to existing regulation); 
- no vessel may fish for scallops before 0600 h or after 2100 h. 
 
Other Activities 
 
As well as issuing regulations, the SSMO looks at other measures that might be taken to 
improve local shellfish fisheries. To date these have focussed on lobsters, as the highest 
value local shellfish species, and one whose stocks were severely depleted in the past. The 
Organisation initially looked at the possibility of stock enhancement through the release of 
juvenile lobsters but the impossibility of obtaining sufficient numbers, the cost of those 
that were available, the logistical difficulties of releasing the lobsters, and uncertainties of 
their survival, led to this idea being shelved. 
 The SSMO switched its attention instead to V-notching of lobsters. This involves 
cutting a V-shaped notch into the tail of a lobster which is then released back into the sea. 
Under existing national regulations it is illegal to land a V-notched lobster, i.e. if a 
fisherman catches a lobster that has been notched, he has to release it. Usually egg-bearing 
female lobsters are notched, thus protecting the brood stock. 
 The SSMO received a grant from the Shetland Islands Council in 2001 to carry out a 
V-notching programme. This involved fishermen bringing in female lobsters which were 
notched by an SSMO representative. The fishermen were paid the value of the notched 
lobsters which they then returned to the sea. The programme proved very successful with a 
high level of interest, enthusiasm and participation from fishermen. Indeed the demand 
outstripped the availability of funds. Many fishermen continue to show a high level of 
interest in the fate of 'their' notched lobsters, providing information on where and when 
they are caught again. 
 In terms of involving fishermen, the lobster V-notching programme has been the 
most successful thing the SSMO has done, probably because of its tangible results, i.e. the 
fishermen can see that the notched lobsters are surviving and being caught again and again. 
The SSMO is keen to continue this programme but its future is tied up with the wider 
problem of funding, which is discussed below. 
 The SSMO has also considered the possibility of enhancing local scallop stocks 
using hatchery-reared spat, which are available in large numbers but as yet no decisions on 
this have been taken. 
 117
4.2.7 Evaluation of the SSMO 
 
Successes of the Shetland shellfish management organisation 
 
In general terms the SSMO can probably reasonably be considered as a success. Even 
obtaining the Order was an achievement. 
 Perhaps the most significant success of the SSMO is the high level of compliance 
with the primary management measure - the local shellfish-licensing scheme. Virtually all 
of the legitimate local shellfish fishermen (i.e. those with registered fishing vessels and 
national fishing licences), including a number from outside Shetland who fish regularly 
around Shetland, have signed up to the licensing scheme. Even the most recalcitrant and 
determined opponents of the Order have generally fallen into line. 
 Ensuring the sustainability of Shetland's shellfish fisheries, and potentially enhancing 
catches, are obviously long-term objectives and it will be some time before the success of 
the SSMO in these terms can be judged. 
 
Problems of the Shetland shellfish management organisation 
 
Although the SSMO can justifiably be regarded as a success, it has not been without its 
problems. 
 
Time Delays 
A significant cause of frustration for the Shetland Shellfish Management Organisation is 
the requirement to obtain government approval for any change to the organisation's 
regulations. If the Organisation seeks to amend or add a regulation then it is usually 
because it feels that the change is needed now, not in three or four months time. If a serious 
situation were to arise that required immediate action, the length of time to get changes to 
the regulations approved would compromise the success of the measures. 
 Delays in the approval of new or amended regulations also undermine the SSMO's 
credibility. Where fishermen, for example, have requested a change in regulations, then 
delays in implementing that change may be seen as the fault of the SSMO rather than the 
Scottish Executive. This was particularly apparent during the development of the 
Regulating Order when there was significant criticism from some fishermen over the 
length of time this process took with the blame largely being placed on the SSMO. 
 
Financial Support 
Managing a fishery involves the expenditure of money to fund the administration of the 
management system, to pay for the scientific work necessary to assess the status of the 
stocks being managed, and to pay for the policing and enforcement of fisheries regulations. 
In most UK fisheries, these costs are borne by the government and funded out of the 
nation's general taxation. In Scotland government funding for the FRS Marine Laboratory 
(responsible for fisheries research, stock assessment, et cetera) and for the Scottish 
Fisheries Protection Agency (responsible for enforcement) amounts to approximately 5% 
of the value of fish landed (~£200 million per annum) each. 
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 With Regulating Orders, however, the grantee is responsible for paying all of the 
costs with no financial assistance from central government. The rate used nationally would 
suggest a cost for the SSMO of between £150,000 and £200,000 given the current value of 
the local shellfish fishery. The SSMO's budget to date has been nowhere near such levels, 
and has been derived partly from licence fees, with most of the balance coming from grants 
from the Shetland Islands Council and other local agencies. 
 No secure long-term funding strategy has yet been put in place for the organisation, 
but it seems unlikely that sufficient funding can be derived directly from the fishing 
industry (through licence fees, et cetera). A budget of £150,000 would require a licence fee 
in excess of £1,000 which most fishermen would probably find un acceptable. Indeed there 
would be a diminishing return as higher licence fees would result in fewer licences being 
issued; so the licence fee would have to be increased further to compensate, and so on. 
Indeed it might be argued that it is unreasonable to expect that the local shellfish fishermen 
should be expected to pay for the management of their fishery since no other fishermen in 
the UK are asked to do so. 
 Nevertheless, without significant, secure, long-term funding the SSMO will find it 
difficult to carry out the work required to effectively manage and enhance local shellfish 
fisheries. 
 
Enforcement 
The problems of enforcing the SSMO's regulations are similar to the funding problems. On 
a national basis enforcement of fisheries regulations is the responsibility of government-
funded enforcement agencies, such as the Scottish Fisheries Protection Agency (the 
SFPA). Yet the SFPA will not play any role in enforcing the Shetland Regulating Order. 
Responsibility for enforcement lies with the SSMO, but as discussed above the 
Organisation requires funding to do this effectively. If this money were to come from the 
fishermen (through licence fees, et cetera) it would place the shellfish fishermen of 
Shetland in the unique situation that they are expected to pay for their own policing. Again 
the SSMO feels that there is a strong case for government agencies to play at least a role in 
enforcing Regulating Orders, or for a public contribution to Regulating Order grantees. 
 An additional problem with enforcement is that the legal powers granted to the 
SSMO under the regulating order are weak in comparison with the powers held by the 
SFPA. For example, an officer of the SSMO has no explicit legal right to board a vessel or 
to search that vessel, examine its catch, et cetera. Nor does the SSMO have any explicit 
right to detain a vessel or to inspect catches after they have been landed. 
 The difficulties of enforcement threaten the credibility of the Order as although most 
fishermen abide by the rules, they strongly resent the SSMO's apparent inability to take 
effective action against those who break the rules. 
 
Non-Compliance 
Despite the fact that virtually all legitimate local shellfish fishermen now comply with the 
principal management measures introduced, the SSMO is aware that a number (possibly as 
high as 20 to 30) of local people fish for shellfish on a commercial basis without a national 
fishing licence and without a registered fishing vessel, as well as without a Shetland 
Shellfish Licence. Most of these are fishing with creels for species such as crabs and 
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lobsters which are generally sold for cash; some shellfish buyers appear not to ask too 
many questions. 
 Such fishermen are of course in breach of national fisheries regulations, the 
enforcement of which is the responsibility of the Scottish Fisheries Protection Agency. 
Collecting sufficient evidence to prosecute such fishermen is a difficulty. However, the 
fact that such fishermen are allowed to continue with their illegal activities, and the fact the 
SSMO apparently does nothing about it, causes resentment amongst legitimate fishermen. 
 The other major non-compliance issue is occasional visitations by large fishing 
vessels from outside Shetland. There have been at least two high-profile occasions when 
large vessels from outside Shetland fished with creels for crabs within the regulating order 
area without a Shetland Shellfish Licence. 
 The problems of enforcement meant that it was not possible in either case for the 
SSMO to take any direct legal action against the vessels concerned, which again caused 
resentment amongst local fishermen. However, it is worth noting that in the first case, 
which occurred not long after the order came into force, the vessel withdrew after the 
SSMO notified its owners of the existence of the order. In the second case also, which 
occurred early in 2002, once the skippers and owners of the two vessels concerned were 
made aware of the order, those vessels withdrew. 
 
Fair Isle 
Fair Isle is the most southerly of the Shetland Islands, lying approximately halfway 
between Shetland the neighbouring Orkney Islands. Fair Isle has a very small indigenous 
lobster fishery, carried out with small, open boats. Most of the commercial shellfish fishing 
around Fair Isle is carried out by an Orcadian fisherman who has fished there for many 
years. In view of his track record the SSMO had no alternative but to grant this fisherman a 
Shetland Shellfish Licence which allowed him to continue fishing around Fair Isle. This 
caused considerable resentment amongst the Fair Isle community who felt that outsiders 
should be excluded to reserve the local fishery for the Fair Islanders. The Fair Isle 
community has ambitious plans for protected areas around Fair Isle for shellfish and fish. 
These are intended both to protect the marine environment, but also to allow the 
development of an indigenous fishing industry. 
 The problem facing the SSMO is that the Shetland order is intended to regulate 
shellfish fisheries around all of Shetland, and the Organisation does not feel that it should 
use its powers to create exclusive reserves for specific communities. Every community 
would want one. 
 
4.2.8 Discussion 
 
Regulating Orders have been promoted in Scotland by the government as putting the 
management of shellfish fisheries in the hands of local communities, and as an example of 
Devolution in action. Two and half years after the Shetland regulating order came into 
force, it is appropriate to ask whether the order has lived up to expectations. Has the 
Scottish government genuinely devolved power to a local organisation? 
 Devolution has been defined as a broad transfer of power, where the transferred 
powers do not appear to remain subject to control by the devolving institution (Karlsen et 
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al., Sharing Responsibilities in Fisheries Management: Analytical and Methodological 
Issues). As has been discussed above, however, the 'powers' 'devolved' in the case of 
regulating orders remain subject to very tight control by the devolving institution (the 
Scottish Executive). The grantee of an order has to grant licences to all applicants and is 
not able to implement varied licence fees (for example for different sized vessels). In 
addition, and perhaps more significantly, all regulations are subject to approval by the 
Minister. A further restraint is that it normally takes a significant length of time for 
approval to be granted. 
 Given this degree of continued control by the Scottish Executive, it has to questioned 
whether there has been any genuine transfer of power. The regulating order has not 
devolved power at all. What it has done effectively is to establish a mechanism for 
implementing regulations for the management of local shellfish fisheries, but without any 
real authority to make regulations independently. To all intents and purposes the SSMO 
has been granted responsibility but not authority. 
 The Scottish Executive effectively retains control of the fishery while the SSMO 
bears the responsibility of implementing and enforcing the regulations, collecting data, 
assessing the stocks, and dealing with discontented fishermen, all at no charge to the 
Scottish Executive. A cynic might suggest that the Scottish Executive has come up with a 
system which the Executive can control, but which costs nothing. 
 In terms of the definitions provided by (Karlsen et al., Sharing Responsibilities in 
Fisheries Management: Analytical and Methodological Issues) the SSMO appears to be a 
case of 'Delegation' rather than 'Devolution'. 
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5. Denmark 
 
 
 
5.1 Devolution of responsibilities in Danish fisheries management 
 
Who takes responsibility and for what? - New trends in the Herring and Protein fisheries 
in the North Sea and Skagerrak? 
 
 
5.2 Introduction 
 
In the wake of the Law of the Sea Convention a new management regime of the European 
fisheries have been introduced. The nation state has got extended rights and obligations in 
management of fish resources within their national economic zone. The sustainable 
management principle laid down in the convention has later been followed up in the Rio 
Declaration and the Convention on Biodiversity and the Precautionary Principle for 
management. Endangered species have been given protection. The single species and their 
place in the ecosystem have been given formal protection to extinction. An ecological 
approach to management has in principle been adopted as the very foundation for 
management. Sustainable management implies more than the long termed rationality of 
economic exploitation of a biological resource, it also brings in an ethical dimension in 
management. The resource has a value of its own, independent of economic exploitation. 
 While access to fish resources traditionally has been more or less open for people 
living at the coast, this situation has changed drastically during some few decades. Over-
exploitation and increased competition, have led to quota regulations of most of the 
commercially exploited species and stricter practise of access to the fisheries. The 
allocation of rights to access and quotas has increased the tensions and conflicts within the 
industry as well as among nations sharing fish stocks. Besides, detailed regulations will to 
some degree imply externalities not foreseen. The impacts of regulations will not only 
comprise the fishermen. When regulations are working over time, they will also have 
impacts for fishery dependent communities and regions. 
 The individual actor will generally adapt to the fishing terms to maximise his 
interests within the given frame - or beyond. If regulations are regarded unjust or 
illegitimate, the motivation for abiding with the rules will be less than in regulatory 
situations with high legitimacy. This is a question of how regulations are perceived by the 
actors and whether those affected have been given the opportunity to influence on the 
outlining of the policy. 
 The outlining of regulative decisions and their implementation take place in a 
political context. Organised fishing interests become political actors when their vital 
interests are affected by state policy. The character of the contacts, influencing activities 
and their outcomes may differ among the affected groups, both within and among western 
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fishery nations. The informal and formal patterns of contact and co-operation may be 
organised in different ways and with variations in effects and degree of success. 
 The management of two very important Danish fisheries, the 'protein' fishery (for 
production of fish meal and fish oil) and the herring fishery (for human consumption) are 
at present under significant change, but for different reasons. In both cases the motivation 
for change should be considered 'increased responsibility' under the conservation and 
economic paradigm respectively. 
 The management of the protein fishery is under change because of growing 
international concern for the sustainability of the fisheries in the North Sea in general, 
concern for the marine and terrestrial bio-diversity dependent on the North Sea and up-
coming suggestions on eco-system management as an alternative to the present resource 
management system by fish species. New stakeholders such as international 
environmentalist organisations have entered the scene and claim influence on the 
management decisions. The changes have over the last less than ten years materialised in 
new types of regulations for example TAC on all 'protein' species, closed areas, by-catch 
limitations and improved enforcement of regulations. It is envisaged that the management 
of the Danish protein fisheries will increasingly become politicised at particularly EU-level 
in the years to come and that Danish 'protein' fishermen will increasingly be alienated from 
the management debate and marginalised in decision making. 
 The management of the herring fishery is under change because of the introduction 
of ITQs. This marks a significant management change at the national level and follows 
upon a heated debate on access to fish resources primarily among fishermen and other 
professionals in the fisheries sector. The rationale behind this change is a political wish to 
see structural changes in the herring fishing fleet come through and secure optimal use of 
the fish resources. If successful, ITQs may be introduced in other Danish fisheries to 
facilitate structural changes and better resource utilisation. 
 
 
5.3 Fisheries Management in Denmark 
 
5.3.1 The European context 
 
Being member of the European Union (EU) Denmark is subject to the EU Common 
Fisheries Policy (CFP). All-important decisions concerning fisheries management in EU 
waters became an EU matters in January 1983 when the CFP was adopted. All national 
policy-making and management actions have to fit within this policy framework. 
 In brief the CFP determines: 
- the size of the TACs and their allocation among member states; 
- the fleet capacity of the member states; 
- the minimum withdrawal price scheme. 
 
 The conservation and management of fish resources in EU waters are primarily 
based upon catch limitation. The instruments used are fixed total allowable catches (TACs) 
for the most important species and technical conservation measures. The TACs are divided 
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into national quotas and Member States are being allocated the same percentages of the 
TACs every year (the relative stability). 
 User/stakeholder involvement in decision-making in relation to EU policies takes 
place through the Advisory Committee for Fisheries and Aquaculture, a committee which 
is established by the Commission as a part of its internal work on drafting proposals. The 
committee is composed of twenty members, representing the fishing industry, aquaculture, 
processing, trade unions, consumers, environmentalists and development organisations. 
The Advisory Committee contains four working groups dealing with 1) resources and 
management, 2) aquaculture, 3) markets and 4) horizontal questions for example CFP after 
year 2002 or R&D programmes.  
 
5.3.2 The national management system 
 
Within the framework of the CFP the Danish Government determines its national fisheries 
policy. The Fishery Law states that the Danish Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fisheries 
(MFAF) has the right to: 
- define access to and exclusion from fisheries through the distribution of licenses; 
- set-up operational rules and management tasks (in accordance with EU rules); 
- transfer/sale rights (for example quota substitution with other countries). 
 
 Denmark has a very well developed consultative process in relation to policy 
formulation, where organisations within the fishing industry and others participate 
formally in various committees and boards. The organisational percentage in the Danish 
fishing industry is close to 100%. 
 Stakeholder organisations presently admitted to the consultative fora are: Danish 
Fishermen's Association, Danish Fishermen's Producer Organisation, Skagen Fishermen's 
Producer Organisation, Denmark's Pelagic Producer Organisation, General Workers Union 
in Denmark, The Association of Danish Fish Processing Industries and Exporters, The 
Association of Fish Meal and Fish Oil Manufacturers in Denmark, The Consumers' 
Council in Denmark, The Danish Society for the Conservation of Nature. 
 Fishermen's associations and labour unions have existed in Denmark for more than a 
century. The labour unions became actively involved in the fisheries sector in the early 
1970s. The PO system was introduced in Denmark in 1973, when the country joined the 
EC. 
 
Management objectives 
 
In the Fishery Act (Act Number 281 of 12 May 1999) it is stipulated that the regulation 
shall attach importance to: 
 
'Rationale conservation and reproduction of living resources, including seasonally optimal 
exploitation of resources, consideration given to the relationship between available 
resources and the fishing capacity, as well as economic and employment issues within the 
fishing industry, the processing industry and other related activities, both generally and by 
geographical regions which may be affected.' 
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 The Act has a very broad mandate, and there is no clear objective for fisheries 
management as in many other countries. Danish fisheries management appears to be 
dominated by the conservation paradigm, as regulations do primarily cater for the fish 
resources. The social/community paradigm, which is concerned with distribution and 
equity, seems to have gained some impact on policy decisions in recent years as equitable 
distribution among fishers appear to be given priority within MFAF. Policies that support 
initiatives directly oriented towards the development needs of local fishing communities 
are rare. 
 
Collective choice rights 
 
MFAF can determine the fisheries regulation for the commercial exploitation of the Danish 
quotas as follows: 
- divide the Danish quota over time and on fishing waters; 
- completely or partly introduce a ban on fishing for specific species or specify the 
condition under which the fishing might be carried out, when the catches in a 
particular fishery has reached a certain level of the available quotas in this fishery; 
- divide the available quotas to specific fleet segments, individual vessels or according 
to applied gear; 
- divide the available quotas in accordance with the utilisation purposes including 
human consumption or fish meal; 
- determine the maximum fishing time, the number of landings allowed and the 
maximum volume per landing; and 
- set aside a particular proportion of the quotas to cover bi-catches. 
 
Quota regulation 
 
In 20021, the following general principles applied to the Danish quota regulation: 
- the annual quotas for each fishing area are distributed as percentages over periods of 
time, most often as quarterly quotas, but with longer or shorter time periods; 
- rationing, in the form of maximum catch-rations on a periodic basis (ranging from 
one or two weeks in some fisheries or two months in other fisheries) are aimed at 
improving fishermen's planning possibilities. The catch rations are typically 
differentiated according to the size of the vessel; 
- in the herring and mackerel fisheries in the North Sea and Skagerrak, 85% of the 
Danish quotas is allocated as individual annual vessel quotas, and 15% is allocated as 
periodical catch rations for vessels not regulated by annual vessel quotas. The 
individual vessel quota is determined as a combination of the length of the vessel and 
the historical catch record of the vessel each counting for 50%, when the calculation 
is made. Furthermore, an individual vessel license is required for participating in the 
herring and mackerel fisheries; 
                                                 
1 Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fisheries Order No. 996 of 7 December 2001. 
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- in the Baltic cod fishery, fishermen have the option either to choose an annual catch 
ration or to be regulated by periodic catch rations, similar to those used in other 
Danish fisheries. 
 
Decision-making process 
 
Denmark has, like the other Scandinavian countries, developed a historical tradition of 
participation of interest groups at a high level, as well as in more detailed policy 
discussions concerning the determination of development objectives for specific sectors of 
the economy. The present Scandinavian model of the 'negotiation economy' (Pedersen 
1989) can be traced back to the cooperative movement in the beginning of the last century 
and to the constitution of labour market institutions in the beginning of this century. Today, 
the political system is characterised by integration of interest groups in the institutions of 
policy making. In contrast the interest groups of many other EU member states are 
effectively sidelined during formal policy making as they only have lobbying roles. 
 The property rights regime in place determines the involvement of fishermen in the 
decision-making process, which influences the incentives for collective action and rule 
compliance. To associate decision-making arrangements in the Danish fisheries with 
Ostrom's 'bundle of rights' (Schlager and Ostrom, 1993) it is necessary to identify the 
levels at which decisions on fisheries management tasks are made and the actors who 
participate in the decision-making process. 
 The political system of fisheries management ought to be approached within this 
political culture. Even if the resource system is quite centralised and is state property 
according to Danish law, cooperative institutions are established in Danish fisheries 
management at a consultative level (Raakjær Nielsen, 1994). 
 
Stakeholder participation 
 
The institutional set-up within Danish fisheries policy consists of a political component: 
Parliament and the Committee for Agriculture and Fisheries (Parliamentary committee), 
and an administrative component, MFAF. 
 Decision-making in Danish fisheries management is centralised. However, 
cooperative institutions comprising sectoral organisations and interest groups influence 
quota allocation and, to a lesser degree, structural measures through representation in 
consultative fora. In Denmark the following two arenas are particularly important for 
stakeholder/user participation in the policy-making process: The EU Fishery Board and the 
Board for Commercial Fishing. MFAF in general follows advice from these two boards: 
 The EU Fishery Board advises the Minister on how Denmark shall respond in the EU 
Council of Ministers to proposals drafted by the Commission, and on how decisions 
already made by the EU can be implemented in Danish legislation. The board is composed 
of representatives from the Fishermen (both DF and PO's), the Fish Processors, the Trade 
Union, the Consumers' Council and the Danish Society for the Conservation of Nature. 
 Besides informing the Minister of Fisheries of their views the organisations of the 
fishing industry in general accompany representatives from MFAF when they negotiate 
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important affairs in the Council of Ministers or elsewhere, for example in EU negotiations 
with Norway or in the Baltic Fishery Commission. 
 During the negotiations MFAF representatives can consult the users and get their 
opinion on different proposals and can take this into consideration during the negotiation. 
 The Board for Commercial Fishing advises the Minister in relation to national 
policy-making, in other words, about how the national quota should be administered. This 
board is composed of representatives of the fishermen, the processors, the trade union and 
MFAF. The Board for Commercial Fishing contains subcommittees and ad hoc working 
groups, dealing with particular fisheries, structural measures and experiments on 
alternative regulation methods, also the Capacity Board, which makes recommendations on 
licenses and permits is a subcommittee under this board. In addition there have been 
several working groups referring to the Board for Commercial Fishing. 
 
 
5.4 Management of the Danish Protein Fishery 
 
5.4.1 Historical background 
 
The Danish fisheries targeted at fish meal and fish oil production (in this document 
referred to as the Danish protein fishery) dates back to the early 1950s when abundant 
stocks of herring, for which there was no market for human consumption, were discovered 
in the North Sea. A Norwegian fish meal and oil factory vessel readily available facilitated 
the starting up of production at a large scale in Esbjerg, the capital of the Danish protein 
fishery. In the following years the protein fishery expanded and a large number of factories 
were set up along the Danish west coast, many of them by fishers forming cooperatives 
(the only major sub-sector where the cooperative movement got permanent foothold in the 
Danish fisheries). The protein fishery soon began to target other species also; many of 
them species never or rarely used for human consumption for example sand eel, Norway 
pout and sprat. However, during the 1960s and 70s large amounts of edible fish also found 
their way to the Danish fish meal and oil factories, primarily as by-catch in the protein 
fishery. Being the only EU-country undertaking protein fishery Denmark during the 1980s 
and 1990s got the reputation among the other EU member states of undertaking 
'destructive' fishing for proteins. 
 The Danish protein fishery peaked in the mid 1970s when around 1.5 million tons of 
fish was landed by Danish vessels for fish meal and oil production, representing 85% of 
the total landings of Danish fishers. Landings in the period 1996 to 2001 were in the range 
of 1.0-1.2 million tons, which is about 70% of the Danish total. In economic terms the 
protein fishery counts for about 20% of the total value of the fish landings in Denmark. 
 
5.4.2 Target species in the protein fishery 
 
The most important species in the Danish protein fishery are sand eel, sprat, Norway pout 
and blue whiting which together counts for 90% of the total landings. Sand eel is primarily 
caught in the Central North Sea (ICES area IVb) during the months April through July. 
Annual catches range from 500,000 to 900,000 tons. Sprat is mainly caught from 
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September through March. Annual catches range from 90,000 to 205,000 tons. Norway 
pout and blue whiting are mainly caught in the Northern part of the North Sea (ICES area 
IVa). Annual catches (July to January) of Norway pout range from 50,000 to 150,000 tons 
and annual catches of blue whiting range (all year round) range from 30,000 to 60,000 
tons. 
 
5.4.3 The Danish protein fishing fleet 
 
The Danish protein fishery is mainly a trawl fishery in which about 400 vessels >15 meters 
take part. For the small trawlers of the size 15-24 meters, which counts for 60% by 
numbers the protein fishery on average only counts for about 15% of the total revenues. 
For the 135 medium-sized trawlers of 24-40 meters some 45 are entirely dependant on the 
protein fishery for their income whereas the dependency of the rest varies between 15 and 
50%. For 32 big-size trawlers >40 meters some 13 are heavily dependant on the protein 
fishery whereas the other 19 (named the 'pelagic' trawlers) generate about 50% of their 
revenue from this fishery. 
 
5.4.4 Socio-economic impact 
 
The protein fishery provides jobs and income for about 500 people onboard the fishing 
vessels (calculated on full-time basis) and another 500 ashore, primarily in Esbjerg, 
Hanstholm and Skagen where the 3 remaining fish meal and oil processing plants in 
Denmark are situated. 
 
5.4.5 Management of the protein fishery (Decision making arrangements) 
 
Management of the Danish protein fishery is based on TACs, closed areas, mesh size 
regulations and by-catch restrictions. TACs are set for all targeted species and Denmark is 
for most species allocated the lion's share of quantities available to the EU in the North 
Sea. The TACs of sand eel and sprat are both set within safe biological limits (ICES 2001). 
In practise the catches seldom reach the TACs. The closed areas include the 95,000 km2 
Norway pout (gear restriction) box introduced in 1995 to reduce catches of juvenile 
haddock and whiting, the 18,000 km2 sand eel (no fishing) box introduced in 2000 to 
increase food security of water birds and other animals and the sprat (no fishing) box 
(ICES area IVa and b) introduced in 2002 to avoid by-catches of herring.  
 The application of the above-mentioned management measures are all decided upon 
at the EU-level by the Council of Ministers on the basis of motions prepared by the EU 
Commission. The utilisation of the Danish national quotas is decided upon by the Ministry 
of Food, Agriculture and Fisheries in consultation with advisory board as explained in 
section 2. 
 At the sector level the Danish Fishermen's Association, DFA, has established a 
number of regional and technical committees that supervises the use of the quotas and give 
advice to DFA. 
 All Danish fishing vessels having a licence to fish can participate in the protein 
fishery. In practical terms only the above-mentioned 400 trawlers are active in this sub-
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sector. At the local level the fishery may be informally managed/coordinated through 
intervention from particular the local fish meal and oil processing plans (the 2 larges are 
co-ops accounting for >95% of all Danish production). 
 
5.4.6 Incentives to coordinate and cooperate 
 
For decades the Danish protein fishery has been exposed to heavy criticism, not the least 
from abroad. Foreign fishers, fishermen's associations and environmentalists/ 
environmental organisations and public authorities have from different viewpoints pointed 
to the inappropriateness of this particular fishery. Initially, the criticism had a fishery focus 
- pointing to the by-catches of fish suitable for human consumption and the impact of by -
catches on the standing stocks. Criticism of this kind, among others, paved the way for the 
introduction of the Norway pout box. Until the mid-1990s the criticism did not include the 
fishery for sand eel because of the limited by-catch of fish for human consumption in this 
fishery. However, since the mid 1990s the criticism of the protein fishery has increasingly 
been related to environmental concerns. Now the focus is on the negative impact of the 
protein fishery on other animals that feed on the same resources, for example water birds. 
This criticism comprises all of the protein fisheries including the sand eel fishery and 
resulted in the introduction of the sand eel box. The decline in the stocks of important 
species for human consumption that has been observed in the North Sea in recent years has 
put focus back on the by-catches, and paved the way for much stricter control of 
compliance with rules and regulations. The extensive by-catch of herring in the sprat 
fishery has led to the implementation of the sprat box on the Danish west coast.  At present 
the Danish protein fishery has again come under heavy fire in the discussions of the new 
CFP. 
 In the management of the Danish protein fisheries different stakeholder groups 
pursue different objectives. The Danish fishing and fish processing industry and local 
fishing communities are focused on economic issues. In contrast bird conservationists like 
the Royal Society of Protection of the Birds (RSPB) and environmental organisation such 
as WWF and Greenpeace are concerned about environmental issues. In addition, and most 
likely because Denmark is the only EU member state with a substantial protein fishery, the 
protein fishery has been used as target by other member states in order to move focus from 
problems in their own fisheries.1 The viewpoints confer by national governments in 
relation to the management of the protein fishery are often used to pursue broader interests 
within the CFP and advocate for national interests more than they objectively address 
management issues. UK stakeholders argue that declining whiting, haddock and cod 
catches are caused by by-catches of these species in the Norway pout fishery. However, 
 
                                                 
1 A recent example is that the Spanish minister of fisheries in the debate on the reform of the CFP proposed 
by the European Commission is accusing the Danish protein fisheries of being unsustainable, all knowing 
that the hidden agenda is to get focus away from a huge reduction of the capacity of the Spanish fleet and for 
Spain to get access to the North Sea. 
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UK fishers have a considerable discard1 of whiting and haddock (ICES, 2001); (Krog, 
1993).  
 A recent study of stakeholder preferences for management of the Danish Protein 
fisheries (Raakjær Nielsen and Mathiesen, 2002) makes it easier to understand stakeholder 
incentives to coordinate and cooperate. The study focuses on twelve active stakeholders.2
 The aggregated preference structure from the above-mentioned study clearly points 
towards minimising by-catches, even the Danish industry representatives' express 
relatively high preference for this sub-objective. Regarding the political objectives the 
preferences are somewhat mixed. All Danish stakeholders and WWF have low preferences 
for closing the protein fishery. In contrast MAFF has this as its top preference to stop the 
protein fishery. NFFO and the environment-oriented stakeholders except WWF also 
express a relatively high preference for closing the protein fishery. Nevertheless, this sub-
objective has the lowest preference in the aggregated structure. 
 All the environmental groups express highest or second highest preference for 
minimising fishing down the food-web or minimising the impact of the protein fishery on 
birds, marine mammals etc. This is a very strong indication, that biodiversity issues are 
considered very important for these stakeholders. 
 DFA and AFMD are most concerned about profitability in the protein fishery at its 
present level. The two associations represent people having invested in the protein fishery 
or processing. It should, however, be noted, that the largest proportion of the members of 
DFA is not involved in the protein fishery. 
 A cluster analysis shows that there are significant overlaps in opinions of 
stakeholders. The analysis supports that 3 major perspectives exists on the management of 
the protein fishery: An environment focused perspective, a balanced eco-fishery 
perspective and an economic - oriented perspective. 
 
5.4.7 Challenges ahead for management of the protein fishery  
 
We expect, that the Danish protein fishery in the North Sea will continue to be challenged 
by the non industrial catch sector (UK) and environment-driven stakeholders, who 
advocate for more restrictive regulations. The reform of the CFP (European Commission, 
2002) also indicates a shift in management strategy from a fisheries approach towards an 
ecosystem-based approach. If the EU Council of Ministers approves this change in 
                                                 
1 Around 24,000 tons of whiting are discarded annually, and mainly in human consumption fisheries, making 
the whiting by-catch of 5,000 tons in the protein fishery less significant (ICES 2001). However, the figures 
do not reflect the full biological impact of the by-catch as the by-catch of whiting in the protein fishery often 
consists of undersized fish and thus include many more individuals compared to the numbers which are 
discarded in the human-consumption fishery. 
2 The Danish Fishermen's Association (DFA); The Association of Fish Meal and Fish Oil Manufacturers in 
Denmark (AFMD) and the General Workers Union in Denmark (GWUD). Two British fishers' associations: 
The National Federation of Fishermen's Organisations (NFFO) and the Scottish Fishermen's Federation 
(SFF). Four environmental organisations: The Royal Society for Protection of the Birds (RSPB); the World 
Wildlife Fund for Nature (WWF); Greenpeace and the Danish Society for the Conservation of Nature 
(DSCN). Three government bodies: The Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fishery in Denmark (MFAF); the 
Danish Institute for Fisheries Research (DIFRES) and the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food in the 
UK (MAFF). MAFF is representing the views of both government and research in the UK. 
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management it will support environment-oriented interests at the expense of economic-
oriented interests and thus support development of a protein fishery with further 
restrictions in the years to come. 
 Given an increased focus on ecosystem-based management one can expect, that the 
sand eel fishery, already within safe biological limits (ICES, 2001), will be further 
restricted as issues like fishing down the food web, impact on birds and marine mammals 
and benthos caused by the fishery will have increased attention. The Norway pout fishery 
will in addition to the above-mentioned also has to pay attention to by-catch-beyond the 
existing measures (area closure and mesh-size regulations) which already reduces by-
catches. 
 The stakeholder preference eliciting process clearly indicates that biological issues 
are given high priority. Hand in hand with the move towards ecosystem-based 
management, no take zones (boxes) are gaining support in the EU as a management 
measure. Since the CFP was introduced boxes have been used as a tool to control the 
protein fishery in the North Sea. Despite, that Danish fishers are reluctant to boxes, this 
management instrument appear as the most appropriate tool for balancing the interest of 
economic and environmental-oriented stakeholders and still maintain a Danish protein 
fishery. The environmental and non-industrial stakeholders generally accept, the existence 
of a protein fishery, as long as the biological impact is minimised The challenge is then to 
find a compromise that will minimise the impact on the eco-system, and still make the 
fishery economic viable for the participating vessels and the processing plants ashore. 
 Based on qualitative interviews it becomes clear that the economic-oriented and 
environmental-oriented stakeholders have conflicting viewpoints. Nevertheless most 
stakeholders express interests in finding pragmatic solutions. In regard to this, it's 
interesting that the cluster analysis of the survey results places the WWF together with 
Danish government bodies. Such eco-fishery-oriented stakeholders can if they manage to 
form an alliance become important facilitators in establishing a dialogue among the more 
opponent stakeholders, but also as a single group become very influential in the decision-
making process. A main purpose of a dialogue would be to agree on a common set of 
objectives for management of the protein fishery, and to develop a common scientific 
knowledge base for stock assessment and impact analysis. In supplement to the scientific 
knowledge some of the stakeholders have extensive local knowledge (biological, 
economical, cultural), which might be of relevance for the management of the protein 
fishery. Scientific knowledge and the political use of scientific data have become 
increasingly influential in the environmental debate in general and on fisheries 
management in particular. Increasing demands for scientific data and growing expenses on 
research puts weight on the argument that fisheries management and the stakeholders 
would gain from cooperating instead of seeking unique and costly research data. Recent 
initiatives to talk and cooperate between the catch sector and environmental groups in 
Denmark and the UK are perhaps the seed to a future development. 
 In terms of practical regulation, one can foresee that boxes will remain as the key 
management tool. Several advantages are attached with this measure. Fishers have to some 
extent adapted to the exiting boxes, boxes are easy to monitor and finally it meets the 
objective of the future CFP, to limit fishing effort In case of the sand eel fishery the impact 
of the present box is to be evaluated in 2002/2003, and hopefully as part of this process a 
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dialogue can be established among management bodies and stakeholders. Although most 
protein fishers would like the protein fisheries less regulated, Danish protein fisher's have 
voluntary suggested to implement temporary boxes or seasonal closings (2-4 weeks) as to 
protect juveniles in the sand eel fishery. 
 However not suggested by the fishers, a similar strategy can be applied in the 
Norway pout fishery, The by-catch problem primarily occurs when fishing is undertaken in 
shallow waters, thus a temporary closures linked with water depths criteria could be 
considered as a measure to reduce by-catches of whiting or haddock without closing of 
larger areas as the Norway Pout Box. However, the practical set-up needs to be discussed 
in a co-management process with the stakeholders groups. The before mentioned initiative 
on protecting juveniles stranded as a result of internal disagreements and the fact that the 
organisations involved did not manage to cooperate with management authorities on 
designing regulations and monitoring hereof. 
 From the study it is evident that the group of stakeholders on the one hand include 
interest groups (the Danish catch sector and processing industry) with high risk taking and 
large investments in fisheries, and on the other hand organisations who (for example 
environmental groups) may argue for a substantial reduction in the protein fisheries 
without facing any economic and political consequences. This presents a major constraint 
for setting up co-management arrangements including larger complex stakeholder groups 
(Raakjaer Nielsen, et al., 2002). If stakeholders have no management responsibilities, 
strong incentives for opportunistic behaviour ('free riding') exists, in particular among 
radical environment-oriented stakeholders. However, most environmental groups do show 
a pragmatic approach to fisheries management, but as any political player, they also see 
this survey (AHP) as a tube for expression of principal and strategic statements to the EU 
(DG-Fish). 
 A future dialogue between stakeholders is both possible and necessary in order to 
reverse the historical disputes into a common agreement on management measures for the 
benefit of a broad set of interest groups (fishers, consumers, fish buyers, ornithologists, 
tourism, processing industries et cetera). With the current political support for a more 
holistic approach, the dialogue between stakeholders should include discussions on how to 
apply the 'new' concept of ecosystem-based management in general and for the protein 
fishery in particular - a debate which is perhaps just beginning in an EU context. Although 
often used in research and management contexts, the concept is still unclear and no 
specific implementation strategy exists (Degnbol, 2002) - which further complicates the 
decision-making process. 
 
 
5.5 Management of the Danish Herring Fisheries 
 
5.5.1 Historical background 
 
Fishing for herring has a century long tradition in Denmark and herring takes a prominent 
position in the Danish diet. This relates to the fishing for herring in the Danish 'inner' 
waters whereas fishing for herring in the open sea is of a more recent date. It was not until 
after World War II that landings of herring from the North Sea provided the basis for the 
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development of a large pelagic industry in Esbjerg, Hirtshals and Skagen on the Danish 
west coast. In Esbjerg the herring from the central North Sea became an important raw 
material for the production of fish proteins (fish meal and oil) and in North Jutland the 
herring from Skagerrak and the Northern North Sea supplied a fast growing filleting 
industry producing for human consumption in Denmark and Germany. 
 
5.5.2 Target species 
 
The herring stocks exploited by Danish fishers are in a fairly good shape and the 2002 
TAC set at the same level as in previous years (Danish quota in tons): Atlanto-Scandic 
(25,750), North Sea (38,457), Skagerrak/Kattegat (34,462). In addition Denmark is 
allowed a herring by-catch of some 50,000 tons. 
 
5.5.3 Fishing fleet 
 
Approximately 115 vessels (70 >24m, 23 24>x>15m and 23 <15 m) are employed in the 
herring fishery in the North Sea and Skagerrak. 24 of the vessels > 24 m are also targeting 
Atlanto-Scandic herring in the North Atlantic. 
 
5.5.4 Socio-economic importance 
 
The herring fishery is of particular importance to the two fishing communities Hirtshals 
and Skagen where port facilities have been established for quality handling of large 
quantities of raw herring for human consumption and the local processing industries 
specializing in semi-products for export provides jobs for many hundreds of people. 
 
5.5.5 Management of the herring fishery 
 
The Danish quota of herring for consumption has in recent years been split 85/15 in two 
pools. The 85% is divided among vessels with a track record in this fishery and an 
informal individual quota system has been in place for several years. The remaining 15% is 
reserved for vessels without a track record, as an instrument to maintain the herring fishery 
open for new comers or vessel that only want to participate in a particular season or year 
due to constraints in other fisheries. 
 After a decade of argumentation and lobbying from the herring processing industry 
and the Purse Seine PO the Danish Parliament in May 2002 decided to introduce an ITQ 
system in the Danish herring fisheries from 2003. A working group with representation 
from major stakeholder groups and MAFF was established to develop a Danish model and 
design an ITQ system that would fit in with other fisheries and practises. The system that 
will come into practise in a 5-year trial period (which may be extended for another 3 years) 
allocates most of the national herring quota to the vessels on the basis of an application and 
an assessment of the applicants' track record in the herring fishery (Danish Fisheries 
Directorate, 2002). A small part of the quota has been allocated to small vessels fishing on 
a day basis also and to new entrants (young skippers). 
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 The reason for introducing ITQs is a political wish to facilitate a restructuring of the 
fleet that will reduce the number of vessels and bring in some new vessels capable of 
supplying quality raw material to the processing industry. The ITQ scheme will be 
reviewed after five years. It is envisaged that a resource rent collection scheme may be 
introduced in due course after the review. 
 
5.5.6 Incentive to coordinate and cooperate 
 
Within DFA the debate on ITQs has been ongoing for several years. Fishers representing 
the purse seine vessels and larger trawlers have been strong advocates for the introduction 
of a management system that would allow long-term planning as well as temporary or 
permanent merging of vessel quotas. ITQs have been strongly opposed by fishers 
representing smaller vessels mainly for general fear of possible ownership concentration 
and loss of local livelihoods. For those reason the Working Group on ITQ established by 
MAFF soon became a battlefield. It was recently realised that DFA could not 
accommodate both viewpoints. For that reason the Pelagic Fishermen's Association have 
decided to withdraw from DFA. 
 The processing industry is in favour of ITQs and through the representation of the 
Association of Danish Fish Processing Industries and Exporters in the consultative boards 
and the ITQ Working Group of MAFF strongly supports the amendment of the Fisheries 
Law to allow for this quota allocation system. Other stakeholders such as the Consumer's 
Council and the Danish Society for the Conservation of Nature have not been active in the 
debate. 
 
 
5.6 Summary 
 
What can be learned from the way the policy-making and implementation of fisheries 
management is carried out in Denmark and the EU from the perspective of user or broader 
stakeholder participation? 
 International experience testifies that the chances for fisheries regulation to succeed 
without support from the fishermen are very slim, because fishermen almost always find 
ways of bypassing regulations Copes (1986). It is therefore of major importance, that the 
fisheries management policy is supported by the fishers. In a EU/Danish context the 
prevailing opinion among different user-groups and administrators is that the current 
conservation policy based on TAC is not an effective instrument to maintain the resources 
at a steady level. In addition, the current conservation policy often brings the fishers in a 
dilemma (in relation to by-catch and discard) where he is forced to react irrationally if he 
wants to follow the regulation. The fishers are seen as victims of a mistaken fishery policy, 
and this fact adds to the lack of legitimacy. 
 At least up to this point in time users/stakeholders only to a very limited extent had 
influence on the CFP as the EU Commission, in the past at least, did not have the habit of 
listening to the Advisory Committee for Fisheries Questions during the preparation of its 
proposals (Hoel, 1993). This situation might hopefully be changed with the new 
organisational set-up for user/stakeholder involvement at EU level. 
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 In Denmark, as in the other Scandinavian countries, stakeholder involvement in the 
decision-making process is part of the democratic cultural heritage, where interest-group 
representation is integrated in the political system. Within the framework of the CFP 
stakeholders have in Denmark a high degree of influence, and in recent years the advisory 
function has been broadened out, and has moved from a narrow user involvement to 
include a larger stakeholder perspective by including consumers and environmentalists, 
which again reflects the general development within the Danish society, where emphasis 
also within the Ministry has changed from being mainly industry oriented to taking a 
broader stakeholder perspective in relation to management. 
 In this respect the legitimacy of the management system is challenged from two 
sides, as two different types of legitimacy objectives, external vis a vis internal, are at risk. 
In this respect the Danish case studies represent both and internal (the herring fishery) and 
an external (the protein fishery) it will be interesting to further analysis how to cope with 
these issues. In Denmark and EU users claim, that their interests are losing out to other 
stakeholders, and the management system might establish external legitimacy within the 
broader society, but lose internal legitimacy among the users, and hereby be caught in an 
ethical dilemma. This is a great challenge for fisheries management in the future. In 
addition as pointed out by Jentoft (2000:146): 'The lack of opportunities for users to 
collectively take on a proactive and responsible role in the management is another causal 
element of the legitimacy crises'. This again will raise ethical questions, and there is 
obviously a conflict between what user-communities and organisations consider as relevant 
for management, and what is decided at national and in particular international level. All 
these components are present in the protein fishery, which will enable us to analyse the 
issues in great details and hopefully come up with suggestions on how best to tackle these 
management challenges. 
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6. France 
 
 
 
6.1 Introduction: Fisheries management between cat and dog? 
 
French fisheries management is balancing between three driven forces: first the historical 
paternalistic model; second, the national politic of state decentralisation initiated in 1982 
and third the evolution of European common fishery policy (CFP). The current 
institutional framework and its evolution the last ten years are driven by these three forces. 
 The core of fisheries management is modelled within close and complex 
relationships between State and its territorial deconcentrated services and fishery 
professionals. These relationships are closely organised by the central state that created an 
inter-professional corporatist organisation. The politic of decentralisation has modified the 
global feature: professional organisations have more competencies and state relies more 
consistently on deconcentrated regional commissions, decentralised structures and 
devolved territorial political institution to manage the fishery sector. Nevertheless, state 
administration stays the central political and administrative management institution. It is 
also a little bit early to analyse the overall consequences of institutional changes. In fact, 
numerous institutional changes occurred the last ten years modifying the scale of 
decisions-making processes and number and status of structures involved. 
 French fisheries are also strongly embedded into the construction of the common 
fishery policy since the origin. The CFP is a strong driven force of changes in French 
fishery institutional organisation at two levels: preventively to be prepared to negotiate 
with the other partners and consecutively to adjust to EU regulations. 
 The presentation of the national institutional decision-making framework will 
explicit weight of each factors and highlight the main trends that fashion the system. The 
two cases studies focus on particular aspects of the institutional system highlighting 
informal relationships and the high diversity of situations in French fishery decision-
making process. 
 
 
6.2 French fisheries management: weight of the past and current trends 
 
6.2.1 Conflictive or complementary trends in fisheries management? 
 
Institutional framework embedded in a paternalistic relationship 
 
French fisheries are tightly embedded in an historical context that fashions relationships 
between the central state and fishermen. In fact, fishermen have a special social status 
linked with the historical French State ambition. They were considered as the 'nursery of 
men' of the royal fleet essential to ensure French dominance at sea. In exchange for of 
giving a part of their time to the King, fishermen were receiving a special social protection. 
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Inherited from an ordnance taken by Colbert in 1668, the law of the 3 brumaire IV (25 
October 1795) created a specialised administration: the inscription maritime. This 
administration was charged to compile a register of fishermen in case of military conflict, 
then after 1902 it was also in charge of regulating navigation and fisheries and taking care 
of seamen welfare and health services. This system remains through time constantly 
accommodated to current issues and new roles. In 1965, a law cancelled the systematic 
enrolment of seamen in national military fleet, but administrators of maritime affairs kept 
the charge of social affairs and maritime police. Nowadays, the minister of equipment, 
transportation, housing, tourism and sea is administrating work rights, retirement, social 
and health services, specific to fishermen1 and the Minister of agriculture and fisheries is 
directing fisheries management. At regional and local level, services of the maritime affairs 
are the Minister's relay and administrative interlocutors of professionals. The counterpart is 
close and passionate relationships between fishermen and state administration. 
 In the 1940s to re-structure relationships between state and fishermen, a corporative 
fishery organisation was created by the state based on existing inter-professional 
committees. Inter-professional committees were erected at fishermen's initiative in the 
1930s. They were organised by species (tuna, herring, sardine, crabs, mackerel, cod and 
seaweed) and generally aimed to ensure minimum price, equalise price from port to port 
and adapt supply to the demand especially for species used in canning industry. They are 
the common ancestors of corporative organisations and producer's organisations (POs) 
formally structured in the 1960s. 
 The building of a corporatist inter-professional organisation initiated in 1938 was 
interrupt by the Second World War. Nevertheless, the concept grew and was integrated by 
the so-called Vichy Government that structured a very centralised corporative organisation 
during the war. After the Second World War, this system wasn't deleted but reorganised 
(decree-Law of the 21/01/1945) within a less centralistic framework. Since it remains the 
central and national professional body that collaborates with state administration to 
fisheries management. 
 At the beginning of the 1990s, a deep reform of inter-professional organisation has 
even widend powers of the corporative, pyramidal organisation but still under state legal 
and financial supervision. In fact the reform is embedded into the State decentralisation 
and deconcentration movements but the close link between fishermen and state 
administration rooted in French history is remaining by the reinforcement of a unique 
organisation integrating all sea workers and covering the entire French territory. 
 
Concepts of decentralisation in fisheries management 
 
French State administration has been historically built on centralistic model. The 
underlying idea is that State only is able to define general interest and then to arbitrate 
relationships between general and particular interests. From this concept of State duties 
come powers of control, arbitrage and expertise. During the second- half of the 20th 
                                                 
1 The direction of the Etablissement national des invalides de la Marine (ENIM) is offering to sea workers an 
adapted and efficient social protection. the direction des affaires maritimes et des gens de mer (DAMGM) is 
in charge of the security of navigation at sea for commercial and fishing vessels and in charge of following 
up activities of sea-related workers (education, health, working rights, social rights, promoting employment). 
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century, the necessity to reform French state became evident. This movement is driven by 
two major ideas: decentralisation allowing a redistribution of powers is more consistent 
with democracy; decentralisation ensures more efficient operational model of public 
action. The term of decentralisation is often used loosely and thus covers two main 
processes: deconcentration and strict decentralisation. 
 There is deconcentration when, into the same institution, the power of decision is 
transferred to an authority at a lower level in the hierarchy. Deconcentrated authorities are 
fully dependant on their upper hierarchical authority that may anytime cancel their 
decisions. Deconcentration is a redistribution of power which lowers the original 
concentration of power into the hand of the top of the hierarchy, nevertheless the global 
attribution of the given administration does not change. Deconcentration aims to tighten 
relationships between administration and citizen. In fisheries management, state services 
are deeply deconcentrated to reach fishermen at the lowest possible level, maritime quarter 
or port. 
 Decentralisation is a transfer of attributions from the State to an institution (territorial 
or not), legally distinct from it and having, under state administrative supervision, a certain 
autonomy of management. The real degree of autonomy of a decentralised institution 
depends on two main factors: 
- process of choice to name the president or directory council (named by the State, 
elected by, et cetera); 
- financial and technical capacities related to management power the institution is in 
charge of. In its deepest form, decentralisation leads to devolution of power. 
 
 From 1958 to 1982 a large movement of territorial deconcentration of the central 
state occurred. In a first stage, territorial administration at departmental level was 
reinforced. Then in 1972 administrative region were created: 22 regional councils were 
elected at universal suffrage and the regional level was thus doted with deconcentrated 
state administration. Regional councils became fully territorial communities with 
devoluted power as general councils (departmental level) and municipalities after the 2 
March 1982 Law on decentralisation. 
 Consequences of this two trends of state deconcentration and decentralisation on 
fishery management are unbalanced depend on management sectors. Fisheries 
professionals are involved in all fishery management sectors but the degree of state control 
is higher in conservation and fishing policies than in fleet or port investments or 
organisation of the market. The reticence to loose too much state control on fishing 
management is consistent with French conception of state duty and fisheries resource 
status (common resource). Nevertheless for the last ten year there has been a general trend 
towards more decentralisation stigmatised by the reinforcement and transfer of decision at 
the regional level. 
 
6.2.2 Actors of fisheries management 
 
Three main types of actors are involved in fisheries management: political actors (State 
ministers, regional council, general council and municipalities), administrative actors and 
professional actors. These actors are involved in a number of structures participating in 
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fisheries management. Most of this structures are specialised into one sector of fisheries 
management: organisation of the market, fishing management, fleet investments, port 
investment, valorisation of the product. This structures have different status: 
deconcentrated, decentralised, association, co-operative. Most of them involve several 
types of actors of the sector, but form and levels of involvement differ (figure 6.1). 
 Fishermen and central state representatives that base the fishery management 
framework are represented into most of these structures. Regional and local political 
authorities that are involved more recently in fisheries management are represented in a 
smaller number of these regional structures. 
 For example, fishermen are members of the administration council of OFIMER, a 
national decentralised structure in charge of valorisation of marine products. Their 
representation is structured through different groups: representative of fishermen, 
aquaculture, ship-owner and producer's organisation. Fishermen are also represented in 
regional deconcentrated commissions that elaborate fleet and port investments 
(CORECODE, COREMODE). 
 
6.2.3 What geographical scale for fisheries management? 
 
Since the beginning of the 1980 and even more consequently since 1990 decentralisation in 
fisheries management is taking place by the reinforcement of regional level of decision; 
before decisions were articulated between local and national levels. This regionalisation of 
fisheries management is occurring through a triple movements of state deconcentration, 
decentralisation and devolution of power. 
 
Devolution of power to the territorial communities 
 
Territorial communities are political structures, distinct from state administration, in charge 
of interest of the population on a defined territory. They have their own budget and civil 
servants, a moral personality (at the opposite of deconcentrated state services), their own 
competencies given by the French Parliament and a power of decision. Decisions are taken 
by deliberation into a Council and implemented by local executive powers. There are three 
territorial communities: Municipality at local level, general Council at departmental level 
and Regional Council at regional level. Their members are elected at universal suffrage by 
the population of their respective circumscriptions. 
 A year after the 1982 Laws on decentralisation territorial communities received 
specific powers on fisheries management. In fact, their powers are limited to economical 
and technical support: create and manage fish auction hall, support projects in port and 
landing sites, support research projects and experimentation, attribute aids or subvention to 
fleet or aquaculture farm, implement new technologies. Nevertheless, the latter developed 
case study on small-scale fisheries in Mediterranean Sea shows how territorial 
communities in supporting professional projects are able to play a sizeable role in fisheries 
management. 
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Figure 6.1 French fisheries management structures by type 
In bold: Political structured with devoluted power from central state. 
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Creation of regional commissions 
 
In response to the decentralisation of power to the regional and general councils, regional 
commissions, COREMODE and CRIPA, were created in the mid-1980s (figure 6.1). 
 COREMODEs elaborate regional program of modernisation and development of 
artisanal fishing fleets and marine aquaculture. It is in charge of investments collectively 
managed or used. It has a consultative voice on the attribution of subventions for the 
construction and modernisation of vessel over 16 meters length. It verifies conformity of 
demands with the POP and grades demands transferred to the European authority for final 
decision. It is also consulted on investment projects soliciting a financial support from the 
State or support from the funds of intervention and organisation of fish market. Parallel 
CRIPA was conceived as a consultative commission on investment program and criteria of 
attribution for regional Council funding. The CRIPA is also consulted on investment 
program for modernisation of the fleet under 16m length. 
 COREMODEs can be considered as deconcentrated structures, they are under the 
direct authority of state regional representatives and aims to fulfil state duties. But at the 
difference of other ministerial deconcentrated services composed of civil servants, regional 
commissions include representatives of professionals, regional council and general 
councils of coastal department that are thus systematically consulted before any decisions 
taking place. In practice, the consultative voice of professionals in COREMODE is often 
pre-eminent in final decision. 
 In 1998 another regional commission, the CORECODE, was created. It elaborates 
and updates regional schemas of orientation in order to rationalise choice of collective 
equipment in fishing ports and landing areas and in order to improve conditions of first 
selling and expedition of this products. Consecutively, the commission is consulted on any 
projects of collective equipment and improvement of landing conditions at regional level. 
Shaped in the same model than CORECODEs, this commission is also chaired by state 
representatives (regional prefect, regional director of maritime affairs and regional director 
of equipment) and constituted of territorial communities' representatives (regional council 
and general council of coastal departments), representative of fish auction markets, fishing 
ports, producer's organisations and committees of marine fisheries. 
 COREMODE and CORECODE are one of the privilege ways for territorial politic 
stakeholders and professionals to intervene in fisheries management sector under direct 
state control. 
 
Delegation of power and reform of inter-professional organisation 
 
Down this regionalisation trend an important step was made in 1990 and 1991 with the 
delegation of power to regional prefect and the reform of inter-professional organisation. 
Those two reforms are closely linked. 
 Before 1991, the inter-professional organisation was organised around two levels, 
local and national. Only, two regional committees, one for the Mediterranean coast and one 
for the North coast were already existing but structured as simple council of president of 
local committees. Regional committees had essentially an incentive role towards central 
and local committees to develop project in the fisheries sector and a role of relay between 
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local and central levels. For example, the regional Mediterranean committee, composed of 
presidents of the seven local committees, initiated the establishment of a licensing system 
in Mediterranean fisheries. 
 Local committees had the so-called power of deliberation to organise fishing 
activities in their circumscription. Their deliberation would be turned into action by 
ministerial decree. This shaping of power distribution led sometime to tricky situation in 
absence of agreement between local committees. The department of Finistère, one of the 
four coastal departments of Brittany, had six local committees. It was almost impossible to 
implement management measures that would be taken by only one of the six committees; 
fish has no such narrow border and fishermen will not apply restrictive measures that do 
not apply to fishermen 10 km farther. Similarly when fishermen from one committee were 
going on strike to complain again a situation or regulation, there was often another 
committee taking advantage of the situation. This situation was prejudicial to the 
establishment and implementation of fishing rules as well as the weight of fishermen's 
claims. 
 To overpass these problems, the 1991 reform creates regional committees; national 
and local committees remain but role and power of each level were reorganised. The power 
of deliberation on fishing management was transferred from local to regional committees. 
The geographical circumscriptions of regional committees match coastal administrative 
regions (with one exception). A year before the reform, in 1990, State delegated to few of 
its regional representative, regional prefects, the power to transform deliberation of 
committees of marine fisheries into action by decree. This measure of state 
deconcentration has one major consequence. Regional prefect may delegate its power to 
the regional director of maritime affairs. In practice, this change tightens even more 
relationships between deconcentrated state services of maritime affairs and committees of 
sea fisheries at local level. 
 Creation of regional commissions where professionals, regional and local politicians 
are consulted, delegation of power to regional prefects, reform of the inter-professional 
organisation is deeply modifying the overall structure of national fisheries management. 
Not such deep reform occurred in fisheries since 1945 and the creation of the inter-
professional organisation. 
 Regionalisation of fisheries management responds to a will of State decentralisation. 
Faithful to the paternalistic tradition and to the State duty conception, regionalisation is 
mostly based on deconcentration of power and creation of decentralised structures under 
state control but this supervision let in most cases large capabilities of actions to the 
professionals. State decentralisation is not the only driving force towards regionalisation, 
building of a European common fisheries policy is also pushing this way. A closer 
overview on the committee of marine fisheries will highlight this second trend and the role 
and capabilities of committee. 
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6.2.4 Fishing management: the role of committees of marine fisheries 
 
New goals 
 
In 1991, the central committee of fisheries became the national committee of marine 
fisheries and aquaculture. Beyond the changing name, the reform attempt to modify the 
role of committees from productivity to conservation goals. 
 The former committees entirely shaped by the state aimed to rebuilt, expand and 
modernise French fishing power after the Second World War. Consecutively otter-trawling 
and seining industrial or semi-industrial fleets were over-represented at national and local 
levels compared to artisanal and coastal fleets. This organisation leaded to marginalise 
small-scale fisheries that had less access to subvention and aids and a weaker 
representation at the highest ministerial centre of decision. 
 The primary feature of committees turned towards increasing fishing capacity 
appeared to be in inadequacy with the context of overcapitalisation and surexploitation 
prevailing since the 1970s. In a first round, committees partly lost their privileged role on 
market regulation with the appearance in the 1960s of producer's organisations. Then in 
1985 regional commissions (COREMODE) were created to manage and control fleet 
development and modernisation. Market and structural policies management were thus 
progressively invested by other fishery professionals and decentralised structures where 
committees were only represented as well as other interest groups. 
 The 1991 reform re-orientates committees toward organisation and management of 
fishing within a conservation framework. This reform was strongly driven by the European 
context. In fact French government had envisaged it to face the more constraining EEC 
decisions and implementation of the Unique Act after the 1/01/1993. After ten years, most 
professional's representatives consider that the building of a regional decision level helps 
to keep under control dissensions into the professionals (small-scale fisheries against high 
sea fisheries and industrial against craft fisheries) and to strengthen French fisheries 
professional representation facing European commission and other EU countries. 
 
Regional committees of marine fisheries 
 
The role of each committee level is specific but regional level is the pivot of the structure. 
Regional committees were doted of the power to deliberate on rules in their 
circumscription (up to the 12 miles limit). Their regulatory power is directed towards the 
stage of defining conservation instruments and local organisation of fishing: 
a) organisation of fisheries -limitation of fishing time, opening and closure dates of 
certain fisheries, delimitation of fishing zones, set of cohabitation rules between 
'métiers'; 
b) adequacy of fishing instrument to available resource for certain species or fisheries 
by the establishment and the limitation of fishing licences, by fishing effort 
adjustment to fleet size or vessel power, by definition and normalisation of fishing 
techniques characteristics; 
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c) limitation of capture (volume) of certain species by sets of fishing quotas per zone or 
period, and by quotas repartition and management at regional or local (ports) level or 
by units of effort (fleet, vessel, number of men in board); 
d) moreover, regional committees can name and remunerate 'guard-judges' (gardes-
jurés) in charge of controlling compliance with conservative measures on fisheries 
management. 
 
 Deliberations shall be voted at the majority of national committee council members, 
then they are submitted to the regional prefect that can reject it or turn it into action by 
decree for a five years period. In practice, working groups are organised at regional level 
on sensible species to prepare deliberations taken in the council. These working groups 
gather data from local committees of marine fisheries and prepare regulation's proposals. 
Local and regional services of maritime affairs are most of the time involved in this 
process at the working groups level. These working groups are also using the expertise of 
other administrations (environment, equipment ...) or structures (IFREMER) to elaborate 
their propositions. In consequence, it is relatively scarce that a deliberation taken by the 
regional level is rejected a posterior by the regional prefect or the regional director of 
maritime affairs (by delegation of power from the prefect). 
 
The local and national committees 
 
National and local committees are structured around the regional committee. At the 
bottom, the thirty height local committees located in port or groups of ports have a 
consultative role in fisheries management, but have also few competencies in social 
matters and technical support to the activity. Their main role in fishing management is to 
organise working groups on sensible questions in their circumscription that will nourish the 
regional ones; they gather data and eventually make propositions that would be widely 
discussed at the regional level. 
 At the upper level, the national committee has two main effective roles: treating 
questions exceeding regional committees circumscriptions; gathering professionals at 
national level to built an information from the profession directly available and quickly 
accessible to the ministerial direction of marine fishery. 
 The power of regional committees is limited to the territorial sea of their 
circumscription; implementing measures beyond their circumscription requires to extend 
the debate at national level. The national committee works like a platform where regional 
committees can confront their point of view. National and regional committees have 
similar scope of competencies and powers but at different geographical levels. Thus 
regulation transbounding regional border can be set up at this level like the implementation 
of special fishing permit (SFP) that are the equivalent of fishing licence at regional level. 
 The national committee, located near Paris, is also working very close to the 
ministerial administration. It is systematically consulted by the Minister on national and 
European measures on conservation and management of fishing resources; conditions of 
practising professional fisheries except fixation of salary and work rights, regulation of 
inter-professional organisation of marine fisheries and marine aquaculture. Relationships 
between professional's representatives of regional committees and the Minister are widely 
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organised through the national committee; professionals have thus an easy access to their 
minister and its upper administration and reciprocally. 
 
Structural limits of committee power 
 
If the legal competencies of national and regional committees may seem broad, they have 
fundamental weakness that lowers their real management capabilities. The main problem is 
the low adequacy between technical and financial capacities of committees and their legal 
competencies. 
 Bolopion et al. (2000) estimate the minimum necessary budget of a small regional 
committee from 91,000 to 12,000 euros. The current annual budget of a regional 
committee approximately ranges from 30,500 to 45,700 euros and the budget of a local 
committee reaches 15,300 euros. The lower budgets do not even allow to hire a permanent 
worker. In this context, their role stays sometime consultative and reactive when they 
could be initiator and proactive. Of course, there are different situations between 
committees and the president's personality and involvement into the Committee also play a 
great part in the effective role of its organisation. 
 A recent ministerial report from a member of French Parliament (Dupilet, 2001) 
points out the necessity to reinforce financial capacities of committees of marine fisheries. 
This report also points out the necessity to change current administrative practice in 
systematising committee's consultation at the earliest possible stage when a project even 
indirectly linked with fisheries is discussed. In fact, if professionals are consulted about 
measures directly related to fisheries matters, limits of this systematic consultation are not 
clear. This is especially true for projects and measures related to coastal development what 
is inconsistent with the actual trends of fisheries management issues. The work of regional 
committees, partly because their regulatory power is limited to the 12 miles, has been re-
concentrated on coastal fisheries and small-scale fisheries. Several regional committees 
(Brittany, Languedoc-Roussillon, ...) are thus doted of working groups targeting fishing  
and coastal development in the territorial sea On this particular point, the situation is also 
changing, Following the Dupilet report, the national committee has been recently consulted 
on a report on national management plan on wind-farms at sea at an early stage of the 
process. 
 
6.2.5 Conclusion 
 
Most of the French fisheries institutional reform preceded EU-negotiations: the reform of 
inter-professional organisation preceded the Spain entrance in 1993; 1997 fisheries law 
that officiated the creation of OFIMER, CORECODE and clarified the overall rules 
preceded the current 2002 re-negotiation of the CFP. Thus, strictly internal driving forces 
like paternalism and state decentralisation are strongly covered by this external trend. It is 
worth noticing that the CFP driven force contributed to the regionalisation of French 
fisheries decision-making. This means in France to weaken decision-making at local level 
that was existing previously. On the other hand, regionalisation also contributed to 
devolution of power and decentralisation of competencies. 
 146
 The CFP driven force as well as internal forces intervenes very unequally on 
decision-making processes. This fact will be highlighted by the two following case studies: 
Mediterranean small-scale fleet and Norway lobster trawling fleet in British and Ireland 
EEZ. 
 
 
6.3 Mediterranean sea versus Celtic Sea, coastal small scale fisheries versus EEZ 
trawling fleet: two cases of decision-making process 
 
The two cases chosen to illustrate decision-making process in French fisheries are 
deliberately opposed: Mediterranean Sea versus Celtic sea, coastal small scale fisheries 
versus EEZ otter trawling fleet. This choice is rooted on the noticing of the high diversity 
of French fisheries: three seas (Mediterranean sea, North sea, Channel) and one ocean 
(Atlantic) with different fishing conditions boarding its coasts, high diversity of vessels, 
fishing gears, species, cultural habits, markets and management setting. Beyond the 
diversity specific to the national fisheries context, the PCP does not apply equally on 
fishing zones: between Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic, between French or foreign 
EEZ and coastal water. European common fisheries policy does not apply at all on certain 
fisheries. 
 Investigating the Groundfish and Norwegian lobster trawler fleet in the Celtic Sea is 
pretext to discuss formal and informal decision-making arrangements on quotas setting and 
implementation at all levels of the process and relationships with other EU groups fishing 
the same stocks in Ireland and British waters. 
 The Mediterranean case study highlights the integration of small-scale fisheries 
management in coastal zone use. It underlines action of territorial communities 
(municipalities, regional and general councils) and professional organisation specific to 
Mediterranean coast, the Prud'homie in fisheries management. 
 
 
6.4 Process of quotas setting: the groundfish Norwegian lobster otter trawler fleet 
in the Celtic sea 
 
The groundfish and Norwegian lobster bottom trawler fleet fishing in Celtic sea, with 
around 150 boats, is one the three major trawling fleet of Brittany, first fishing region of 
France. The core of the fleet is based along the southern coast of Brittany in the port of Le 
Guilvinec and more marginally Douarnenez et Lorient. 
 Beside Norway Lobster (Nephrops norvegicus, langoustines), benthic and demersal 
fishes are targeted; the main species are monk (Lophius budegassa, baudroie noire), cod 
(Gadus Morhua, morue), megrim (Lepidorhombus whiffiagonis, cardine), witch flounder 
(Glyptocephallus cynoglossus, plie cynoglosse), whitting (Merlangius merlangus, Merlan), 
plus haddock (Melanogrammus aeglefinus, églefin), common hake (Merluccius 
merluccius, Merlu) and Ling (Gadus molva, Lingue franche). This fleet is thus highly 
dependant on species managed under TACs fixed by the European Council. 
 Quota management in France involves scientists from IFREMER, producer's 
organisations, the Direction of maritime fisheries, the national committee of marine 
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fisheries, deconcentrated state services and more marginally the regional committee of 
marine fisheries. 
 
Stages of decision-making in quota setting 
 
If you choose the example of Norway lobsters from stock assessment to TAC and finally 
quotas, and landings, the history starts and finishes in France after a long road from 
IFREMER to CIEM to European Commission, CSTEP and Council and finally to national 
Committee, POs and fish auctions halls. The different stakeholders intervene at almost all 
levels of the process with a leader at each level and various formal or informal 
relationships. 
 Seven stages can be distinguished that involved local, national, European and 
international levels of decision (figure 6.2): 
1. stock assessment by scientists of IFREMER, National level; 
2. meeting at the ICES and fixation of TAC by the ACFM (advisory committee of 
fisheries monitoring), international level; 
3. consultation of the scientific, technical, economical fishery council (STEFC) and 
proposition of national quotas by the European Commission, European level; 
5. negotiation on national quotas by the European Council and final decision, European 
level; 
6. division of the national quotas between producer's organisations, national level; 
7. quota management into each POs. 
 
From TAC to Quotas (Stages 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) 
 
IFREMER is the national scientific institute in charge of oceanographic research including 
fishery research (stock assessment, fishing technology, environmental study ...). Stock 
assessments are made by scientists located in IFREMER stations along the coast. Few of 
these scientists participate to the advisory committee of fisheries monitoring (ACFM) of 
the ICES that produces TACs transmitted to the European Commission. 
 Stock assessment and establishment of reference points for stock under TAC is 
generally perceived by professionals as a crucial point in the decision-making process 
considering the current weight of biological data at European level of decision. Thus 
professional's expectation towards fishery biologists is high. Professionals express various 
opinions on what links should be strengthen with scientists to improve decision-making 
process. 
 The common professional's feeling, crossing French border, is that methodology of 
stock assessment are not accurate and does not reflect real stock abundance. In France, 
professionals contest scientific methodologies, but also the low number of researchers and 
the weak financial capacities given to scientists to proceed their work. There is a strong 
demand from regional and national committees to participate to stock assessment or at 
least expectation of including information from the profession into ACFM advice. At the 
other end, fishery biologists express a will of better explaining scientific bases of their 
work to professional to improve quality of reciprocal understanding. It is worth noticing 
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that a crucial part of the data used in stock assessment is coming from fishermen logbooks 
and fishing declaration. 
 Generally professionals and scientist agree on noting the last two or three years a 
common effort towards improving reciprocal relationships; several steps were recently 
made. 
 At local levels two types of action can be noted. Meeting are organised at 
professional demand on stock assessment of sensible species. Again the different level of 
expectations between the two groups leads sometime at serious misunderstanding, but also 
some ideas cross in each way and improve each other understanding. 
 An interesting example is the last ACFM meeting on Norway Lobster that occurred 
in Lorient. Professional from POs and committees asked scientists to organise a meeting 
with them at this occasion. The meeting took place but after the ACFM meeting what 
provoked professional's discontent: they wondered why discussing with them when 
decision was already taken. This event reflects difference between scientist's will to 
explain bases of their diagnostic and professionals that would like to carry out information 
usable to nuance ACFM advice. 
 This tension between biologist and professionals is mostly due to, on one hand, the 
apparent pre-eminence of biology in decision-making at the detriment of social and 
political considerations and on the other hand due to extremely centralised system and low 
level of professional input in decision-making at European Commission level. 
 Another type of platform is available to scientists and professionals to discuss on 
stock diagnostic. Every year scientists from Ifremer, attending ACFM meetings, are 
convoked by the Fleet and Quotas Commission at the national committee of marine 
fisheries. This meeting normally occurred after the European commission publishing its 
proposition of quotas. The purpose of this meeting will be discussed latter but at this point 
it is worth noticing that in 2002 at scientist's demand one meeting occurred after the 
ACFM advice but before STEFC consultation and propositions of the EU Commission. 
This modification responds to a will to explain scientific process outside political debate; it 
also meets professional desire to intervene at an earlier stage of the quotas setting process. 
 A new type of interaction, which does not apply yet to the Norway Lobster fleet, 
took place recently. The producer's organisation PROMA in southern Brittany that gathers 
a large part of the deep-sea species quotas has hired a biologist to work in tight 
collaboration with Ifremer. The presence of an internal scientist into the PO is conceived to 
improve and extend quality of data collection. This experience is innovative in the French 
context and under observation from the other producer's organisations; nevertheless it 
requires will from scientists and professionals but also available funding what decrease the 
potential extension of a such experience even if successful. On a very informal base, 
certain producer's organisations have also developed contacts with foreign fishery 
scientists working at the ACFM from countries where their fleet are fishing. 
 As written above, the Fleet and Quotas commission of the national committee of 
marine fisheries organises every year a meeting where scientists are present as well as 
members of the ministerial direction of marine fisheries. 
 For professionals, this meeting is a privilege time to discuss quotas proposition 
before European council takes place. Arguments against non-acceptable quotas, different 
ways to reach biological reference points and socio-economical data are gathered at this 
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time. This meeting is mainly a way for the central administration preparing the negotiation 
at the EU council to overview professional's positions and proposals. 
 Then the work of national committees is to convert this information in arguments and 
then to grade with the direction of marine fisheries points to negotiate. To perform this task 
more efficiently, engineers or scientists have been recently hired at the national committee 
and at the direction of marine fisheries. This relatively new tendency responds to the 
necessity of better understanding of EU-propositions based on biological data in order to 
defend French interest. 
 In 2002 the earlier meeting organised with scientists allowed to built information that 
could be used by the Minister but also by the STEFC French members that are consulted 
by the European Commission before it fixes its proposition. 
 Relationships between STEFC members and professionals are thus developing even 
if professionals have low confidence on the real power of STEFC to counterbalance 
European commission's objectives in quotas setting. Producer's organisations have also 
direct contacts with French STEFC members to provide data and professional's position. 
 
Quotas repartition and management at national and local levels 
 
National quotas negotiated at EU level are shared between producer's organisations (POs). 
Producer's organisations have been created in the 1960s before the building of common 
organisation of the market to defend and stabilise landing prices. Quota management by 
POs started almost informally in France before the appearance of official texts on the 
subject. The first quotas given to a producer organisation, the FROM Nord, were on North 
Sea herring before the stock collapse at the beginning of the 1980s. Management in this 
case was limited to a statistical review of the adherent vessel to ensure quotas won't be 
exceeded. 
 In the 1980s, the European Union extended quotas to an increasing number of 
species and parallel quotas sharing between professional organisations extended. Few 
quotas were shared only between POs, others like sole quotas were shared by sea coasts 
then divided between producer's organisations and local committees of marine fisheries. 
This last system revealed itself to be unmanageable mainly because committees had not the 
statistical and technical capabilities to participate efficiently to process. 
 In 1990, the partition of quotas between POs was officiated; the Minister of fisheries 
and agriculture gave to producer's organisations the quota management of seven 'sensitive' 
species. The targeted species were those of which quotas were fully utilised or exceeded 
the previous years: flounder, sole, cod, whiting, pollock, herring and mackerel. All the 
other species were managed under standard common national quotas. 
 The European Council also incited to use POs structure to manage quotas through the 
1992 EU regulations (CE 3759/92, 17 September 1992). Between 1995 and 2000, the 
number of species under quotas increased sensibly as well as the number of quotas reached 
or exceeded. Consequently a long negotiation occurred between 1995 and 1997 on rules 
and process of quotas sharing between POs in France. The negotiation led to set 
operational rules, transcribed in the 1997 Law on fisheries orientation. Nevertheless, many 
gaps remained to solve practical problems that require regular negotiations at national 
level. 
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 Negotiations were made more difficult because of the co-existence of two types of 
POs in perpetual opposition. At the origin the opposition was between POs of artisanal 
fleet affiliated to the federation of artisanal producer's organisations (FEDOPA) and POs 
of industrial and semi-industrial fleet affiliated to the association national of producer's 
organisations (ANOP). Nowadays both federations and POs includes industrial and 
artisanal vessels; the difference is mostly link with the status of POs: co-operative 
(FEDOPA) or non co-operative (ANOP). The two federations general express different 
point of view on quotas sharing process and PO's role on quota management. Two POs 
dominate Lobster Norway fishing in the Celtic Sea: the OPOB is a co-operative OP 
affiliated to the FEDOPA and the FROM Bretagne is affiliated to the ANOP. 
 The difficulties of negotiation are coming from a contextual fact. Industrial fleet 
went through a relative decline during the 1980; during the same time artisanal fleet was 
quickly growing. The three FROM, Bretagne, North and Southwest already had relatively 
sophisticated statistical system and were taking an account of their landings. This was not 
the case of co-operative POs, artisanal fleet fishing coastal water had no obligation to fill-
up logbooks and their statistics were not very accurate. The sharing process is based on 
proved historical landings (antériorité de pêche), the ANOP wanted the quota sharing 
being only based on referred landings, the FEDOPA wanted to take account of the social 
and economic weight of artisanal fleet in absence of landings statistics. 
 This negotiation occurred between POs, the FEDOPA, the ANOP and the direction 
of marine fisheries. Finally, the federation of artisanal producer's organisations succeeded 
to impose two criteria other than historical landings to share the quotas: 
- historical landings; 
- economical and social interest; 
- market interest. 
 
 In practice, only the first criteria are used, but the existence of the two others gives 
some flexibility of application of the law to the government in the future. The general 
philosophy of operational rules are maximising quota use for the benefice of the entire fleet 
and preserving the flexibility of fishing strategies. One quota is shared between POs only if 
more than 70% of the quotas were landed the previous year; if not, the quota is commonly 
fished by all POs and statistical records of landings are kept in case of future share. Quotas 
shared between POs are divided at the pro rata of the average landing of the three previous 
years. This last rule is made to adjust the quota division to the evolution of fishing 
strategies. If one PO does not consume its entire quota of one species, it informs its 
federation that will look for an other POs needing quotas of this species and inversely if 
one PO feels that it will exceed its quotas, the federation will look for unutilised quotas of 
this species elsewhere. This system is working into and between the two federations of 
POs, its goal is to maximise quotas use for the entire fleet; in consequences there is no 
monetary or other type of transaction between the PO that gives and the PO that receives 
part of the quotas. Once again to allow an evolution of quota share the following year, the 
part of the given quotas used by the demanding PO is divided in two parts: 50% will be 
attributed to the statistical record of the demanding POs and other 50% will be attributed to 
POs that part of its quota. 
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 Now that this rule were negotiated and accepted by the POs, by the two federations 
and by the direction of marine fisheries, the annual process of sharing quotas is almost an 
administrative process. The administration sends to each PO, its calculation for each 
species with statistical details per vessel. Each PO verifies the data with its own statistic 
and then final calculations are made. When the final document is ready, it is revised by the 
Fleet and Quotas Commission that in this matter operates more like a chamber of 
registration. 
 Modalities of quota management into each POs are various, nevertheless the most 
common way is still a free access to the adherent vessels and in best cases a precise daily 
statistical review to follow the quota consummation until it is reached and the fishery 
closed. Nevertheless, with recent reduction of quotas, the issue moved from a situation of 
under-utilisation to a situation of over-utilisation of quotas. Certain POs starts to set up rule 
of quota distribution into the PO. Nevertheless professionals in France have in majority a 
negative opinion on individual quotas; one of the solution used is to share the quotas 
between fleets (type of fishing gear) of the PO. One of the other solutions is carry out by 
committees of marine fisheries. Regional and national committees are the structure able to 
set-up licences with associated rules to organise and limit fishing effort. Thus committees 
of marine fisheries play a role at the first stage of quota setting and at the far end of quota 
consummation. 
 
 
6.5 Small-scale fleet (les petits métiers) in Languedoc-Roussillon, Mediterranean Sea 
 
6.5.1  The small-scale fisheries 
 
Continental Mediterranean French coastline stretches on 700 km, around 13% of the total 
French coastline (without DOM-TOM); in the 1990s, fishing landings (30,000 to 
50,000t/y) as well as fishing units reaches approximately 1/5 of the total; 14% of the total 
fishing employment, but one quarter of the small-scale fishing employment are situated 
along the Mediterranean coast. 
 In opposition to the other metropolitan seacoasts, Mediterranean Sea has no EEZ; the 
territorial sea (12 miles for France) joined directly international waters. The common 
fishery policy framework originally covers Mediterranean Sea. Market and structural 
policies have been applied since 1983; nevertheless the implementation of technical 
measures of conservation policy to the professional has occurred only in 1995 (EC 
regulation n°1626/94), ten years after its implementation in the Atlantic Ocean and North 
Sea. Moreover, quotas on commercial species are not applied on Mediterranean fishing 
stocks. 
 In French Mediterranean coast 86% of fishermen fish into the territorial sea all 
métiers1 included, and but small-scale fleet fishes essentially into the three or the six miles 
limits and in salty coastal ponds. The exploitation of strictly national fish stock and inland 
waters is under national jurisdiction and does not belong to the common fisheries policies. 
In consequences, decision-making arrangements small-scale fleet if facing are much more 
                                                 
1 A Métier is a fishing practice defined by the association of a fishing gear, targeted species and fishing zone. 
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imbedded into coastal zone consideration and local particularities. The coastline of 
Languedoc-Roussillon is heavily used, industry and tourism compete strongly with 
fisheries. To illustrate the particularity of fishing very close to the coast or in inland salty 
waters in Mediterranean sea, decision-making process are analysed through two different 
events: a recent project of artificial reef carried by fishermen in the Gulf of Aigues-Mortes 
and the establishment and implementation of a clam licence in the pond of Thau. 
 
 
Figure 7.3 Stakeholders interactions during the different phases of TAC and Quota setting  
 
 
Definition 
 
The so-called 'small-scale fleet' in Mediterranean Sea covers a such override of 'métiers' 
that they are defined by opposition to the rest of the Mediterranean fleet. Small-scale 
fishery includes all 'métier' except trawlers (bottom and pelagic), seiners and draggers: the 
fishery is dominated by set gillnetting and trammel netting, besides combined gillnetting, 
lift netting, hand and boat dredging, set long-lining, trolling lining, pole-lining, traps and 
surrounding netting. 
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 Approximately 90% of the Mediterranean fleet belong to the small-scale fishery. In 
the Gulf of Lions where the core of the fleet is concentrated 769 fishing units belongs to 
this fishery. Length of fishing boats ranges from 4 to 18 meters. This fleet is characterised 
by seasonal fisheries requiring multiple gears, targeting various species and exploiting 
diversified spaces; each fisherman practises several 'métier' per year. 
 Around 18 species are targeted, Seabream (Pagellus spp., pageot), common sole 
(Solea vulgaris, sole commune) and Mullet (Mullus spp., rouget), grey Mullet (Mugil spp., 
muge ou mullet) come first before Atherina spp., Gilthead (Sparus aurata, dorade royale), 
tellina spp. (télline), European Conger (conger conger, congre), Scorpion fish (scorpaena 
spp, rascasse), Dicentrarchus labrax (bar) and common hake (merlucius merluculius, 
Merlu). 
 
Main management structures where small-scale fishermen intervene in Languedoc-
Roussillon 
 
Fisheries national structures are also existing in Mediterranean coast: commissions 
(COREMODE and CORECODE), syndicates, co-operatives and committees of marine 
fisheries. The regional committee constitutes in Languedoc Roussillon the main structure 
to promote their project and defend their interest. As in the national framework, they are 
represented by local committees but also by an old institution specific to the Mediterranean 
Sea, the prud'homies. 
 Prud'homies are professional organisations issued from medieval and Ancien régime 
corporations and organised by a modified decree of the 18 November 1859. There are 
thirty-three prud'homies covering the entire Mediterranean and Corsica coastline and ten in 
Languedoc-Roussillon. They are constituted by all the independent self-employed 
fishermen of their circumscription. Their competencies restricted to the 12 miles limits are 
focus on fishing organisation, regulations and conflict resolutions at local level. Their 
traditional intervention is more directed towards gear authorisation and characteristics, 
share of space between fisheries in coastal salty ponds, opening and closing dates of 
fishing. They are the initiators of most of local fishing regulations in the Mediterranean 
Sea. 
 Their weight and role in fisheries management are highly variable depend on the 
area; nevertheless they keep a moral authority especially regarding conflict resolution 
between fishermen. Their role in fisheries management seemed to weaken with the 
establishment of committees of marine fisheries and the priority given to development of 
trawling fleet in the 1970-1980. Nevertheless, for the last few years, it seems that they 
regain local power even if they have no official recognition in French fisheries 
management framework. Nevertheless, like committees of marine fisheries their weight 
depends strongly on the charisma of the their leaders It is worth noticing that presidents of 
committees of marine fisheries and prud'hommes are often personally invested in local 
politic. Regularly some of them occupies the post of Mayor or member of town council in 
charge of fisheries. 
 The regional Council of Languedoc-Roussillon has created an original structure, the 
CEPRALMAR, centre of study and promotion of salty ponds and marine activities. The 
structure is a tool of definition, animation and implementation of the regional politic of 
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coastal zone valorisation. This structure led by the regional Council integrates all partners 
intervening in fisheries and aquaculture and associates them directly to the definition of 
regional plans. The administration council is composed of territorial communities (regional 
and general council, 40%), professionals (regional and local committees, prud'homies, co-
operatives, POs1, 40%), The regional economic and social council (12%) and others 
(Members of IFREMER, maritime credit, maritime affairs, professional teaching structure, 
8%). 
 Technicians and engineers of the CEPRALMAR work in tight collaboration with 
fishermen to built innovative projects; their work is complementary to the one of the 
Mission of marine affaires of the Region that ensures the administrative instruction of 
project, demand of subvention and preparation of report for the Regional Council. 
 
6.5.2 Management of artificial reefs in the Gulf of Aigues-Mortes 
 
Artificial reef immersion along the Languedoc-Roussillon coast started in the 1960s on a 
very empirical base and continued in the 1980s and 1990s, the Gulf of Aigues-Mortes 
project is thus embedded in a solid regional experience. Reef immersion in coastal sea has 
for official objective to support and develop small-scale fisheries that was in regression for 
the last 10 years. The expected impacts are: 
- materialising space used by small-scale fleet; 
- favouring concentration of high-value species and biologic diversity; 
- limiting exploitation costs and risks in inciting fishing closer to the coast; 
- favouring rationalisation of the exploitation in inciting to use more selective fishing 
techniques (longline, pots, traps) on reef. 
 
 The analysis of the decision-making process will be divided on stages: origin, design, 
partnership, following-up. 
 
Origin of the project 
 
Small-scale fishermen from Palavas les Flots and le Grau du Roi initiated the project. At 
the mid-eighties they solicited their prud'homies to built a project on oyster and mussel 
aquaculture in the Gulf of Aigues-Mortes. This project included immersion of artificial 
reefs to protect aquaculture farms at sea from destruction by other fishing activities. The 
Grau du Roi municipality is solicited to support the project with success, nevertheless 
fishermen at the origin of the aquaculture project left and only the project of artificial reefs 
remained. 
 The new project is supported by the two prud'homies and the territorial communities 
(municipalities and regional council), nevertheless it creates tensions between fishermen. 
On one side, trawling fishermen are opposed to the project. Trawlers are forbidden into the 
three miles limits, nevertheless under some weather and wind conditions, they still fish into 
                                                 
1 The Mediterranean producer's organisations focus on trawling fisheries; small-scale fleet's landings are 
mostly sold directly at the wharf or to restaurants without going through public auction. Small-scale fisheries 
are then not concerned by withdrawal price and common organisation of the market. One of the other 
consequences is the known under-evaluation of the total French Mediterranean production. 
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the three miles limit. Artificial reefs are conceived as fish concentration device but small-
scale fishermen also use them as tool to keep trawlers and draggers away from their fishing 
zone. 
 
Project design 
 
The project took several years: it was initiated in the mid-eighties and the first reef 
immersion occurred in 1999. During this time, technical meeting were organised to define 
what could be done, how, what partnership could be find. In its stage, technician from the 
CEPRALMAR played a leading role. They organised information meetings and 
concertations between the different partners: fishermen, scientists, administration, elected 
representatives of territorial municipalities. Work groups were organised to discuss and 
define reef characteristics: type, form of reef modules, localisation into the three miles 
limit. 
 
Project partnership 
 
To support the project, mayors of municipalities along the Gulf of Aigues-Mortes were 
contacted and informed on the project. They created a multi-actors syndicate for the 
development of fisheries and the protection of marine zone in the Gulf of Aigues-Mortes 
that supported politically the project. The syndicate gathers the regional Council of 
Languedoc-Roussillon, Hérault and Gard General councils, municipalities of Carnon, 
Palavas, Le Grau du Roi and La Grande Motte. It took decisions on reef characteristics 
(type, localisation) after concertation with the other partners; during the concertation small-
scale fishermen had chosen two third of reef localisation and one third was chosen by 
otter-trawling fishermen. 
 The syndicate also managed the funding and delegation of the implementation to 
specialised enterprises or institutes. These structures are in charge of technical building of 
the project to obtain a concession on the public marine domain (public maritime domaine) 
and organise the call for tenders. 
 Fishermen are not represented in the syndicate, but as stated before several of the 
territorial communities representatives have the double cap: elected representative in 
municipalities and professional fishermen, president of committee of marine fisheries or 
prud'hommes. The current president of the syndicate is the municipality councillor on 
marine affairs of le Grau du Roi municipality, professional fishermen and the treasurer of 
the local committee of marine fisheries. 
 
Implementation and follow-up 
 
To implement the project, the syndicate relies on consulting company. On a first stage, one 
consulting companies realised an impact assessment of reef immersion. Then the syndicate 
delegated to another one the demand of concession. As artificial reef are immersed on the 
public maritime domain (domaine public maritime), a temporary concession must be 
granted by the State. In practice, this concession is given by the maritime and navigation 
service of the Languedoc-Roussillon that depends of the regional services of maritime 
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affairs. Another scientific organisms is in charge of monitoring and following-up the site: 
its uses and its colonisation by marines species, a first report was produced in 2001. 
 
Perspectives 
 
After this first project, other artificial reef immersion project is actually under study. The 
Syndicate is carrying this new project. 
 
6.5.3 Clam licensing system in the pond of Thau 
 
The pond of Thau is the biggest (1,700 ha) and the deepest (10m) salty pond in 
Languedoc-Roussillon. There is a large variety of exploited species and an extensive 
mussel and oyster aquaculture. Shellfish constituted for a long time the main income 
source; other shellfish were also abundant in the pond. Certain species disappeared but 
clam still constitutes a primordial resource. Until the 1970s, fisheries in the pond of Thau 
were productive; fishermen alternated fishing activities in the pond and at sea. During the 
summer time when shellfish suffers from the heat and several species are spawning into the 
pond, fishermen redirected their effort towards coastal seawaters. This informal 
management system of the pond was ensured by the cohesion of the profession in the 
prud'homie. The equilibrium broke in the 1980s, leading fishermen to envisage a clam 
licensing system. 
 
1987 licensing system: a failure of the decision-making process 
 
The prud'homie of Thau initiated the project of clam fishing licensing, led by the changing 
context in the 1980s. In the 1970s, maritime affairs accorded many fishing cards to new 
fishermen in the pond without consulting of professionals, in particular the Prud'homie 
traditionally regulating the fishery. Parallel, clam price increased significantly in the 1980s 
attracting new fishermen in the pond. Pressure on the resource increased also supported by 
the development of illegal fishing practices. Illegal fishing is an endemic issue in the pond 
but it reached a peak at this time with a convergent movement of increasing number of 
professionals and non-professionals poachers and the introduction of unauthorised fishing 
gear (scuba diving gears). To stop this process, the prud'homie of Thau pond suggested to 
limit the total number of fishermen by a clam licensing system. 
 
Project design 
 
The prud'homie could have edited a 'prud'homal' regulation, but then prud'hommes would 
have had to ensure its implementation and control. With the recent entrance of new 
fishermen in the pond and the development of an uncontrolled illegal fishing, the 
prud'homie felt not equipped to ensure this task by itself. It proposed the project to the 
administrative service of maritime affairs that accepted the principle and then led the 
project. Maritime affairs are then in charge of implementation and control. 
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Project implementation 
 
A decree officiated the implementation of a clam licensing system in 1987. Following an 
agreement between IFREMER and the prud'homie, a license was issued to each fishermen 
of the pond; 750 licences are issued in 1987. Then to regulate licence issuance, a 
commission was created; it is presided by the regional director of maritime affairs and 
composed of IFREMER representatives and the prud'hommes of Thau pond. The 
commission examines demands and delivers licences. On commission's proposal, the 
prefect of Hérault department is responsible of cancelling temporarily or definitively 
licences of fishermen caught fishing illegally. Administrative services of marines affairs 
are in charge of updating the licensee file. 
 After a few years, fishermen noticed the total inefficient of the licensing system. The 
level of illegal fishing was still uncontrolled: controlling patrols were almost absent and 
even worse at the beginning of the ninety's, an evaluation of the licensee file showed a 
consequent number of dead fishermen in the file. Several time, fishermen asked the 
regional prefect to set up a stricter control of illegal fishing without result. They ask 
directly the Minister of environment, M Lalonde, to obtain a fishing boat to patrol on the 
Thau Pond. The boat was delivered but without motorisation. Facing the inefficient control 
system, prud'hommes decided to create their own police. They were patrolling in the pond 
accompanied by fishermen to stop illegal fishing. After two years this police stopped its 
activity discouraged by reprisals (destruction of fishing gears). 
 In the mid-nineties clam fishery is hit by new crisis: landings dropped and price 
decreased due to the importation of Tunisian clam. Facing this situation, fishermen decided 
to restore the management system. 
 
1999 Licensing system: a new decision-making process for more success 
 
The establishment of a pilot study 
Facing the crisis, fishermen required a global analysis of the situation. A 'research-action' 
was initiated to complete this task. This study was partially financed by fishermen them-
self; CEPRALMAR, French State and PESCA programme were the other financial 
partners. 
 A working group was constituted with professionals (regional and local committees 
of marine fisheries, the four prud'hommes of Thau and the master prud'homme, State 
administration (Maritime affairs services), territorial community (CEPRALMAR) and 
scientist (fishery biologist, economist, political scientist). The working group defined three 
objectives: 
1. elaboration and validation of a diagnostic; 
2. presentation and confrontation of the diagnostic to all stakeholders of the sector; 
3. elaboration and implementation of a new management plan. 
 
Choice of management measures: working group's proposal 
During the diagnostic phase and even more significantly during the validation phase, the 
choice has been made to elaborate a new licensing system in the pond of Thau. This 
licence would be managed by professionals that would fix the maximum number of licence 
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and issuance criteria. This licensing system would not be limited to the clam fishery but 
extended to the other resources (multi-species fishing licence) in order to control the total 
effort on the pond and to preserve the polyvalence of fishing activities. The system would 
be managed by the prud'homie of Thau. 
 
Implementation and management of licensing system 
Those proposals were accepted by professionals and a decree of the regional prefect 
officiated the licensing system in 1999. Since 1991, the regional committee of marine 
fisheries has the legal authority to manage licensing system in its circumscription; for 
efficiency purpose the committee delegated the licensing system management to the 
prud'homie of Thau pond. The prud'homie manages licence issuance and licensee file. 
Issuance of licence is conditioned by the inscription to the prud'homie of Thau submitted 
to entry criteria (registered fishing vessel, minimum number of fishing months). 
 
Perspective 
The new system is relatively successful, nevertheless it remains a consistent level of fraud 
and illegal fishing. The service of marines affairs in charge of fishing control proposed to 
the professionals to establish a system of transportation slip to help control illegal fishing. 
Each fisherman would have to fill a slip (fishing date, species and quantity by species) 
when he delivers its landings to the first buyer; the slip would be transmitted to the service 
of maritime affairs. The distribution of transportation slip will be financed by the 
prud'homie that received a subvention from the regional council for this purpose. 
 
 
6.6 Conclusion 
 
The case studies show on one hand a decision-making process strongly embedded in 
European context and in the other hand a decision-making process relatively free from 
European constraints. It is worth noticing that in the first case the main processes of 
decision-making involve national and local structures but occurred mainly at national or 
European levels. At the opposite, decision-making processes in the second case study 
involve strictly local and regional structures that operate at local level. 
 In a global perspective, the CFP had an influence on French institutional changes 
favouring regional level of decision at the detriment of strictly local level. French local 
structures revealed to be too weak to participate in decision-making processes at European 
scale. Certain regional and local structures, like POs and regional committees of marine 
fisheries, even suggest to organise trans-regional structures (by sea coasts or other types) to 
be able to face more efficiently the centralistic behaviour of European Commission. This is 
partly due to the financial cost for professional organisations to participate actively to 
decision-making process. This also due to the perceived necessity to represent the largest 
possible interest group to have a weight in the process. 
 In Mediterranean Sea where the impact of the CFP is lower and fisheries more 
concentrated into the territorial sea, local structures are much more involved into decision-
making processes and fishing management. The re-direction of fisheries management 
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towards issue of space use in territorial sea and inland salty ponds even revived historical 
organisation like prud'homies that have no real recognition at national or European levels. 
 In both cases those trends meet the French politic of state decentralisation that 
transfers part of territorial organisation and monitoring to the regional Council after 1982. 
In supporting projects and financing investment inland and at sea, territorial communities 
are playing an increasing role in fisheries management. The second vague of 
decentralisation has been recently opened by the French First Minister, but it is too early to 
overview how it will impact on the fishery sector. 
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7. The Netherlands 
 
 
 
7.1 General description of the Dutch fisheries1
 
7.1.1 Introduction2
 
Starting 1975, the implementation of a EU-TAC and quota system for certain commercial 
fish species changed everything in Dutch fisheries. It produced a major social, economic, 
cultural and institutional transition process. This process, although never ending, seems to 
have found calmer waters by the end of the millennium. Earlier, these waters were rough 
and wild, to the extent that not everybody could survive. A minister drowned, and several 
fisheries enterprises were ship wrecked or had to sheer away to foreign harbours and many 
honest fishermen became - against their will - pirates and traders in a black market. 
 This situation could not last and finally the parties accepted restrictions within a new 
management framework. For this purpose a new organisation has been created: groups of 
fishermen. The new management system is often referred to as co-management. 
 Here co-management is considered an institution. In the broadest sociological sense 
an institution is a cultural pattern or a system of roles that regulates behaviour concerning 
certain functions of group life. An institution need to become institutionalised, this process 
of stabilising interaction and communication patterns between people will result in more or 
less enduring social relationships and social balances (Van Doorn et al. 1962:123). 
However, institutions cannot come out of the blue and institutions cannot be designed and 
implemented by external authorities only. 
 
'In the Dutch situation the co-management institution did not drop out of a clear blue 
sky, because there was history (the rough waters), but also there is an institution 
named neo-corporatism, which has some similarities with the concept of co-
management. Next to this, a part of the fishermen had in the 1990s formed groups 
and pooled their ITQs, however their aim at that moment was not to co-operate with 
government and regulations (they were pirates and traders in the black market). Also 
external authority did not design the system; a steering committee, composed of 
fishermen of the national fisheries organisations, the chairman of the Fish 
Commodity Board, policymakers and a representative of the fish traders, agreed 
together upon a division of responsibilities in fisheries management.' (Stuurgroep 
Biesheuvel, 1992) 
 
                                                 
1 This study is a compilation of parts of studies and articles on Dutch fisheries, by Ellen Hoefnagel. 
2 Hoefnagel 2002 Corporatist Origin of the Dutch Co-Management System, In: Conference Proceedings 
IIFET 2002 conference: Fisheries in the Global Economy, Wellington New Zealand. Forthconing in 2003. 
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 By 1993 the responsibilities for quota management had been delegated to groups of 
fishermen. The fishermen, fishing for sole, plaice, shrimp, herring, cod and whiting possess 
an access right to the resource in the form of Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs). In 
their groups they pool their ITQs and manage the total group share of quotas. In this they 
were successful. 
 
7.1.2 The process of institutionalisation 
 
For the purpose of dividing responsibilities of fisheries management tasks a new 
organisation has been created: fishermen's groups. This new management system is 
referred to as co-management. The concept of co-management is not precise (OECD 
1996), but is a broad term referring to joint management, most often used in relation to 
resource management with considerable input from the users/stakeholder or local 
communities (Karlsen et al., 2002). Here co-management is considered an institution. 
Organisations and institutions differ in the sense for instance that an organisation can be 
established over day, while institutions have to grow in time. One could say that an 
institution gets under your skin. Institutions do have the following characteristics (Bunte, 
2002): 
 
(1) 'Institutions restrict the set of possible actions in one way or the other by laying down 
some 'do's' and 'don'ts'. The regularities require or forbid certain actions in certain 
situations.' 
(2) 'Institutions create regularities in the behaviour of individuals. Everyone conforms to 
the regularity and expects everyone else to conform as well. If someone deviates, 
sanctions are imposed on the deviator. Moral values are attached to both 
conformance and non-conformance. These values are used to reinforce institutions: 
conformance is approved and non-conformance disapproved.' 
(3) 'A social institution offers a solution to a co-ordination problem; a perennial, basic 
problem. Individuals face a co-ordination problem, if they all decide by themselves 
which action to take and all these individual decisions jointly determine the outcome 
(payoffs). Institutions restrict the set of possible actions and outcomes, and hereby 
they enable individuals to co-ordinate their behaviour. This allows stable 
expectations, for instance.' 
 
 These characteristics consider behaviour but also mention expectations, moral values 
and (dis-)approval. These concepts point at an invisible world, a world inside heads of 
individuals sharing meanings, values, and norms with each other. It is not difficult to learn 
rules and regulations. However, to learn common sense, meaning of behaviour or non-
behaviour, preferences, shared emotions, biases and blind spots is something else. 
 In the Dutch situation the co-management institution did not develop overnight, 
because there was history (the rough waters), but also there existed institutions like neo-
corporatism and compartmentalisation, out of which the concept of co-management 'grew' 
in a way. 
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Neo-corporatism and compartmentalisation 
 
In the Netherlands corporatism is a social doctrine that has the organisation of civilians in 
occupational groups (corpora) as an ideal situation. Corporatism has an organic worldview: 
not conflict is central in the corporatist way of thinking, but the harmony between different 
societal groups. In Western Europe after 1945 welfare states came into being that had 
corporatist features. Firstly, the creation of welfare states was only possible by a 
compromise between employers and unions. A compromise that in the Netherlands 
persisted by organisations as the Council of Labour (Raad van de Arbeid) and the Social 
Economical Council (Sociaal-Economische Raad). Next to this the Netherlands had other 
corporatist features, because the 'verzuiling' or the compartmentalisation along political-
religious lines, formed a 'consociational democracy'. In this compartmentalised society, 
political decision-making lay in the hands of the elite of the different compartments. In this 
democratic model the same-layered social structure can be found as in corporatism. In the 
fifties the 'verzuiling' was at it's peak. The decompartimentalisation, 'ontzuiling', started in 
the sixties, leading to a new form of social structure, which is called neo-corporatism. The 
social organisations that before belonged to a 'zuil' or political-religious compartment and 
their elite operate then as interest groups. Those interest groups take far-reaching decisions 
in consultative bodies without consulting the parliament.1
 Frouws (1997) who studied the manure policy in the Netherlands says about the 
Agricultural Policy Community (ACP) and it’s reactions on restrictions: 
 
'Interest intermediation and policy formation in the APC can be analysed as a neo-
corporatist exchange, characterised by a close partnership between the organised 
agricultural interest and government ... The participating organisations were granted 
the privilege of influencing public policymaking in exchange for their cooperation, 
the legitimisation of negotiated policies and the disciplining of their constituency. 
This neo-corporatist exchange was 'ruled' by a permanent search for consensus, elitist 
decision-making, membership passivity and isolation vis a vis non-agricultural 
'outsiders'. The APC was like a state within the state and the Landbouwschap 
functioned as the 'farmers parliament'. It had a near monopoly of political power and 
expertise and thus provided the farmers' lobby with a great advantage over 
environmental and other interest groups' (Frouws 1997:211). 
 
 One could read in a way for Agricultural Policy Community: The Fisheries Policy 
Community. The Fisheries Policy community consisted of: 
- experts from the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (The Fisheries Directorate); 
- the Fish Commodity Board; 
- leading fishermen's representatives; 
- members of the Parliamentary Committee on Fisheries; 
- economists from the Agricultural Research Institute (LEI). 
                                                 
1 Encarta Encyclopædia. 
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 During the 'rough waters' period, when the Fisheries Policy Community could not or 
did not want to legitimise Common and national Fishery Policy and especially after the 
'drowning' of a minister in 1990 Parliament wanted more influence so fishermen and their 
representatives had to change their attitude. In 1993 the Steering group, partly composed of 
people from the Fisheries Policy Community and fishermen, came up with the idea of co-
management. Which in a way is comparable to neo-corporatism, it is democratic but less 
elitist. Fishermen nowadays are less atomised individuals that do not leave policy to the 
elite. They have formed homogeneous occupational groups with group responsibilities that 
have to take in account the wider society. 
 
Re-institutionalisation 
 
So in the sixties and seventies, when the Netherlands became de-compartmentalised and 
influence of the European Union became stronger, especially noticed by fishermen through 
the TAC and quota regulations, the institutions of the political-religion compartment, the 
Fisheries Policy Community and the freedom of the seas were shaken. A kind of 
institutional gap arose: there was no well functioning institution in this period of adjusting 
to restrictions. 
 The new institution - co-management groups - could fill the gap. The process of 
institutionalisation can better be understood as a process of re-institutionalisation. This is 
seldom a process in which total new values, aims, norms and expectations will be born out 
of the interaction. Mostly it is about reforming old elements into new combinations 
(Van Doorn et al., 1962). 
 Within Dutch society family enterprises are important. Through the value of having a 
healthy family enterprise that earns good money, values like hard work, respect, austerity, 
saving, sovereignty and capitalism are passed on to the next generations. When the process 
of de-institutionalisation developed, fishermen started to fight for the continuance of their 
family enterprise and their way of life, their position in (large) society, in their villages, 
among their colleagues. They still valued those core values hard work, sovereignty and 
capitalism. As a fisher put it: 'I have always worked hard and I had learned that it was good 
to work hard, I continued to work hard and landed amounts of fish I was used to. I caught 
what I could catch. Then suddenly I found myself in prison. What was good yesterday was 
criminal today'. 
 Although it looked as if the value 'hard work' was attacked, this was not really the 
case. The case was that catches were restricted. The meaning of hard work was not 
synonymous any longer with large quantities of fish. The core value sovereignty had 
changed. This meant that those family enterprises had to take more and more in account 
the wider society and especially environment. 
 This of course counted for the whole of (Dutch) society; however, fisher families 
(and farmers) were the ones to notice this so intensely. Sole and plaice fishermen were the 
ones (or that part that was left, there were winners and losers) that could adapt to the new 
situation the best. They found a capitalistic solution to their restriction in sovereignty; they 
became gradually owners of the right to catch fish. Fishermen nowadays do not fight 
government any longer, because they understand they have to cope with restrictions or 
otherwise stop their enterprise. Their goal remained to continue their family enterprise and 
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derive good living from it. Means are still hard work and capitalism became more 
important. Respect for government after a decrease is gradually growing, the level of 
sovereignty changed (lessened), austerity is less, more luxury is permitted, savings are 
important but investments are more important. The goals remained the same, values and 
means are gradually adapting to new situations - the importance of co-operation in 
groups -, however core values like hard work and capitalism remain the same. Co-
operation in groups means a real new adaptation to fishermen. They changed from 
atomistic individuals (at sea, not in their communities) who left politics to an elite, into co-
operative individuals taking into account colleagues, policy, the wider society and 
environment. 
 For the ministry situations changed as well. The ministry changed its attitude 
gradually from co-operative towards the fishing sector (neo-corporatism) to a restrictive, 
authoritarian one and lately into a restrictive, but a less authoritarian attitude and now co-
manages the National quota with fishermen. For the future of the co-management system it 
seems to be important that groups of fishermen do not only get delegated responsibilities, 
but also need to become more involved in the decision-making process. A start is made by 
the North Sea Commission Fisheries Partnership Group, which tries to tune the knowledge 
systems of biologists and fishermen. Legitimacy of policy and TACs adjustments is the 
cornerstone of co-management and participation in decision-making will enlarge 
legitimacy. In the near future new restrictions concerning food safety and environmental 
demands will make the life cycles of the family enterprises again uncertain and will be a 
test to their adaptive strategies. 
 Organisations, institutions and human behaviour are in the long run not completely 
stable structures. People do change their pattern of behaviour, institutions, organisations, 
ideas and group balances when their aims change or when they find other, better ways to 
reach their goals. 
 
 
7.2 The Oakerson framework and co-management experiences in the Netherlands 
 
7.2.1 Introduction 
 
In the Netherlands since 1993 more responsibilities in fisheries management have been 
assigned to fisheries organisations (groups within POs). The management system in the 
Netherlands is referred to as a co-management system. In the new system individual quotas 
are managed by user groups, while government remains responsible for the compliance 
with the common Fisheries Policy. 
 Objectives of this study are: 
1. to analyse experiences with co-management in the Netherlands in order to determine 
conditions for successful co-management; 
2. to study the legal, economic and social effects of co-management on individual, 
organisational and governmental level; 
3. to evaluate the effectiveness of the Dutch co-management system. 
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 The study aims to assess the different factors that determine the effectiveness/success 
of co-management. For that purpose the experiences of the different actors in the new 
system have been studied. The positive and negative experiences of individual fishermen, 
fisheries organisations, and the Dutch government were analysed, taking into account all 
relevant legal, economic and social aspects. The relations between the groups and their 
members on the one hand and the groups and the government on the other were 
investigated in order to understand the developments and the outcomes of co-management. 
Special attention has been paid to the effects of a combination of an ITQ system and co-
management on the social and economic position of fishermen. 
 In order to reach the objectives and to structure this report a conceptual framework 
(of Oakerson) to analyse 'commons' is adopted. The reasons for this are twofold: 1) it 
delivers an analytical tool; 2) the framework makes international and systematic 
comparison possible. Different international fora are interested in commons, in this case 
fisheries management. For example the OECD 1, and scholars like Jentoft and McCay 
(1995). When we analyse fisheries management, we study questions related to commons 
management. This is so because the use of the commons is characterised by individual 
consumers who appropriate a portion of the (shared, EH) flow of benefits and make that 
portion unavailable to others (Oakerson 1992: 41). Translated to our fisheries subject this 
means: the use of the European Union fishing grounds and the fish stocks occurring in this 
territory is characterised by individual European fishermen who appropriate a portion of 
those fish stocks and make that portion of fish unavailable to others. Unlike pure public 
goods (listening to the wireless, for example), the commons (fish stocks) cannot be shared 
without limit. This asks for coordination, or management. Fisheries resources are managed 
in a variety of manners: ranging from external authority regulation to self regulation by 
user groups. All kinds of in between variations exist. In the Netherlands the Dutch portion 
of the European stocks has been 'co-managed' by user groups and government since 1993. 
The Oakerson framework gives room to these variations, by distinguishing different, so-
called decision-making arrangements. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1 A Dynamic Framework for analysing the commons 
Source: Oakerson (1992). 
                                                 
1 Nielsen and Vedsmand (OECD issue paper on the efficient management of living marine resources: cases 
from Denmark, 1995) adapted this model for analysing fisheries co-management arrangement in a slightly 
different manner. 
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 The framework consists of four sets of attributes or variables that can be used to 
describe a commons: 1) the physical attributes of the resource and the technology used to 
appropriate its yield; 2) the decision-making arrangements (organisation and rules) that 
govern relationships among users and relevant others; 3) the mutual choice of strategies 
and consequent patterns of interaction among decision makers; and 4) outcomes (ibid: 43). 
 In this report these four attributes will be described for the management of the Dutch 
quotas, especially the flatfish quota, focusing on the new management scheme which is 
referred to as co-management. 
 After studying the outcomes, we will try to use the model as a diagnostic tool 
working backwards through the relationships between the variables in order to understand 
conditions (and obstacles) for effective and successful co-management. 
 
Research questions 
1. How did the new co-management scheme function? 
2. Does the new management scheme lead to an efficient quota management? 
3. Does co-management improve the distribution of net benefits? 
4. What are the conditions of effective and successful co-management? 
 
7.2.2 Physical & technical attributes 
 
In this chapter we consider the physical attributes and constraints of the natural resource 
Dutch fishermen exploit as well as the constraints placed upon the used techniques. 
 
Boundaries/jointness 
 
The Dutch fleet is fishing the coastal waters (12 miles zone), the mid-distant waters (North 
Sea), and the high seas. In this study we only consider the Dutch cutter fleet fishing the 
North Sea, because this is the main fisheries in the Netherlands and this type of fisheries is 
involved in co-management. The cutter fleet fish mainly for demersals, like sole, plaice 
and cod, whiting and also pelagic fish, like herring. Physical boundaries are the fluctuating 
sizes of the different stocks fished for in the European waters, especially the North Sea. 
These North Sea stocks are joined with some of the European Union Member States 
bordering on the North Sea, namely Belgium, Germany, Great Britain, and Denmark, and 
to a certain extent with the non-Member States Norway, for plaice. 
 
Excludability 
 
Since 1977, fishermen of non-EU Member States are excluded from the European Union 
part of the North Sea (200-mile zone/Exclusive Economic Zone). EU fishermen are 
sometimes seasonally banished from fishing grounds which function as nursery areas. 
 
Subtractability 
 
In 1993 473 Dutch cutters fished on the North Sea, with 2,184 fishermen aboard. Total HP 
in 1993 was 491,000. The Dutch fishing enterprises are family-based, fishermen are paid a 
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share wage. Since 1960 the beamtrawler is the cutter type fished with. Because physical 
boundaries and technical attributes were not in equilibrium various kinds of measures to 
recover equilibrium have been introduced since 1975, some of a technical nature and 
aimed at a capacity reduction. Below we describe decommissioning schemes, licensing 
systems and fishing gear measures. 
 
Decommissioning 
 
As has been stated above the capacity of the Dutch cutter fleet has been bigger than 
necessary to catch the allotted quotas since the introduction of quotas by NEAFC in 1975. 
In 1975 the government set up a decommissioning scheme for the cutter sector. In the 
years 1975 and 1976 165 ships were laid up. After 1976 the interest for decommissioning 
weakened, mainly because sole catches and prices were high. In 1987 the fishery industry 
and the government agreed on a new decommissioning scheme to which the industry 
contributed again. Over 90% of the decommissioning costs have been financed by the EU. 
The direct result1 of the decommissioning programme has been that 135 vessels have been 
withdrawn from the fleet. These vessels represent 22% of the engine power on the fleet as 
at 1987. However, the withdrawal of 135 vessels did not result in an equal reduction of the 
size of the fleets: mainly the fleet fishing for cod and whiting has withdrawn vessels 
without replacing them. Withdrawn beam trawlers have in general been replaced. During 
the running time of the programme, the fleet size has also been modified by replacement 
investments and international transfer of vessels. In 1987 616 vessels sailed with a total of 
560,000 hp, in 1994 this was respectively 469 and 492,000 (see also table 7.3). The 
capacity reduction achieved, has resulted in a 70% reduction of effort on cod and whiting 
catches. The programme had no substantial impact on the total fishing effort on sole and 
plaice, due to the allocation of extra sea days to remaining vessels. The decommissioning 
programme has been much to the benefit of the remaining fleet. 
 
Licensing 
 
In 19851 capacity licensing was introduced in the Netherlands in order to maximise total 
engine power of the fleet. On a licence the engine power of a vessel is registered. Fishing 
licenses can be freely transferred. It is also possible to aggregate more than one license on 
one vessel. The licensing scheme is coupled to the EU Multi-annual Guidance Programme. 
When the licensing system was introduced fishermen could get a license for their existing 
engine capacity and for engine capacity for vessels under construction. The latter provision 
in the scheme resulted in additional new capacity. By the end of 1988 the fleet had 
expanded by 14 per cent compared with the position before licensing. In 1987 measures1 
were taken to prevent the constantly increasing engine power of individual fishing vessels 
in the beamtrawl-fleet. The maximum engine capacity in new vessels was specified at 2000 
HP. At the time of establishment of the measure some 80 beamtrawlers exceeding 2000 hp 
were already in service or ordered previously. These existing vessels were allowed to 
                                                 
1An appraisal of the effects of the decommissioning scheme in the case of Denmark and the Netherlands. 
Draft final report 10-4-1995. Danish Institute of Fisheries Economics Research. 
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continue operations. But in case of transfer of (part of) these licenses without the >2000 hp 
vessel the engine power exceeding 2000 pk can not be transferred. 
 
Fishing gear 
 
In order to limit the fishing capacity of the Dutch beam trawl fleet further a maximum 
beam width was introduced in 1987. Each of the beams may not exceed 12 meters.1 This 
measure was adopted as an EU-technical measure later on. Beam trawling inside the 12 
mile zone is restricted to smaller vessels (up to 300 HP). For these vessels the maximum 
beam width is 9 metres (two times 4.5 metres). 
 Another technical measure is the implementation of minimum mesh sizes, in order to 
reduce the rate of fishing the youngest age groups of fish stocks. According to the 
Biesheuvelreport (June 1992: 7) however, the technical capacity of the Dutch fleet is still 
too big (for the allowable catches). 
 
7.2.3 Decision-Making Arrangements 
 
In general, decision-making arrangements are defined by authority relationships that 
specify who decides what in relation to whom (Oakerson, 46). In the framework of 
Oakerson, decision-making arrangements are divided into operational rules, external 
arrangements and collective choice arrangements. 
 In this report the operational rules concern the management/regulation of the use of 
the European fish stocks and the national quotas; the external arrangements are here 
defined by decision structures of organisations and institutions outside the immediate user-
group; collective choice arrangements are rules that establish conditions of collective 
choice within the user-group. 
 
Operational rules 
 
The development of the Dutch fisheries management system till 1993 
The main components of the Dutch fisheries management system1 are quota management, 
capacity and effort limitation, and enforcement regulations and agreements. This set of 
rules and regulations evolved gradually. The Dutch management scheme is nested in the 
Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) of the European Union. 
 
Quota management 
The Dutch quota management system has developed over the past 20 years. For different 
groups of species different methods to manage national quotas have evolved. The system 
and its development can be described as follows: 
 
Plaice and sole 
 
In November 1974 the North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC) established 
TACs for the year 1975 for several species including plaice and sole. The Dutch flatfish 
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quotas were set considerable lower than the 1973 and 1974 flatfish landings. Dutch catches 
of plaice and sole had to be reduced by 10 and 40% respectively. 
 The Dutch government officially delegated the management of the national quotas to 
the fisheries industry. The Fish Commodity Board (FCB) was asked to fulfil this task. The 
FCB developed a regulation1 to limit effort and landings in the flatfish fishery. On the basis 
of this regulation several decrees of the chairman of the board were established. However 
on 22 November 1975 sole fisheries were closed because the national sole quota was 
exhausted. At the beginning of 1976 the FCB returned its quota management task to the 
government. In 1976 the government introduced individual quotas in the fishery for plaice 
and sole. The minister of Agriculture and Fisheries stated in parliament that a system of 
individual quotas could increase operational certainty. It would enable fishermen to 
maximise their profits by regulating their landings and to plan their fishing activities in 
advance and discuss their plans with their financiers. A limited part of the national quotas 
was not included in the allocation, but was kept as a 'National Reserve'. This reserve was 
meant to compensate for eventual excess landings. 
 The quota was allocated on the basis of historical catches and/or engine power. The 
individual quotas received by fishermen that exploited their ship prior to 1 January 1974 
were based on the highest amount of plaice and sole landed in the years 1972, 1973 and 
1974. For ships under 1,250 hp commissioned after this date, quotas were based on the 
average performance of the vessels in the same hp-group. For ships with more than 
1,250 hp, quotas were fixed by the Ministry. This system met a lot of resistance from parts 
of the industry because it resulted in considerable differences in quotas between vessels of 
similar capacity. As a result, the system was revised in 1977, adjusting IQ's both to engine 
power and to historical performance. The 1977 allocations are still the basis of the present 
quota system. 
 In the 1977 system, fixed by-catch quota per hp-group for non-beam-trawlers over 
250 hp were frozen at the 250 hp level. This resulted in a relatively large number of small 
quotas. Because of their limited size these quotas are often referred to as 'mini-quotas'. 
 When the quota system was introduced in 1976 flatfish quotas formally were only 
transferable together with a vessel. Soon however it proved to be possible to circumvent 
this rule by using legal constructions. In 1985 quotas became officially transferable 
without a vessel. 
 The transfers are subject to the following rules: 
- quotas can only be bought by owners of a fishing vessel that is registered on a EU list 
and who are in the possession of a licence; 
- fishermen can only sell their plaice and sole quotas as a total whereas it is allowed to 
buy parts of these quotas; 
- the transfers have to be approved and registered by the Fisheries Directorate. 
 
 Since 1985 the transfer of quotas is subject to rules restricting them to limited 
periods during the year. This was done to prevent doubtful transfers at the end of the year 
when quotas are nearly exhausted. 
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Cod and Whiting 
The NEAFC 1975 quotas for cod, whiting and haddock were relatively high compared to 
Dutch landings in previous years, so initially no national measures were needed to comply 
with these quotas. In 1979 quota management responsibilities reverted to the Dutch 
government again. In this year cod was very abundant in the North Sea and catches were 
high, so that by September the 3rd the national cod quotas was exhausted and the cod 
fishery had to be closed. To prevent the early closure of the directed cod fishery a system 
of permits (K-documenten) for the directed cod fishery was introduced in 1981. Under the 
new system part of the national cod quotas was reserved for the 'K-document' holders (20 
vessels with a long cod fishing history). This part was based on an amount of 200 tonnes 
per vessel. 
 In the early 1980s the Dutch beam trawl fleet expanded considerably. As a 
consequence more cod was caught as a by-catch and the part of the national quotas 
reserved for the roundfish fleet came under pressure. To reduce the cod landings of the 
beam trawl fleet, in August 1985 landings by beam trawlers were limited to 200 kg (5 
boxes) a week. This measure could not prevent the early closure of the cod fishery in 1985. 
 On 30 December 1987 the management system for the roundfish fishery was 
revised.1 In addition to the 'K-document' roundfish (R-document) and seasonal roundfish 
(SR-document) permits were introduced. A fisherman could obtain an R-document if at 
least 65% of his income in at least two out of the years 1984, 1985 and 1986 was obtained 
by landings of cod, whiting and haddock. A S-document was given to fishermen who could 
demonstrate that at least 25% of their income in 1987 was made up by landings of cod, 
whiting and haddock and who had fished at least 6 succeeding weeks with trawl nets or 
static gear. The national cod quotas were divided between the three groups of permit 
holders and the fishermen without a permit (mostly beam trawlers). To regulate the uptake 
of these quotas and to prevent early closures a maximum weekly amount of landings of 
cod and whiting was set. This measure (kistenregeling) has been criticised by fishermen 
because its inflexibility. Fishermen have been obliged to throw fish overboard when 
catches were too high whereas weeks with low catches could not be compensated for. The 
'K-, R- and S-documenten' were not transferable without a ship until 1 January 1994. The 
Ministry had to be asked to issue a new permit to the new owner in case a ship was sold. 
When a ship was laid up the validity of the document expired. The permits were explicitly 
not cumulative. On 1 January 1994 the system was revised again. Nowadays permits can 
be transferred without the transfer of a vessel. It is also allowed to cumulate permits. This 
is expected to lead to a flow of permits (fishing rights) into the beam trawl fleet. Another 
important change is the change from weekly to monthly quotas. 
 
Herring 
For the few vessels fishing seasonally on herring a licensing system developed into group 
(PO) quotas that work out as ITQs in practice. 
 
Effort regulation 
Apart form a capacity reduction which already has been discussed in section 2, there also 
exist another input reduction regulation: the days at sea regulation. 
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Days at sea 
To adjust fishing effort to the national quotas a restriction of the number of days spent at 
sea (Zeedagenregeling 1987) was introduced in 1987. The year before an obligation to tie 
up vessels for a number of weeks spread over the year had proven to be ineffective. The 
allocation of days within the framework of the days at sea measure is dependent on type of 
fishery, documents, individual quotas and engine power. 
 So far the operational rules till 1993. In 1993 a new management system has been 
introduced, above-mentioned schemes like ITQs, licensing system and days at sea 
regulation remain operative. Before we turn to co-management we first will give an outline 
of institutions and organisations playing a role in fisheries management and decision-
making arrangements. 
 
External arrangements 
 
Institutions of government-industry cooperation are commonplace within fisheries nations 
of the Western hemisphere and user participation is an integral part of a country's fisheries 
management regime (Jentoft and McCay, 1995:233). However, how these institutions 
work is dependent on their design as well as on how they are implemented in their context. 
Basically, there are three alternatives available for institutional design that to a varying 
degree allow user-groups to be involved: 
1) Government may restrict its role to informing user groups of decisions it is ready to 
make; 
2) Government may prefer to consult with user groups (for instance by setting up 
advisory boards); 
3) Government and user groups may co-manage the resource (ibid: 229). 
 
 What follows is an outline of institutions and organisations playing a role in the 
Dutch fisheries sector and sometimes playing a role in management. We will classify 
management influence within the three mentioned categories. 
 
Non-user group institutions and organisations playing a role in Dutch fisheries 
management1
 
Supra governmental 
Each year the European Commission determines Total Allowable Catches per species and 
area in the European seas, on the basis of biological advice (ICES) and political 
negotiations. The Dutch minister of Agriculture, Nature Management and Fisheries is a 
representative in the Council. The EC also determines the Common Fisheries Policy for 10 
years, now till 2002. The EC allocates national quotas for different species to the Member 
States. The EC consults the Advisory Committee on Fisheries which consists of 
representatives from all sectors of the fishing industry plus consumers. The European 
                                                 
1 The institutions mentioned in this and next section have partly been extracted from one of the reports of an 
EC funded research project (no. AIR2-CT93-1392) on the role of producers' organisations in EC fisheries 
Management: Phase I national report, the national fisheries management system of the Netherlands, LEI-
DLO 1994, Bert Keus en W. Smit. 
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Association of Fish Producers' Organisations and Europèche have representatives in the 
Advisory Committee, which consists of three sub-committees. Relations between the sub-
committee on resources are strained for the reason that the sub-committee is frequently not 
consulted on proposals (concerning TACs) until after they have been adopted by the 
Commission (Holden 1994: 211-212). 
 
Governmental institutions 
The central governmental institution dealing with fisheries management is the Directie 
Visserijen, Ministerie van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij (Fisheries Directorate of 
the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Management and Fisheries). This Directorate is 
responsible for the establishment of fisheries management schemes. The Minister has to 
discuss and give account on fisheries matters in Parliament. 
 Furthermore within this Ministry there is the Algemene Inspectie Dienst (General 
Inspection Service) which is monitoring fishing activities and has legal powers to lead 
violators to court.1
 
Collective choice arrangements till 1993 
 
Collective choice arrangements are defined as rules and tasks that are included in the 
responsibilities of user group organisations that establish conditions of collective choice. 
Collective choice arrangements concern the management of the common. 
 
In between institution 
The Fish Commodity Board. 
 For the fishing industry the central institution is the Fish Commodity Board 
(Produktschap voor Vis). The FCB works according to a law, determining a system of 
public bodies by industry sector. In the FCB all sectors in the industry are organised: the 
catching sector, aquaculture, processing and trade on wholesale level, retail trade and trade 
unions. 
 Every firm in the country contributes financially by means of an obligatory levy. 
This levy is organised differently according to sectors: 
- fisheries and shell fish culture: levy on sales; 
- aquaculture: fixed amounts per business; 
- processing and trade: levy on purchases, including imports; 
- retail trade: fixed amounts per business. 
 
 The industry is represented through national and regional professional organisations. 
These organisations appoint delegates in the central board and in sectoral sub-boards. For 
the Fisheries Directorate this FCB is the logical partner in discussions of proposed 
management schemes. The FCB is less involved in the execution of the schemes. However, 
in some cases translation of national or sectoral schemes into sectoral or individual fishing 
rights was organised by the FCB (for example herring quotas between trawler- and cutter 
sector and individually for cutters; individual shrimp fishing licenses). 
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 For the FCB a central management task is developed in monitoring and steering the 
functioning of POs and from 1993 on, of co-management groups. The FCB has the 
ultimate responsibility for their functioning.1
 
User group organisations 
 
Producer Organisations 
In the Netherlands Producer Organisations were set up according to EC rules in 1971, 
originally mainly playing a role in the implementation of the common organisation of the 
market for fishery products. Until 1986 there existed only two POs in the Netherlands: PO-
West and PO-Oost. In 1986 and 1987 PO-Wieringen and PO-Vissersbond came into 
existence respectively, of which the latter became really active only in 1993. Since the 
introduction of the co-management system new POs came in to existence (see below). In 
1993 about 95 per cent of the Dutch fishing fleet was a member of a PO. As we saw 
already these POs are represented at the European level. 
 
Local, regional, national and (sub)sectoral organisations 
The industry itself is professionally organised in a number of organisations on local, 
regional, national and (sub)sectoral basis.1 Apart from their contribution in the 
establishment of management boards of the FCB these organisations are only sideways 
involved in discussions of (proposed) management schemes. The professional 
organisations working on a national or regional basis in the catching sector (excluding 
organisations of fisheries sectors not being dealt with in this study, like fresh water 
fisheries, aquaculture, shell fish culture, et cetera) are: 
- Nederlandse Vissersbond. This organisation is built up out of a number of local 
organisations. It contains a part of the beamtrawlfleet, a big part of the roundfish 
fleet, the majority of the shrimp fleet and a number of multi-purpose vessels, based 
all over the country; 
- Federatie van Vissersverenigingen. This Federation combines some local 
organisations, especially those organizing the bigger beam trawlers. These are mostly 
based in Urk, Den Helder, Texel, Goedereede and Katwijk. 
 
Conclusion 
It can be concluded that until recently the execution of the management schemes was 
centralised to a large extent. The European Commission and The Council annually sets 
TACs still without consulting relevant partners in the industry (the sub-committee 
resources). Although the Dutch government officially delegated the management of the 
national quotas to the fisheries industry, through the FCB in 1975, the FCB returned its 
quota management task to the government one year later. Still, for the Fisheries Directorate 
the FCB is the logical partner in discussions of proposed management schemes. Apart from 
their contribution in the establishment of management boards in the FCB, fisheries 
                                                 
1 One of the organisations arising from the FCB is the Sociaal Fonds voor de Maatschapsvisserij. This 
organisation is dealing with a mutual social security system for fishermen working on a share basis. These 
fishermen are not considered as employees in the sense of the national social security systems. 
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organisations are only indirectly involved in discussions of (proposed) management 
schemes. 
 From the three alternatives available for institutional design that to a varying degree 
allow user-groups to be involved, government restricted the role of user groups to 
informing them and consulting the CFB. In 1993, however, part of the executionary 
responsibilities was delegated to the fishing industry. The Dutch government decided to 
delegate (part of) the responsibility for quota management to the fishing industry. A study 
group, presided by the former Prime Minister Biesheuvel, worked out a delimitation of 
responsibilities of government and industry. The responsibilities were not delegated to 
Producers Organisations directly, but to groups to be formed within Producers 
Organisations. 
 
Collective choice arrangements from 1993 onwards 
 
The above-mentioned organisations and set of rules and regulations evolved gradually. 
Also the co-management of quotas is not a radical, total reorganisation. Still, co-
management means institutional change and an explicit plea for collective action to the 
fishermen. 
 As has been said before, the co-management system mainly regulates the cutter 
sector. The cutter sector is the most important fisheries sector in the Netherlands, fishing 
for sole, plaice, shrimp, herring, cod and whiting.1 The co-management scheme is nested in 
the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) of the European Union and the national management 
scheme. Here below, in this part of the section 'collective choice arrangements' we will 
look at the composition of this user groups and at the institutional design of these co-
management groups. 
 
The co-management groups 
As is said before in 1993 about 95 per cent of the Dutch fishing fleet was a member of a 
Producers Organisation. Within each PO one or more 'groups', are active. Totally eight 
groups have been established in 1993, in which 410 vessels are participating. The groups' 
sizes vary between 22 and 87 vessels (at the end of 1995 group sizes had gradually 
increased.1 The groups are composed according to the type of vessel/gear/species, region 
and membership of one of the two national fishermen's organisations. Groups are rather 
homogeneous, which is a good basis for cooperation. Cooperation between groups is 
organised by the Fish Commodity Board. In table 3.1 the shares of each group in the fleet 
and in the fishing rights are summarised. The table confirms the variety in the groups' 
relative size and activities and their specialisation on parts of the fleet's activities. 
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 The following POs1 and groups were in operation in 1993: 
- PO-West. This PO organises 127 active vessels in the cutter sector (part of the beam 
trawler fleet, the roundfish fleet and the multi-purpose fleet, a major part of the 
shrimp fleet). Within this PO two 'groups' exist; 
- Groep Delta/Zuid. This group consists of 57 (mostly large) beam trawlers and a 
number of 300 hp multi purpose vessels generally based in the South West of the 
country; 
- Groep Nieuwe Diep. This group contains 22 (mostly large) active beam trawlers 
based in Den Helder; 
- PO Oost. This PO organises 87 active vessels, large beam trawl cutters and some 
medium sized beam trawlers or roundfish cutters, practically all based at Urk. Within 
this PO one 'group' is created; 
- Groep PO-Oost. This group includes all 87 vessels; 
- PO Wieringen. This PO organises cutters in (the former island) Wieringen: 43 active 
mostly smaller or medium multi purpose vessels (flatfish beam trawling and/or 
roundfish pair trawling and/or shrimp fishing). Within this PO one 'group' is created; 
- Groep PO-Wieringen. This group includes all 43 active Wieringen based vessels; 
- PO Texel. This PO organises most of the cutters on the island of Texel: 30 vessels, 
mostly big beam trawlers. Within this PO one 'group' is created; 
- Groep Texel. This group includes 26 vessels, most of them relatively large beam 
trawlers and some vessels partly pair trawling on herring; 
- PO Nederlandse Vissersbond. This PO organises members of the professional 
organisation with the same name. Members are 195 active cutters with a wide range 
of activities. Within this PO three 'groups' are created; 
- Groep Nederlandse Vissersbond I. This group combines 65 active vessels, all small 
shrimp fishing vessels and mostly based along the coast of the Friesland and 
Groningen provinces, (together the shrimp fishing members of the Nederlandse 
Vissersbond); 
- Groep Nederlandse Vissersbond II. This group combines 24 active vessels with 
flatfish and roundfish rights based at Urk; 
- Groep Nederlandse Vissersbond III. This group combines 86 active vessels with 
varying fishing activities and based all over the country excluding Urk. 
 
 The number of non-members decreased quickly. Non-members are mainly two kinds 
of fishermen who represented together 3% of the total capacity of the Dutch fleet: 
- fishermen with small vessels, those who do not fish on assigned quotas like the 
Crangon shrimp; 
- a very small number of fishermen with a lot of quotas and days at see, gradually the 
most of these fishermen became group member in the last years. 
                                                 
1 Two of these PO's are not involved in the Groupsystem and will be left aside in this report: PO 
Mosselbedrijven. This PO organises the fleet engaged in mussel culture, about 80 vessels. The management 
of the shellfish fishery in fishing plans has been organized in Zevibel until 1994. In 1994 however this task is 
transferred to the PO Mosselbedrijven. PO Redersvereniging. This PO is affiliated to the Redersvereniging, 
the freezer trawlers' organisation and includes 13 trawlers. In the freeze trawler sector no groups are formed. 
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T
 
able 7.1 Summary of each group's share in fleet and fishing rights in 1993 (per cent of total fleet) 
 
Group No. of vessels Aggregated Aggregated hp Aggregated Aggregated 
  engine power days issued flatfish ITQ's roundfish 
     licences 
 
 
A 11.5 22.1 21.3 21.1 7.5 
B 4.4 8.3 9.3 11.1 2.6 
C 17.5 30.0 27.0 29.2 13.1 
D 5.2 7.9 8.4 8.8 5.6 
E 8.7 2.4 2.6 1.2 13.4 
F 13.1 2.6 3.4 0.2 0.0 
G 5.4 6.1 5.5 6.8 4.6 
H 17.5 14.3 14.2 15.7 31.4 
Not in group 16.7 6.3 8.2 6.1 21.9 
A
 
ll groups 100 100 100 100 100 
 
 
 
Co-management design in the Netherlands 
 
Institutional aspects of the collective choice arrangements 
In the new system, responsibilities in the management of individual quotas have been 
devolved to groups of fishermen. These groups are formally independent legal persons. It 
is obligatory that the chairman of the group is a person without interests in the fisheries 
sector. All group members have to be member of the same Producers Organisation (PO). In 
daily practice the functions of PO and groups are often carried out by the same staff of 
people. The secretariats of the groups are carried out by or on behalf of the Fish 
Commodity Board. 
 Group membership is not compulsory. To induce fishermen to enter a group, group 
members do get a slightly more favourable treatment than outsiders. This led to a high 
participation in the groups. 
 The aim of the groups1 is: to maximise economic results on the basis of joint 
management of the individual quotas of group members; to guarantee a consistent fishery 
policy; as well as to improve durable exploitation of the available fish stocks in an 
economic responsible way; to install manageable fishing systems; to confirm 
groupmembers to private and public law regulations; to be responsible for management of 
quota for sole and plaice and eventually other fish species. 
 The group tries to reach its goals by designing fishing plans; by implementing and 
inspecting regulations; by arranging arbitration; by imposing sanctions; and by organizing 
smooth intra-group ITQ exchanges. 
 Every group member has to sign an agreement. This agreement comprises the 
following obligations:  
- to design annually a fishingscheme;  
- to sell his catch in acknowledged auctions; 
                                                 
1 Memorandum of association of the Group PO Oost 5-1-1993. Memoranda of associations of the different 
groups differ slightly. 
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- to make available his VIRIS logbook statistics and fish auction data to the group 
management board; 
- to deposit his individual quota for group management; 
- to assure for payments of penalties;  
- to authorize the group managementboard, the Fish Commodity Board and the 
General Inspection Service (AID) to inspect his individual catchdata; 
- to pay penalties imposed by the group management board; 
- in case of exceeding his individual quotas (rented quotas included), to pay to the 
group the gross proceeds. 
 
 The group management board is responsible for management of the pooled quotas. 
The board is entitled to impose penalties/fines and other sanctions, including the closing of 
fishing activities for the group or a group member. Fines have to be appropriated in such a 
way that in the end the transgressor is never favoured. All these implementation tasks and 
management rules can be referred to as collective choice arrangements. They are 
concerned with the operational rules of the management of the common, more specifically 
with group and individual quota management. The government remains responsible for 
controlling the national quotas and tasks pertaining to CFP. 
 
Some economic aspects 
Most of the Dutch fishermen became group member as a result of positive economic 
inducements, which are a) 10% more days at sea and b) the possibility to rent and hire 
quotas during the year. Outside the group the rent market is closed early in the year. On the 
other hand fishermen felt motivated to join the groups because of a threat of a forced 
reduction in capacity in the case of unsuccessful results of the system. 
 The 10% extra days at sea as well as the extension of the rent market result in more 
flexibility for fishermen, which may lead to better economic nett results. It was expected 
that the collectively agreed voluntary sale by auction would improve prices. There are no 
direct financial costs for group membership. PO-membership costs include group 
membership. 
 
Juridical aspects 
Since the establishment of the co-management scheme, two legal systems came into 
operation: some arrangements now pertain to private law, others pertain to public law. 
 
Private law arrangements 
Next to the implementation task, groups have to maintain their management rules. Boards 
try to handle this by controlling and sanctioning practices. The boards have to monitor 
their members concerning design and execution of their fishing plans and to monitor that 
group quotas are not exceeded. The boards have to compare the weighed amounts of fish 
which have been offered at the auction with the actual amount sold. Boards also have to 
fine members who transgress the auction rule, or individual and group quotas or their days 
at sea limit. 
 For membership, fishermen have to subscribe to the fine prescription for different 
potential transgressions. These sanctions vary according to the gravity and to the 
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frequencies of repeated transgressions and aim at pruning away profits. In case of a 
disagreement, conflicts can be laid before the Arbitrage Foundation for Fisheries. This 
Foundation has been established especially for this purpose. Nevertheless, discussion on 
rightness of fining should be avoided, in order to implement a 'tit for tat' strategy. This 
means that immediately after detection of a group rule breach, a fine should be imposed. 
 
Auction sale 
EU fishermen under CFP are not obliged to sell their fish at auctions. Of course, the caught 
fish needs to be registered because of the monitoring of the assigned quotas. This can be 
done in different ways. Some Dutch fishermen have pled many times, though 
unsuccessfully, for 'veilplicht': the obligation to sell catches on an official auction, in order 
to make catches more 'visual'. What is impossible in public law, is now feasible in private 
law. Fishermen in the group system voluntary agreed on selling catches at specific 
auctions. 
 
Social control 
Since the start of the co-management scheme, fishermen have to cooperate with 
government. However, they also have to cooperate with each other to a larger extent than 
ever before. Yet next to the management board of the groups, and next to the General 
Inspection Service, the participating fishermen should control among themselves as well. 
At the design phase of the co-management system this seemed to be an important idea, 
which had to result in a decrease in monitoring costs for government. 
 
Public law arrangements 
Tasks of the General Inspection Service are monitoring and controlling on European and 
national fisheries regulations, especially monitoring total catch at group level to prevent 
exceeding of national quotas. In the previous situation, the General Inspection Service had 
to control the individual landings of fishermen, now this is a task of the group board. In 
practice however, the monitoring of the observance of group management rules has been 
carried out by the General Inspection Service as well. Yet, the inspection system changed 
from controlling individual landings into process control: to control from landed fish to the 
auction sale and subsequently to compare auction data and catch declaration data. When 
transgression of European and national regulation are detected, prosecution follows. 
 
7.2.4 Patterns Of Interaction 
 
'Patterns of interaction result directly from the mutual choice of strategies by the members 
of a group. Given the physical features of the commons and the characteristics of the 
relevant technology, on the one hand, as well as the decision-making arrangements 
available to govern its use, on the other, individuals make choices, from which there 
emerges some pattern of interaction' (Oakerson, 49). One can say that these patterns can be 
measured along a scale ranging from a free-rider strategy to a cooperative strategy as far as 
it concerns the interaction pattern of the exploiters/fishermen. We also want to know how 
government and organisations score on the scale of cooperativeness, because we are 
discussing co-management. For this purpose we will study incentives and motivation to 
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cooperate in the co-management scheme of participants on three levels: the fishermen's 
level; the governmental level; and the organisational level. 
 
1. Incentives and motives to cooperate and to contribute: Patterns of interactions on the 
individual Fishermen Level 
Among other things, the fishermen from the sample (see appendix A) were asked for their 
motives to join a fishermen's group , as well as for their motives to stay group member.1
 
Motives to cooperate 
 
The logic to cooperate 
One of the aims of the group system is that the new system (on the long run) has to be 
beneficial for fishermen (Biesheuvel, 1992:10). In short this means: to obtain economic 
profit through cooperation. 
 An important question in the literature about cooperation (collective action theory) is 
the following: 'Are rational individuals, who look after their own interest, willing to 
cooperate when there is a joint benefit in the long run?' A question related to this is 
whether the rational and egoistic groupmembers with a group interest will act so that this 
group interest will be secured. 
 This is the theoretical perspective of the prisoner's dilemma, mentioned in the report 
of the Biesheuvel Steering Committee and of for example Hardin's tragedy of the common 
predict, that rational individuals will not cooperate and will not emulate and realise a group 
interest. Mancur Olson (1965) gives a moderate positive view on the possibility of 
individuals to cooperate with each other. Olson also states that the possibility of a group 
profit is not sufficient to realise collective action. He also states that they can if they fulfil 
one of three side conditions: 1. the number of groupmembers has to be small; or 2) 
coercion to join a group; or 3) membership is made attractive with positive incentives. 
 The Biesheuvel Steering Committee seems1 to follow the theses of Olson and has 
taken the safe side. Probably knowing that the ambition to (and promise to) gain economic 
profit is not enough for a fisherman to become groupmember, the Committee adopted not 
one but all three of the mentioned conditions. Namely: 1) groups include at least 15 
companies and 100 companies at most, so groups are relatively small; 2) if there are not 
enough participators or when groups fail to fulfil their management tasks, finally the so-
called Stok van Mok will be put into action. Which means a forced capacity reduction; 3) 
groupmembers are more privileged than non-members, namely a) additional days at sea 
and b) larger possibilities to rent or hire out quotas. 
 A more detailed explanation of these 3 conditions and fishermen's reactions to them 
are given in the following. 
 
1. Small groups 
Olson states that small groups will be more successful than large groups in reaching 
collective action. His arguments are, that groupmembers of a relative small group can 
control each other so they can overcome the so-called free-riders problem. 
                                                 
1 It concerns a qualitive analyses, statements of fishermen have not been quantified any further. 
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 Although, the fishermen involved in co-management think that social control is not 
working, they are well informed about the situation of their co-groupmembers. However, 
they assert never to report a colleague. They even assert to 'turn around' if they notice 
something illegal/disloyal towards colleagues. Now that fishermen are better informed than 
ever about each other's way of acting, it can be expected that it will have a positive effect 
on preventing free-rider's behaviour. 
 Fishermen rarely mention group size spontaneously as a motive to join the group. 
Because a number of groups developed, choice possibilities did occur. Fishermen could 
choose the specific group they expected to feel at ease with. The choice was often 
determined through membership of the two national fishery unions: Nederlandse 
Vissersbond and Federatie van Visserijverenigingen. Then, most groups can be 
characterised according to region and/or type of fishery. PO-Vissersbond 3 is an exception 
to this. Fishermen who are members of PO-Vissersbond 3 live in several regions and there 
are several types of fisheries. The interviewed fishermen of PO-Vissersbond 3 thought that 
this was an advantage in connection with the rent/hire possibilities of more than only sole 
and plaice quotas, especially of cod. 
 
2. Coercion: Stok van Mok 
The 'Stok van Mok' is seldom mentioned spontaneously (possibly additional) as a motive 
to join the Biesheuvel groups. The idea of the Stok van Mok faded into the background 
because the groups operate satisfactorily, according to the fishermen. Some fishermen did 
not take the threats of the Stok van Mok seriously, others did. 
 
3. Positive incentives: extra days at sea and longer rent/hire 
The fishermen's motivation to become group member points to the third criterion, namely 
the extra days at sea and the larger rent/hire possibilities of the quota. Especially the latter 
has been a strong incentive to join groups. Moreover, the larger rent/hire possibilities are 
so satisfactory that this lead to the continuing of group membership. The larger rent/hire 
possibilities lead to an optimal use of property rights, according to the fishermen. The 
fishermen who have quotas left, rent the quotas to a colleague who needs more quotas than 
he owns. One of the interviewed fisherman wonders if it is wise to maintain weak 
companies in this, in his opinion, artificial way. This opinion was not shared with others. 
Fishermen who own a lot of quotas just liked the possibility to help weaker fishermen. 
Because of personal economic profit, but also to be able to maintain the modern but small 
Dutch fleet. One fishermen, who is also a board member of the group, thought that the 
increased numbers of days at sea (as a result of the extra days at sea and the small vessels 
with a high number of days at sea) did not simplify the monitoring tasks of the groups. 
 
Contextual and historical perspective to cooperate 
 
Economical incentives, external enforcement and group size stimulated fishermen to 
cooperate with the co-management system. Beside these, other factors have contributed to 
the massive joining of fishermen groups. As the report of the Biesheuvel Steering 
Committee (p.4) indicates, the relation between Government and fishermen was heavily 
disturbed, in particular after the fall of Minister Braks. Both parties agreed that this 
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relationship has to be improved. The control has been tightened, especially after 1990 
(Braks's fall). From 1986 fishermen try to strengthen their companies by buying property 
rights, which can be seen as an indicator that restrictive policy was taken more and more 
serious. So fishermen have adapted to restrictive circumstances for quite some time. The 
period before the groupsystem has been very stressful for the fishermen. Now, when it is 
more peaceful and the shortage of quotas can be solved much better, this leads to 
relaxation and satisfaction. 
 
Intrinsic motives to remain cooperative 
 
The introduction of the co-management system at the right moment and to use economical 
incentives and low external enforcement, has stimulated fishermen to join the relatively 
small, reliable fishermen groups. The economical incentives (extra days at sea and more 
flexibility for the rent/hire of quotas) and the clear groups also encourages remaining  
cooperative. But the group system has more advantages: 
 
Participation 
Fishermen believe that an efficient fishery policy depends on the feasibility of rules. Policy 
makers realised this also, especially after the fall of Minister Braks. Co-management seems 
to be a solution for this. Most fishermen confirm that the rules within the system were 
more practically oriented. However, they always stated that this was not yet sufficient. The 
rules for the unloading of catches were regularly mentioned as an example of an 
impractical rule. The question remains whether fishermen or their representatives are 
joining the decision-making process sufficiently. The fishermen, for example, are not 
involved with the determination of TACs. Many of the interviewed fishermen hope and 
expect that in the future POs will perform more tasks, and will for example arrange the 
exchange of quotas between countries. 
 
Information 
Although many fishermen keep up their landings, their figures did not always correspond 
exactly with the official figures. Nowadays, discrepancy does not often occur. Besides, 
fishermen are often informed about their quota exploitation and are warned when they 
have landed 80% of their personal quotas. The published quarter surveys of all groups give 
clarity about the national quotas exploitation. The fishermen experienced clarity about 
these figures as positive, and as an extra incentive to stay in the group. The information 
about the possibility to rent/hire or sell, which they get via the group board suits well. In 
the past you had to go after it yourself, nowadays it is arranged, according to a fisherman. 
Because more information is available, it does not seem to increase the rent unnecessarily 
as before. 
 
Auction duty 
The auction duty forms an attractive part of the group system from the start. To put the fish 
behind the market did not suit everybody. For a lot of fishermen it is a relief that this has 
been made more difficult. The expectation that the auction duty would have a positive 
influence on the price is disappointing to the fisherman. The cause of the rather low prices 
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has to be sought outside: with imported fish from former Warsaw Pact countries. Some 
expect that wages in those countries will increase and so will the price of imported fish. In 
any case this is an external factor. Auction duty is positively judged upon. But the market 
has to be closed on the other side as well, according to a fisherman. The trade wholesale 
and retail trade) should also have to buy on the auction and not from private individuals 
(anglers et cetera). 
 
Summary 
 
Motives for membership 
Fishermen mentioned the larger rent/hire possibilities of quota together with the extra days 
at sea as the main incentive to join the groups. Besides these reasons, they wanted to come 
in smooth waters with the government and each other. 
 
Motives to remain group member 
According to the fishermen, important motives to stay group member are the extra days at 
sea, larger rent/hire of quota and the good functioning of the groups. The information about 
the exploitation of own and group quota and about rent/hire and selling possibilities of 
quota are judged upon very favourably. Fishermen are satisfied with the auction duty. 
Group rules are judged as more flexible than governmental rules. Within the groups the 
fishermen see larger possibilities to influence future policy than outside the groups. 
 
Motives to cooperate, contribute and coordinate: Group management board 
Group management board consist of fishermen and an independent chairman. Some of the 
chairmen are paid for their services, others are against payment so as not to bring their 
independency in danger. Chairmen and board members consider their position honourable 
and challenging. They are asked to take a seat on the board and agree upon that voluntarily. 
Most of the board members are non (ex/older) fishing members of family-based fishing 
companies (except for the chairman). Their incentives are engagement in policy matters 
and fisheries matters, influence and pursuit. The position is considered to be honourable, 
although not enviable, because of the monitoring tasks of the board. 
 
Incentives to cooperate, to contribute and to coordinate: Patterns of interactions on the 
Organisational Level 
 
PO 
POs originally mainly playing a role in the implementation of the common organisation of 
the market for fishery products, which in practice was a small task, are now involved in co-
management. Fishermen can become member of a co-management group through their PO 
membership. In most cases the management board of the PO consists partly of the same 
persons as in the group management board. This additional task gives the Dutch POs more 
existential sense and prospects. 
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FCB 1
The FCB carries out management tasks and has to look after the sector's interest. With the 
start of the 'co-management' system, the FCB has to execute five new tasks: 
- be secretary of the separate groups; 
- approbation of the fishing plans of the separate groups; 
- approbation of the appointment of independent chairmen of the groups; 
- co-monitoring of the auction duty; 
- to inform the Ministry on co-management matters. 
 
 Incentives to cooperate for the FCB are the willingness to participate in fisheries 
matters, because of their formal task to look after the sectors interest. However, more 
clearness is necessary about the formal position of the FCB in the co-management scheme. 
 
(National) Fisheries Organisations 
Fisheries Organisations (Nederlandse Vissersbond en Federatie van Visserijverenigingen) 
exist through the membership of fishermen. 
In most of the cases the management board of the PO consists partly of the same persons 
as in the group management board as stated before. In the case of the two relevant national 
fisheries organisations, we can state that PO-Vissersbond and the FO Nederlandse 
Vissersbond (NVB) partly overlap and this is also partly the case with the Federatie van 
Visserijverenigingen and PO-Oost. 
 It can be stated that fisheries organisations on the national level are very much 
involved in the co-management scheme, however this is not formally organised. 
 Their incentives to cooperate and contribute can be found in that they are there to 
look after the fishermen's interests and do not want to be ruled out, by POs or Groups. The 
solution for the NVB was to revive their PO (founded in 1987, became inactive) and to 
create three groups. Some of the PO-West members joined PO-Vissersbond. PO-West 
created two groups and PO-Wieringen created one group, most of the members of these 
two POs are allied with the Federatie. PO-Texel is a new PO/group, of which most of the 
members are member of the Federatie. Schematically represented: 
 
 
VISSERSBOND FEDERATIE 
PO-Vissersbond - group I 
  - group II 
  - group III 
PO-Oost - group PO-Oost 
PO-West - group Delta/Zuid 
  - group Nieuwe Diep 
PO-Wieringen - group Wieringen 
PO-Texel - group Texel 
Figure 7.2 National Fisheries Organisations of the Netherlands 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Biesheuvelgroepen-Quo vadis? (FCB, 1995). 
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Incentives to cooperate, contribute and coordinate: Patterns of Interaction on 
Governmental Level 
 
The most important incentives for the government to cooperate, contribute and coordinate 
are: 
1. to ameliorate relationship with the industry; 
2. to manage quotas efficiently; and 
3. to lower transaction costs. 
 
 Ad 1) and 2) Excessive catches in the past caused problems and led to the 
introduction of a set of diverse management schemes, among others the co-management 
scheme. In November 1991, a working group was established by the Minister of 
Agriculture, Nature Management and Fisheries in order to propose an increase in 
correspondence of fishing patterns of the Dutch fishermen and market opportunities. The 
establishment of this so-called 'Stuurgroep Biesheuvel' was a reaction to the disturbed 
relation between fishermen and government, caused by a lack of confidence in government 
and of acceptance of fishery policy on the fishermen's side, and on government's side a 
lack of confidence in fishermen's and tradesmen's behaviour. One year earlier, the former 
minister of Agriculture, Nature Management and Fisheries had to resign as a result of 
uncontrolled excessive catches of sole. After this happened, tensions between industry and 
government were clearly noticeable. In June 1992, the Stuurgroep, which was composed of 
representatives of government and fishing industry, of lawyers, of organisational advisers 
and of an independent chairman, the former Prime-minister mr. B.W. Biesheuvel, issued a 
report.1 In this report several ideas were presented in order to make fishery policy more 
acceptable to the fishing industry. The key ideas are 1) distribution of responsibilities 
between government and fishing industry and 2) cooperation between fishermen: co-
management. This co-management system has to improve economic results within the 
restrictive frame of the existing catch limits. In February 1993, as already became clear, 
the co-management system was implemented, and (above expectation) 95% of the total 
number of hp in the cutter sector united in 'groups'. 
 When the management scheme proves to be unsuccessful in managing quotas and 
fishing performances, a forced capacity reduction shall be implemented three years after 
the start of the co-management scheme. Considering the historical perspective of a 20-
year-old restrictive fisheries policy, three years of becoming adjusted to cooperation is a 
rather short time span. Within those previous twenty years, fishermen who now have to 
cooperate have been engaged in tough competition for fish and especially for fishing 
rights. Its effects are still present. In fact, fisheries policy and quota regulations were more 
likely to cause divergence than a process which automatically led to cooperation. In the 
unfolding of fisheries policy, fishermen and government learnt from their experiences and 
now we see processes leading to convergence, resulting in co-management. 
 Ad 3) According to Bromley transaction costs can be divided into three elements: 
information, contracting and enforcement costs (Bromley 1991 in Whitby 1994 
'Transaction costs and Property Rights: the omitted Variables?'). Whitby states, however, 
                                                 
1 Beheerst Vissen. Rapport van de Stuurgroep Biesheuvel, June 1992. 
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that our ignorance of such costs is quite remarkable. In this study we will not quantify 
these costs either. Nevertheless, we will consider here especially the enforcement costs, 
because lowering monitoring costs is officially mentioned in the report of the Steering 
Committee Biesheuvel (pp. 10) as a government aim in cooperating in co-management. It 
can be estimated whether monitoring costs increased or decreased by comparing the 
number of person years and number of checks spent on monitoring fishing regulations by 
the General Inspection Services before and during the co-management period. An 
estimation will be made whether information and contracting costs have changed. 
Information costs concern the 'actions' to inform the industry on policy matters; contracting 
costs are here considered as administration costs for ITQ transfers. 
 
7.2.5 Outcomes 
 
First the effect of co management for fishermen will be described. Then we will turn to the 
effects on the organisational and the governmental level. Within these sections, effects on 
decision-making arrangements and the physical and technical attributes will become clear, 
as far as possible. 
 
The effects of co-management for individual fishermen 
 
To study these effects a case study of Group PO-Oost has been carried out.1
 In this case study we address the following topics: What are experiences of members 
of group PO-Oost with the co-management system (this section) and how are their 
economic performances (next section)? 
 
Case study of Group PO-Oost 
The Group PO-Oost has been selected because this group is concerned with demersal 
fisheries which are the major fisheries activity in the Netherlands. Another reason is the 
large number of fishermen participating in the group. 
 
Overview 
The Group PO-Oost is located in the traditional fishing village of Urk, which is a former 
island in the former Zuiderzee. Since ancient times Urk has been largely dependent on 
fisheries. In the past 20 years the capacity of the Urk fleet and the wealth of the fishing 
community have grown considerably. Since the introduction of strict quota control 
measures fishermen from Urk have managed to aggregate a considerable share of flatfish 
ITQs (32 and 30% of the national plaice and sole quotas). 
 In Urk an important part of the Dutch beam trawl fleet is based, even if the fleet 
cannot sail to its homeport nowadays. In Urk also a large part of the national fish 
processing industry is located. The majority of the fishermen living in Urk land their fish in 
the fishing ports of Harlingen, Lauwersoog or Delfzijl/Eemshaven. Fish landed in 
                                                 
1 In a later phase of the project interviews with members of some of the other groups have been held as well. 
Because research results did not differ from that of the case study PO Oost, we decided to present only this 
case study. Results of total sample of interviews are presented in the previous section on 'patterns of 
interaction' (see appendix A, methodology). 
 186
Harlingen is mostly traded on the Harlingen auction 'Insula' which is owned by PO-Oost. 
Fish landed in other ports is generally transported by truck to the Urk municipal fish 
auction. 
 Since Group PO-Oost membership is homogeneous (predominantly larger beam 
trawlers) it was decided to interview a sample of 11 members and to interview these 
members in depth rather than taking a larger sample and have more superficial interviews. 
These 11 fishermen own 18 vessels flying the Dutch flag. The 11 fishermen represent 
about 20% of the group PO-Oost's over 10 meter fleet1 (89 vessels). The interviews were 
held in December 1994. 
 
Fishermen's perspective on co-management experiences 
 
Group Management Board 
The Board of Group PO-Oost overlaps with the staff of the local fishermen's organisation 
'Visserijbelangen' and with the staff of the Producers Organisation PO-Oost as well as with 
the staff of the national fisheries organisation the Federatie van Visserijverenigingen. So 
the tasks which stem from the new co-management system are carried out by these same 
persons at the same office. 
 The chairman of the group however is independent, he is the head of a local school at 
Urk. From the interviews it became clear that functions of PO, 'group' and the local 
fishermen's organisation 'Visserijbelangen' are difficult to distinguish for fishermen who 
are generally member of these three organisations. The making of a distinction between PO 
and 'group' certainly in the case of PO-Oost is merely a formal matter whereas in daily 
practice PO and 'group' are seen as one organisation by both PO-staff and PO-members. 
 
Responsibilities 
All respondents answered positively on the question whether Group PO-Oost should have 
more competencies. Especially with regard to the fixing of quota respondents wanted more 
responsibility for the fishery sector. It became clear that these responses were brought 
about by dissatisfaction with the procedure for fixing TACs in which in the opinion of 
respondents biologists had too much influence. Respondents argued that the forecasts of 
biologists had often been wrong and that policy should take more notice of economic 
factors and practical knowledge from fishermen.1
 
Contact 
Most firm managers indicated that they generally contact the PO-office every week. These 
contacts concern new developments, quota transactions, information about regulations, 
problems with inspections (at sea) and the Argos system.1 All respondents claimed that 
they were well informed by the Group. 
 
                                                 
1 It must be taken into account  that the interviews were taken off at a moment when considerable reductions 
of sole (30%) and plaice (50%) TACs were proposed by the European Commission. 
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Rules 
In order to investigate whether fishermen are inclined to observe rules laid down by a 
fishermen's organisation (PO/group) better than rules laid down by the government 
respondents were asked about their opinion on this matter. A majority of the respondents 
(70%) answered that they personally were inclined to observe group rules better than rules 
laid down by the Ministry. Main argument for this attitude was the opinion that rules laid 
down by the industry were better adjusted to the daily practice of the fishery since the rule 
makers have more knowledge of the conduct of the fishery. Thirty percent of the 
respondents did not make a difference between governmental and PO/group rules. One of 
them argued that fishermen tested every new rule. 
 
Control 
Fishermen notice that controlling tasks are mostly performed by the General Inspection 
Service. According to the fishermen this controlling is effective. Fishermen are afraid of 
high fines, this has a positive effect on behaviour. 
 
Social control 
The question whether the increased responsibilities for the sector and the pooling of quotas 
in the group of PO-Oost had resulted in (more) social control in the fisheries community of 
Urk revealed that only a minority of respondents felt that this was really the case. About 
three quarters of the respondents did not see any increase in mutual control. Two 
respondents argued that in a community like Urk there had always been a great deal of 
social control as nearly everything became public in this community. 
 
Advantages of group membership 
The unrestrained possibility to hire or rent quotas within a group was mentioned by all 
respondents as the most important advantage of group membership. 
 
Quotas 
Some respondents argued that the new system results in the supply (renting) of quotas to 
fishermen who do not possess enough quotas themselves to fish the whole year through. In 
the last two years with a relatively high plaice TAC compared to plaice catches, the supply 
of plaice fishing rights was sufficient for all group members. It can be expected however 
that quota supply will dry up in years with lower TACs and that fishermen with small 
quotas will be in problems as a consequence. In these circumstances the group will have to 
make sure that group quotas are not exceeded. Since the group has some management 
powers concerning the group members' individual quotas it will be interesting to see if the 
PO is willing or able to shift individual fishing rights brought into the group from 
fishermen with large (surplus) individual quotas to fishermen who run into problems as a 
result of insufficient quotas. Or in other words whether the PO is a manager of group 
quotas or merely an office for transfers of individual quotas. 
 Information on quota offers reached every member regularly by post. 
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Auction rule 
The voluntary agreed auction rule is assessed positively by all fishermen. Since many of 
them already sold their catches at the auction, nothing seemed to have changed. Although 
many fishermen stated that now supply and demand is clearer, which is an advantage. 
 
Future 
All but one of the persons interviewed felt that perspectives of the Dutch fisheries sector 
were improved as a result of the group system. One fishermen even felt that the new 
system had been the only way to solve the in his eyes immense problems related to control 
and enforcement the sector faced in the late eighties. 
 The respondent that did not feel that future perspectives of the sector had improved 
argued that the future of the Dutch fishery sector is totally dependent on the (quota) 
decisions of the EU Council. Another respondent argued that the situation had improved 
theoretically but that fisheries by nature are unpredictable. 
 Asked about their ideas on the future role of groups in the Netherlands, the most 
common answer given was that groups or PO's should have more influence and that policy 
makers should listen more to the industry. Specific ideas about major changes of the 
current fisheries management system were not ventilated. Ideas about practical adjustments 
of rules or technical measures were often presented. 
 It can be concluded that the interviewed fishermen of Group PO-Oost are quite 
positive on the operation of the co-management system. Although the degree of 
participation/influence could increase. Now we will focus on the economic effect of the co-
management system. 
 
The effects of the combination of an ITQ system and co-management on the social and 
economic position of fishermen: The economic performance of group PO-Oost1
 
Income distribution 
We looked at the distribution of the economic results of individual vessels. Instead of 
looking at average levels of results and incomes it is interesting to see if this distribution 
has changed. In establishing the group system the cohesion of the group's members and the 
allowed liberal exchange of (parts of) fishing rights between members may give room to a 
relatively efficient use of these rights. Besides a likely increase of the general level of 
incomes this could also lead to diminished income differences within the groups. To this 
end a case study has been done, aimed at the PO-Oost group, based at Urk. This group is 
rather big, earning some 25 per cent of the Dutch cutter sector's gross proceeds. 
 Of this group economic results are calculated for all sailing vessels (80) owned by 
the group's members. Some 20 of these vessels appear in the LEI-DLO panel and have 
their detailed results ready. Of the other 60 vessels results are estimated. For this estimate a 
number of essential data of those vessels are known: 
- technical data (HP, GRT, age of vessel and engine) out of fleet statistics; 
- data on days at sea by gear out of VIRIS log book statistics; 
                                                 
1 See part 1 of this report for the methodology. 
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- data on landings by species by gear out of VIRIS log book statistics, checked by fish 
auction data. 
 
 On this basis rather accurate estimates of financial results can be made, using Hp-
group averages calculated out of the LEI panel. 
 A useful criterion to value economic results is 'average return to labour per crew 
member' as used by LEI-DLO frequently to measure economic performance. This figure is 
calculated as the sum of crew remuneration (including social premiums) and net result (the 
latter after deduction of all capital costs like depreciation and interest over the aggregate 
invested capital) divided by the number of crew. Thus surplus income is attributed to the 
production factor labour, after rewarding the production factor capital at shadow prices. 
 In years preceding and after the establishment of the groups (1993) standard 
deviation could be calculated of that part of the LEI-DLO panel being representative for 
the types of vessels and fisheries of the PO-Oost case study. This part of the panel 
consisted of between 64 and 76 vessels through the period 1988-1994. For these vessels 
standard deviation of the return to labour per crewmember, adjusted to 1993 prices (in 
NLG), was: 
 
 
Table 7.2 Standard deviation of the return to labour per crew member of the LEI panel (NLG) 
 
 
 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
 
 
45,800 68,000 68,600 84,400 56,300 43,000 48,100 
 
 
 
 
 The level of standard deviation increased in the first period after the formulation of 
more stringent management measures in 1987. Probably the sector had some difficulties 
adjusting to the new situation. In the meantime one must keep in mind the general decline 
in fleet capacity, starting in about 1989. An apparent adjustment, at least partly including 
this diminution of the fleet, led to sharply decreasing standard deviations after 1991. It 
cannot be ascertained if (in 1993) the establishment of the group system had a word in this. 
Calculated in the same way standard deviation for the PO-Oost group was: 
 
 
Table 7.3 Standard deviation of the return to labour per Group PO-Oost crewmember (NLG) 
 
 
 
 
1993 1994 
 
 
 
78,400 59,600 
 
 
 
 The level appeared to be substantially higher that of the LEI-DLO panel. One of the 
reasons for this is clearly that in the PO-Oost group several vessels only sailed during a 
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part of the year (mostly caused by fleet mutations like replacement of vessels). In the LEI-
DLO panel only full year sailing vessels are represented for reasons of comparability. If 
only with regard of PO-Oost full year sailing vessels are included in the calculation the 
figures are 44,800 and 45,900 NLG respectively. And then they are very much in line with 
the general level. 
 Furthermore variations within PO-Oost, including vessels sailing only a part of the 
year, showed a decline from 1993 to 1994. This development cannot be attributed to a 
changing fleet as the size and structure of this PO remained grossly the same, and also the 
number of vessels not sailing the full year was about the same. The PO-Oost members as a 
whole probably needed a year to adjust to the new situation (namely liberal possibilities to 
exchange quotas), as the full year sailing fleet was already in the course of adjustment in 
1993. Probably they did a good job utilising the opportunity of intra-EU trade of ITQ's to 
make the most of these quotas. It must be said that quota costs (net cost of individual 
quotas: interest on the value of quotas owned plus cost of hiring extra quotas, minus 
proceeds of quotas hired out) increases income differences. Without quota costs the 
standard deviation (of all vessels) should be 55,300 and 56,000 NLG respectively 
(naturally at higher average income levels). 
 It can be concluded (for the whole cutter fleet as well as for the case study producers' 
organisation) that up to now there is some evidence that the establishment of the groups 
did diminish income differences in a certain way. It seems that one of the purposes of the 
group system, namely to give room to a more efficient use of fishing rights, did so with 
regard of the average level. On top of that regarding incomes on individual vessels the 
system does also seem to benefit the 'have-nots' to some extent. By the figures one may 
suppose that intra-EU trade of ITQs, be it executed on an exclusively commercial basis, 
still created some convergence. In this aspect the fishermen, still acting individually, did 
experience some mutual interests within the producers' organisations. This is the more 
striking as there is no evidence that the producers' organisations as a whole (or their 
management) have intervened, for instance by influencing ITQ rent prices or by 
influencing the direction of ITQ shifts. This supposition is corroborated by the judgment of 
group managers and other experts. 
 However, there still exist rather wide income differences within the cutter fishery. 
Especially within PO-Oost in 1994 incomes grew wider apart. 
 
Future developments 
As the cost of acquiring vessel and fishing rights generally is prohibitive for newcomers in 
the trade in the future one may expect a concentration of these rights to the 'haves' out of 
the hands of the 'have nots'. Which effect this will have on fleet capacity is yet unclear. It is 
conceivable that in the course of years some of the vessels generating low incomes will 
stop activities, especially in times the general level of incomes is relatively low. As the 
fishing rights (individual quotas, days at sea, HP-licenses) will be taken over by prosperous 
enterprises eventually new vessels could appear within those enterprises and a return to the 
present-day number of vessels is not unlikely, especially in times of improving general 
income levels. 
 
 191 
Outcome on Organisational level 
 
FCB 
An additional task, apart from the already mentioned tasks, was delegated to the FCB. In 
order to reach uniformity between groups a coordinator was appointed by the FCB. Several 
meetings were held to establish a high degree of uniformity and communication between 
groups. The coordinator was quiet successful in this task. 
 According to the FCB their tasks cause too great an organisational and budgetary 
burden. The FCB wanted the Ministry to pay for these co-management tasks; however, the 
Ministry refused. A procedure has been started by the FCB in order to let the Ministry pay 
these transaction costs. Co-monitoring of the auction duty caused problems for the FCB as 
well. Last but not least fishermen experience the working style of the FCB as 
meddlesomeness and patronising. 
 It is also stated that the legal status of the co-management tasks of the CFB is unclear 
(A. Berg, 1995). 
 
FO/PO/Group 
 
Quotas and effort management and the group system 
In recent years landings kept well below quotas (described in section 5.3); however, this 
cannot be attributed to the co-management system solely, as this was only established in 
1993. But at least since that establishment the sector still adhered to the quotas as a whole 
and fleet capacity did not increase. One gets the impression that the group management 
system at least helped in consolidating levels of input and output resulting from the 
management structures in the years preceding its establishment. In that way the group 
system seems to have had a stabilising effect on the cutter sector. 
 In 1994 the share of quotas that was used rose, this development being accompanied 
by an increasing use of the vessels. It is conceivable that the liberalisation of intra-group 
trade of individual quotas (and days at sea attributed to those individual quotas) within the 
groups has contributed to that development. It may be concluded that on the one side the 
fleet as a whole fished well within the quota framework, but that on the other side the fleet 
succeeded in a more economic usage of the quotas. 
 
Group control and social control 
The monitoring task of the group management board concerned the auction duty in 
particular. It can be concluded, however, that the group management board was not very 
'active' in performing this task (neither was the CFB and auction staff): 
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T
 
able 7.4 Breaches/irregularities auction duty a) 
 
 1993 1994 1995 b) 
 
 
Reported by: 
- General Inspection Service 46 26 6 
- (-Special case Vlissingen) (108) 
- CFB 3 4 1 
- Groups 0 4 1 
-
 
 Auction staff 0 2 0 
 
a) AID report to the Ministry 30-10-1995; b) Period 01.01.1995-30.09.1995. 
 
 
 The so-called social control was too much asked for in the initial stage of a group 
process. Social control is only possible when group norms are accepted and internalised. 
Probably the idea of social control has been misinterpreted by the designers. Social control 
is a rather subtle behaviour within groups with strong cohesion. The breach of a group 
norm mostly does not result in official prosecution, but the punishment varies from gossip 
to group exclusion. However, when it is not yet clear if certain behaviour is disapproved of 
by every group member, it is not clear how to react. Fishermen experience social control as 
a form of treason, instead of socially correct behaviour. So social control does not function. 
 
Outcome on Governmental Level 
 
The combination of positive inducements and some coercion made fishermen decide to 
cooperate. Fishermen who often are portrayed as selfish individualists, apparently are able 
to cooperate under favourable conditions. During the 2½ years of co-management under 
consideration, national quotas were difficult to exceed with the existing fleet capacity. So 
the conditions to start the co-management system indeed were rather favourable. As 
already became clear, the government had three incentives to cooperate in the new 
management system: 
1. to improve relationship with the industry; 
2. to manage quotas efficiently; and 
3. to lower transaction costs. 
 
 The most important criteria for successful co-management in the government's point 
of view are the absence of excessive catches. The following section describes in detail 
quota and effort management in the co-management system (incentive 2). 
 
Landings 
As said before quotas issued by the European Union form the framework in which the 
Dutch cutter fishery operates. So one of the tasks of the national fisheries management is 
trying to fit fishing operations within that framework. For the cutter fishery demersal fish 
is by far the main target category, especially sole, plaice, cod and whiting. Accurate data 
                                                 
1 AID report to the Ministry 30-10-1995. 
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on time series of landings by species are not available, but LEI-DLO estimated total 
financial proceeds of these species rather accurately. A way to compare quotas and 
landings is to use those financial proceeds. For that end those estimated real proceeds can 
be confronted to potential proceeds out of quotas: a summation of national quotas 
multiplied by average prices of these species. For a long range of years this comparison is 
shown in table 7.5. 
 This comparison of (weighted) total landings with (weighted) quotas reveals for a 
range of years that landings as a percentage of quotas steadily dropped (an exception is 
1987, in which year total Dutch quotas somehow was reduced by some 20 to 25 per cent). 
In recent years landings kept well below quota. The development is illustrated in figure 7.3 
on next page. A remarkable feature revealed by the graph is that the cutter sector's real 
proceeds show a far more regular pattern than that of potential proceeds. Do fisheries 
adjust more smoothly to changing stocks and their catchability than TACs and quotas? 
 
 
Table 7.5 Proceeds of demersal fish of the cutter fishery and the potential proceeds out of national 
quotas, multiplied by average prices (million NLG nominal) 
 
 
Year Real proceeds Potential proceeds Real as a percentage 
 
 
  of potential 
 
1975 234 212 110 
1976 257 236 109 
1977 264 227 116 
1978 313 211 148 
1979 352 264 133 
1980 363 344 106 
1981 426 417 102 
1982 447 408 110 
1983 518 413 125 
1984 539 447 121 
1985 622 594 105 
1986 588 581 101 
1987 563 470 120 
1988 503 469 107 
1989 493 487 101 
1990 528 578 91 
1991 575 707 81 
1992 495 628 79 
1993 481 614 78 
1994 481 575 84 
 
 
Source: LEI Fisheries Directorate; Fish Commodity Board. 
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Figure 7.3 Cutters demersal fish proceeds 
 
 
Fleet capacity and effort 
Development of landings should be compared with the development of fishing capacity 
(fleet) and effort (days at sea). In table 7.5 the development of fleet (and employment), 
effort (nominal HP-days) and average number of days at sea per vessel is shown. 
 
 
Table 7.6 Number of vessels, total engine power, HP-days and average number of days at sea per vessel 
 
 
Year Vessels Total crew 1,000 HP Million HP-days Average days 
 
 
    per vessel 
 
1975 588 2,511 367 70 192 
1976 547 2,290 355 67 190 
1977 498 2,106 323 57 178 
1978 497 2,133 28 55 168 
1979 500 2,186 333 56 167 
1980 518 2,314 363 59 163 
1981 549 2,522 408 64 158 
1982 565 2,544 443 76 171 
1983 581 2,780 476 84 177 
1984 610 2,929 512 90 175 
1985 618 2,990 534 90 169 
1986 615 2,970 537 85 158 
1987 616 3,036 560 86 153 
1988 607 2,825 588 91 155 
1989 588 2,641 586 87 149 
1990 553 2,486 559 83 148 
1991 512 2,292 521 79 151 
1992 482 2,195 492 81 164 
1993 473 2,184 491 86 176 
1
 
994 69 2,251 492 90 183 
 
Source: LEI. 
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 The figures show an accompanying drop of fleet capacity and for that sake 
employment on the fleet. The nominal number of HP-days first also dropped, but rose in 
recent years. The average number of days at sea per vessel showed an increase as of course 
constant effort divided by a decreasing number of vessels will already result in higher 
effort per vessel. Moreover clearly the catchability of the species package under quota 
regime became less as an increasing effort was needed to reach an even under 100 per cent 
usage of quotas. This led to an even sharper increase of the number of days at sea per 
vessel, reaching the level of pre-quota times. 
 Next government's perspective on co-management experiences is further described. 
 
Achievements 
The Minister of Agriculture, Nature Management and Fisheries mentioned several 
achievements of the groups in a speech held on a symposium on co-management (June 9th 
1995) and in his mid term review of the system (June 16th 1995). Achievements were in 
short: 
- of the sailing total cutter capacity (hp) 93% in 1993 and in 1994 96% united in 
groups; 
- the private auction sale regulations have been observed quite well: In 1993 of 24,000 
landings 46 were incompatible with the auction rule and in 1994 this was 
respectively 27,000/23; 
- a 'tit for tat' strategy has been increasingly implemented with success; 
- national quotas has not been exceeded (for more details, see above); 
- an increase in flexible exploitation of quotas resulted, for instance a nearly 100% 
utilisation of sole quotas; 
- many fishermen seem to be satisfied with the group system; 
- finally, the Minister ascertains a willingness of group management boards to fulfil 
management tasks and responsibilities. 
 
Problems 
These 2 1/2 quiet co-management years have occasionally been disturbed. Especially some 
members of a certain group systematically circumvented the private auction rule in the 
period during 1993 till February 1994. This circumvention concerned 1.6% of the group 
sole quotas and 0.06% of the plaice group quotas. Although these quantities are not 
extremely high, transgressions were structural and asked for measures. An understanding 
between transgressors and the prosecutor has been reached. 
 Public law and private law converge now and then, which causes problems.1 
Controlling tasks are rather intertwined and some fishermen have been double fined. It 
occurred that criminal judges imposed fines while group management boards already did 
so too. As a result management board are less willing to control and inspection is mostly 
performed by the General Inspection Service. 
 All in all, quality of inspection seems to be improved and the number of 
transgressions is decreasing (see table 7.7). 
                                                 
1 A.J. Berg. Vissen in troebel water. Juridical comments on Dutch co-management of marine fish resources. 
Lecture held on the co-management symposium, Noordwijk June 9th 1995. 
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Table 7.7 Results of the General Inspection Service a) 
 
 
Year Number of checks Number of transgressions Percentage transgressions/ checks 
 
 
1991 15,871 1,207  7.6 
1992 17,404 854  4.9 
1993 12,290 984 b) 8.0 
1994 8,913 618 b) 6.9 
 
 
a) Mid-term review of the co-management system of the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Management and 
Fisheries, June 16th 1995; b) Charges included which were dismissed due to change in regulations. 
 
 
 This also means a lowering of the monitoring costs, which was one of the incentive 3 
for government to participate in co-management: 
 
 
Table 7.8 Monitoring effort AID 
 
 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 a) 
 
 
Number of person-years 100 101 86 75 71 58 
 
 
a) Period 01.01.1995-30.09.1995. 
 
 
 The main part of the administration of temporary quota transfers is handled by the 
group management board. So contracting costs consequently lowered for government. The 
same counts for information costs. 
 Some external factors are worrisome, like falling prices for roundfish and negative 
valuta influences. Furthermore, future TAC's are expected to be lowered. However, the 
Minister is of the opinion that this should cause problems in any fishery management 
system. 
 All in all, the Minister stated to be very satisfied with the operation and effects of the 
co-management system, which points to an amelioration of the relationship between the 
industry and the Minister (incentive 1). The Minister suggested the Dutch Parliament to 
prolong the experimental term of three years with one year (till January 1st 1997). 
 
7.2.6 Conclusions And The Conditions For An Effective And Successful Co-
Management System 
 
First we will present the conclusions by answering to the first three research questions, 
then we will answer the fourth research question on the conditions for an effective and 
                                                 
1 Mid-term review of the co-management system of the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Management and 
Fisheries, June 16th 1995. 
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successful co-management. Finally the ideal situation for Dutch co-management will be 
presented. 
How did the new co-management scheme function? 
 
Government and organisations as well as fishermen, having all their own incentives to 
cooperate, contribute and respectively coordinate, are quite positive about the functioning 
of the co-management system. 
 An amelioration in the mutual relationship of government with the industry is 
established especially by more flexibility in regulation and an increase in legitimacy, 
participation and responsibilities on fishermen's side and, on government's side no worries 
about over catching (these three years). 
 Fishermen mentioned the larger rent/hire possibilities of quotas together with the 
extra days at sea as the main incentive to join the groups. Besides these reasons, they 
wanted to come in smooth waters with the government and each other. 
 According to the fishermen, important motives to stay group member are the extra 
days at sea, larger rent/hire of quotas and the good functioning of the groups. The 
information about the exploitation of own and group quotas and about rent/hire and sell 
possibilities of quotas are judged upon very positively. 
 Fishermen are satisfied with the auction duty. Group rules are judged as more 
flexible than governmental rules. Within the groups the fishermen see larger possibilities to 
influence future policy than outside the groups. 
 Transaction cost lowered for government, however, partly shifted to the CFB as well 
as to FOs and POs/groups. It is uncertain whether the lowering of government's monitoring 
costs will appear to be structural, considering the lowering of quotas in 1996. 
 Monitoring still remained in actual practice a task of the government, self or social 
control was disappointing, however understandable considering the youth of the 
management scheme. Now that fishermen are better informed than ever about each others 
way of acting, it can be expected that it will have a positive effect to prevent free riders 
behaviour. 
 Legal uncertainty. Tensions between public and private law became clear. The legal 
classification of the management scheme seems to be incorrect. The form pertains to 
private law, however the tasks like management, monitoring and standardisation pertain to 
disciplinary jurisdiction. A suggestion is to make a clear distinction between monitoring 
and sanctioning. 
 The motives to join groups (among others: flexibility in renting and hiring of quotas 
as well as more days at sea) also seem to be motives to stay in the groups. 
 
Does the new management scheme lead to an efficient quota management? 
 
The new management scheme leads to an efficient quota management. Since the 
implementation of the co-management system, the sector still adhered to the quotas as a 
whole and fleet capacity did not increase. One easily gets the impression that the group 
management system at least helped in consolidating levels of input and output resulting 
from the management structures in the years preceding its establishment. In this way, the 
group system seems to have had a stabilizing effect on the cutter sector. In 1994 the share 
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of quotas that was used rose, and this development was accompanied by an increasing use 
of the vessels. It is conceivable that the liberalisation of intra-EU trade of individual quotas 
(and days at sea attributed to those individual quotas) within the groups has contributed to 
that development. It may be concluded that on the one side the fleet as a whole fished well 
within the quota framework, and, on the other side that the fleet succeeded in a more 
economic usage of the quotas. 
 
Improves co-management the distribution of net benefits? 
 
The establishment of the groups did diminish income differences in a certain way. It seems 
that one of the purposes of the group system, namely to give room to a more efficient use 
of fishing rights, did so with regard to the average level. But regarding incomes on 
individual vessels, the system seems to benefit the 'have nots' only partly. From the figures 
one may infer that intra-EU trade of ITQ's occurs exclusively on a commercial basis, but 
there is evidence that this trade contributed to a more equal distribution of fishing rights 
and therefore of incomes. In this aspect the fishermen experienced some converging 
interests within groups, while still acting individually. Income differences still are notable. 
The groups themselves as a whole (or their management) have not yet intervened, for 
instance by influencing ITQ rent prices or the flow of intra-trade. This supposition is 
corroborated by the judgment of group managers and other experts. 
 As the cost of acquiring vessel and fishing rights generally is prohibitive for 
newcomers in the trade one can still expect a concentration of these rights to the 'haves' out 
of the hands of the 'have nots' in the future. The effect this will have on fleet capacity is yet 
unclear. It is conceivable that in the course of years, a number of low income generating 
vessels will stop activities, especially at times in which the general level of incomes is 
relatively low. As the fishing rights (individual quotas, days at sea, Hp-licenses) will be 
taken over by prosperous enterprises an eventual increase of the number of vessels within 
those enterprises is not unlikely, especially at times of general growing income levels. 
 All in all it can be stated that the economic management of quotas (ITQs) was very 
successful in the co-management system; relationships ameliorated; transaction cost 
lowered for government, but increased for organisations; the legal framework needs to be 
adapted; and monitoring and sanctioning tasks should be separated. The scheme caused no 
major problems in the three years of its implementation. Next we come to the answering of 
the fourth research question. 
 
What are conditions of effective and successful co-management? 
 
To discover this, we will use the framework as a diagnostic tool working backward 
through the relationships between the variables. We also will use terms and ideas from the 
design principles of successful self regulation from Elinor Ostrom (1992) and the 
comparison of these design principle with the design principle of Dutch co-management 
(Hoefnagel 1995). 
 First we will value the core elements of three years co-management experiences in 
the Netherlands within the variables of the Oakerson framework: + indicates a positive 
result; - indicates a negative result; +/- an insufficient or unclear result. Then we will weigh 
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those elements by looking again upon the outcomes. Finally we will develop ideal core 
elements of successful co-management within the Oakerson framework. 
 
Outcomes 
+ efficient quota management in terms of no overcatching and better economic usage 
of the available quotas; 
+/- uncertain results upon effects on income differences; 
- expectations for further concentration of fishing rights; 
+ positive attitude towards the co-management scheme of all groups and institutions 
(In 1996 95% of the fleet joined in groups again); 
+ an amelioration of the relationships between sector and government; 
+/- transaction costs partly shifted from government to non-governmental institutions, 
unclearness about proportionality of this shift; 
+/- legal frameworks need to be worked on; 
+/- monitoring remained chiefly a governmental task; 
+ sanctioning system is frightening. 
 
 Total of 9 core elements of which 4 are positive, 1 is negative, 4 are 
unclear/uncertain. These outcomes are directly related to 'the physical and technical 
attributes' as well as 'the patterns of interaction'. We will first consider the patterns of 
interaction. 
 
Patterns of interaction 
+ on all levels a high degree of cooperation, contribution and coordination. Focusing 
especially on user-groups; 
+ predominantly homogeneous groups; 
+ short-term incentives (additional days at sea and expanded possibilities to rent/hire 
quotas); 
+ long term incentives (participation/influence/flexibility in a part of the operational 
rules; direct information channels; relaxation in relationships); 
+ slight coercion; 
+ appropriate moment and context. 
 
 Total of 6 core elements of which 6 are positive. 
 
The physical and technical attributes 
+ clear boundaries (excludibility, subtractibility, jointness); 
+/- quotas were bigger than catch possibilities (effort and landings). In fact this was 
positive for co-management in the short term, however, on the long run this has a 
negative effect on stock sizes, which could be dangerous for a cooperative attitude in 
the long run; 
- in 1995 quotas lowered (in 1996 quotas lowered strongly); stocks are not in good 
shape, however, there is no direct, complete relationship between co-management 
and stock sizes because Dutch fishermen catch a percentage of the stocks and other 
influences play a role. Influences from an ecological nature as well as a man made 
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nature: behaviour of other European fishermen fishing the same stocks (patterns of 
interaction on a European scale), and deriving from decision-making processes 
(external arrangements and operational rules of other Member States). 
 
 Total of 3 core elements of which 1 is positive, 1 is negative, 1 is insufficient. The 
physical and technical attributes and the patterns of interaction are related to the three other 
variables, so play key roles. The variable patterns of interaction are a very strong one in 
this case as we would see above: of the 6 core elements all 6 elements were positive. This 
is not the case in the other variable. It is interesting to think of the ideal situation for the 
physical and technical attributes. 
* clear boundaries; 
* effort and landings in equilibrium with quotas, ideally catch = quotas; 
* incentives to leave respectively enter the industry when there is no equilibrium (to 
enter the industry is difficult due to property rights in the form of ITQs, to stimulate 
to leave the industry is possible for example by decommissioning); 
* TACs, decommissioning, property rights implementation/change et cetera should be 
discussed in decision-making arrangements. 
 
Decision-making arrangements 
+/- groups form an extra layer in hierarchical layered and nested structures; 
- no direct influence on external arrangements on EU level (influence via Minister, not 
via sub committee); influence between user groups and Minister via FCB; 
+ participation in design co-management by fishermen and government in Steering 
Committee and subscribed by all relevant partners; co-management is a national 
affair; 
+ homogeneous groups; 
+ development of operational rules by groups (auction duty; fishing plans; renting 
market et cetera); 
- according to design: monitoring and sanctioning by government and user groups, in 
practice- unclear social control- monitoring by government (AID); 
+ sanctioning practices are effective; 
+/- Arbitrage Foundation is installed, not yet functioning well; 
+/- legal framework has to be adapted. 
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Figure 7.4 Dynamic framework presenting the ideal conditions for an effective and successful co-
management of quotas in the Netherlands 
 
 
 Total of 9 core elements of which 4 are positive, 2 are negative, 3 are unclear or 
insufficient. 
 It should be taken into account that circumstances were rather favourable due to 
relatively high quotas and low catches. Because of the latter we are unable to pronounce 
upon whether the co-management system prevents exceeding of quotas. Nevertheless, it 
can be concluded that much has been achieved in three years time: co-management of fish 
resources is functioning in the Netherlands. The balance between the mentioned positive 
conditions and the less successful elements of co-management design and actual operation 
seems to be in favour for the continuing of the system, considering the 1996 renewed 
subscription in groups of 95% of the Dutch fleet. The less successful elements of the co-
management scheme may form future obstacles if these remain unchanged. Situations 
cannot be perfect, however, a clear aim at perfection will be stimulating for participants. 
The aim then is the ideal situation, which is represented in figure 7.4. 
 
 202
7.2.7 Epilogue 
 
Many changes occurred in Dutch fisheries management since the EU tried to implement an 
active fishery policy in the seventies and eighties. Dutch government had to change from a 
stimulating actor within a neo-corporatist setting into a restrictive one, without a well 
functioning institutional setting. The co management institution has finally filled up this 
institutional gap. This new institution could be created after a period of trial and error, of 
de-institutionalisation and re-institutionalisation. Co management seem to fit well in Dutch 
management tradition, and is therefore not complete new. It builds on old institutions, 
traditions and values. New though is the more conscious role of fishermen in the co 
management of fisheries management. They have to operate less individualistic and less 
autonomous, taking into account more and more their colleagues, society, policy and the 
environment. 
 
 
7.3 The Dutch shrimp case and the Oakerson model 
 
7.3.1 Introduction 
 
Shrimps (Crangon crangon) can be found along the entire coast, sometimes even at a few 
metres from the beach. The shrimp fishing fleet is therefore characterised by small vessels 
with a very limited draught. The estuaries in Zeeland and the Wadden Sea are attractive 
places for the shrimp. As the shrimps are caught, they are immediately cooked aboard ship. 
After having been cooked, the crew cleans the shrimps from any impurities and the 
shrimps are stocked in refrigerated fish holds. At the auction, the shrimps are first 
transported over a sieve to sift the undersized shrimps. Then the sale in the auction room 
can commence. The traders send the shrimps to shelling shops in Holland or abroad (to 
Morocco) (PV 2002). 
 The shrimp fishery is an uncertain enterprise, in movement in prices and catches. A 
well-known and traditional solution to this uncertainty is to direct one selves in low periods 
towards other fisheries. For a part of these enterprises the shrimp fishery became less 
important than before and the flatfish or round fish fishery became the core activity. Others 
left the shrimp fishery completely aside. The larger beam trawler enterprises of today 
originate from this group (Salz and De Wilde, 1990). 
 Within the shrimp fishery of today (220 vessels) one can distinguish along many 
types: 
- the pure shrimp fishermen; 
- the mixed fishery enterprises; 
- fishermen with a G.K. licence (circa 90), which are allowed to fish the Wadden sea 
and the coastal zones; 
- fishermen with a G.V. licence, which are not allowed to fish the Wadden sea (about 
135); 
- vessels with a certificate of reliability from the Vessel Inspection; 
- vessels without this certificate of reliability; 
- vessels with an extra licence and ITQs (like whiting, cod, sole, plaice ITQs); 
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- vessels without an extra licence and ITQs; 
- vessels that sold their licence and ITQs recently. 
 
 Many of these distinguishing features are developed by policy. In the context of 
overexploitation of marine resources and the complexities involved in developing effective 
conservation policies, the concept of common-pool resources (CPRs) is often introduced. 
Common-pool resources (CPRs) are resources (i) for which joint use involves 
subtractability: use by one user will subtract benefits from another user's enjoyment of the 
resource system, and (ii) for which exclusion of individuals or groups involves high 
transaction costs. 
 Though the Crangon crangon stock in the European marine resources is a CPR, it 
seems not vulnerable to over-exploitation. Hence, no quota system has been installed to 
control the shrimp fishery, as has been introduced for many other European commercial 
fish stocks. Nevertheless the quota regulations have their influences on the shrimp fishery 
as well. Since 15 years the shrimp fishery sector is increasingly confronted with 
regulations. This case presents the results of a research into the effects of the introduction 
of regulation by using the Oakerson model. The Dutch shrimp fishery case shows that self-
regulation under market forces and governmental regulation under CFP forces are essential 
developments. 
 
7.3.2 Physical & Technical Attributes 
 
In this paragraph we consider the physical attributes and constraints of the natural resource 
Dutch shrimp fishermen exploit as well as the constraints placed upon the used techniques. 
 Since 1977, fishermen of non-EU Member States are excluded from the European 
Union part of the North Sea (200-mile zone/Exclusive Economic Zone). EU fishermen are 
sometimes seasonally banished from fishing grounds that function as nursery areas. 
 Due to a bilateral agreement Dutch fishermen are allowed to fish shrimp in Germany 
and Denmark. One is only allowed to fish shrimps with a licence (GV or GK licence, given 
by the ministry of LNV). 
 The shrimp fishing-fleet consists of circa 220 boats. Of these 220, only about 90 are 
allowed to exploit the Wadden Sea. Typically, the shrimp sector has been less capital 
intensive than the other Dutch fishing industries. 'When one wanted to become an 
independent fisherman starting from scratch, one became shrimp fisherman.' From old, the 
shrimp fishing-fleet has been characterised by older and smaller boats for a number of 
reasons. In general, a shrimp fisherman sticks to the coastal zone. Large vessels then do not 
generate enough extra profit to cover for the additional costs. Furthermore, one needs one 
crewmember only, to fish shrimps. But most importantly, 'the shrimp prices were so low 
usually, that there was nothing left to invest on, at the end of the day.' The last years, both 
landings and prices have increased drastically, and investments in vessel improvement as 
well, which led several interrogated stakeholders to make the following remark: 
 
'The new ships, built now, after a couple of good years have to make a gross revenue 
of about 10,000 euro (per week), but a fisherman does not think about the fact that 
the amount of shrimps necessary to make such gross revenue, put prices under 
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pressure. The fisherman is impulsive, he invests on a good year. He thinks mainly on 
the short run.' 
 
 So an important constraint in the shrimp fishery is the relation total amount of 
catches of the fleet and the prices. 
 
7.3.3 Decision-Making Arrangements 
 
In general, decision-making arrangements are defined by authority relationships that 
specify who decides what in relation to whom (Oakerson 1992, 46). In the framework of 
Oakerson, decision-making arrangements are divided into operational rules, external 
arrangements and collective choice arrangements. 
 Here the operational rules concern the management/regulation of the use of the 
shrimp stock; the external arrangements are here defined by decision structures of 
organisations and institutions outside the immediate user-group; collective choice 
arrangements are rules that establish conditions of collective choice within the user-group. 
 
Operational rules 
 
Licences are important in Dutch fisheries; this is also the case in the shrimp fisheries. For 
the mixed fishery fleet quota management is as well an important management regulation. 
Apart from that total capacity of the shrimp fleet is frozen. 
 
Licences 
Since the sixties the condition to receive a licence is a maximum capacity criteria, namely 
221 Kilowatt. There are two types of shrimp licences. The GK licence that allows one to 
fish shrimp in the Wadden sea and the 12 miles zone, the number of these licences is 
frozen in 1988 for nature conservational reasons. And the GV licence that allows 
fishermen to catch shrimp within the 12 miles zone, however the Wadden sea area is 
excluded. Since the cod fishery became less profitable due to low catches (and 
consequently low TACs) coastal fishermen turned again towards shrimp fishery which the 
fishermen of which shrimp are the core business did not like. They organised a fishermen's 
protest and, because they asked for it, in 1992 the number of GV licences has been frozen 
too. 
 
European regulation 
 
Since 1983 one of the pillars of CFP is its fleet policy, the multi-annual guidance program 
(MAGP). The core idea of this policy is that investments in a vessel is a long term financial 
burden that means a long term exploitation in fisheries and implicitly means a long term 
pressure on stocks. Until MAGP IV the shrimp fleet that was for 70% dependent on shrimp 
catches was not under the MAGP regime. 
 So to fish shrimp in the Netherlands, does not only imply a national shrimp licence 
but as well a so called 'list one or list two' licence. List 1 is a list with a special type of 
vessel on it. This is the MAGP segment Euro cutters: These are small multi-purpose beam 
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trawlers with engine power <= 221 kW, fishing mainly in coastal waters within the 12-mile 
zone (Davidse and De Wilde, 2001). These Euro cutters are allowed to fish for flatfish and 
shrimp with beam trawls within the 12-mile zone on the condition that the length of each 
beam trawl is less than 4 m (4.5 m overall) (EC regulation no. 55/87). Total horsepower of 
List 1 has been frozen since the first of January 1998. Mutual trade is possible within the 
total. So after 1998 shrimp fishermen had to pay for extra horsepower (De Wilde, 2001). 
 Meanwhile the shrimp fleet had nice financial results, and fishermen started to invest 
in extra capacity. They paid their investments by selling (mainly) cod and whiting ITQs 
and cod and whiting licences. Fishermen who sold their ITQs and licence are now pure 
shrimp fishermen. They do not belong any longer to List 1, the Euro cutters. Nowadays the 
pure shrimp fleet segment is due to this development becoming too big. Producers 
Organisations (POs) only receive subsidy for crush prices from the EU if they fulfil their 
MAGP obligations. That's why is decided to reduce capacity when capacity is traded by 
40% Kilowatt (and 35% tonnes). Capacity can only be bought from stopping shrimp 
enterprises. When a shrimp fishermen decides to buy 60 Kilowatt he needs to buy 100 
Kilowatt. In this way the segment will decrease in capacity and the Netherlands can fulfil 
its obligation toward the EU. 
 Inclusion on the so-called 'List 2' allows shrimp fishermen to use beam lengths over 
4.5 m for shrimp trawling and, as an exception, for fishing for sole (of course, only if in the 
possession of sole quotas) on the condition that these fishermen have fishing for shrimp as 
their main activity (70% of their catches is shrimp). 
 Nowadays, these List 2 permits are traded, although they were not meant to. As one 
of the informants noted: 'Even if permits or licences are officially not tradable, who is 
going to control and how? Experience shows that fishermen trade everything what 
becomes scarce, allowed or not.' 
 For 'List II' a 'grandfather' system has started in 2000, implying that only boats 
continuing to fulfil the conditions are to remain on the list. 
 
7.3.4 External arrangements 
 
Ironically the shrimp fishermen were until recently rather free from national and EU 
regulation; nowadays they are more limited than the Euro cutter segment. While these euro 
cutters were already under a severe management regime due to quotas and other 
regulations. The fishermen that has chosen for a mixed fishery are better off according to a 
Wieringen fishermen: 
 
'…Shrimp fishery has been divided in segments. As result a group of shrimp 
fishermen has been classified in a segment that they can not leave anymore. Here 
(Wieringen) shrimp fishermen can do other things as well, here the fishermen have 
invested in licences and ITQs. Here they have built it all up, while at the other side 
(Wadden area) they have sold all rights. Then you have a bare business left. Of that 
group 40% has to disappear because there is an overcapacity according to the Multi 
Annual Guidance Plan. We are not in that group.' 
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 Government and the EU are becoming stronger players in the shrimp fisheries. 
Traders have always been a very strong player in the shrimp fishery. 
 
Trade 
 
Nearly 100% of the in Dutch water caught shrimp is landed on 6 fish auctions. Still de 
prices are not made by the auction system, because: 
- The oligopolistic position of the Dutch shrimp trade. According to Moret, Ernst & 
Young 5 traders control circa 90% of the Dutch shrimp trade (1994); 
- Dutch traders are also active at the Danish and German shrimp market, where no 
auction system functions. Van de Beek (1998) concludes that the Dutch, German, 
and Danish shrimp market is one market. About 70% of the German and Danish 
shrimps are traded to Dutch merchants, which of course have its effects on prices. 
- The main part of the Dutch shrimp fleet that catches shrimp in Denmark during 
winter, sells directly to the Dutch traders; 
- Large landings cause low prices, however at first reasonable prices are made, which 
stimulates large landings; 
- The traders store extra landings in freeze houses. In 1990 LEI ascertained that a 10% 
increase in landings in the high season, means a decrease of 6,3% in price in the next 
half year, due to freezing practices (Salz and De Wilde, 1990). 
 
Collective Choice Arrangements 
 
Neo-Corporatism in the shrimps 
In other Dutch fisheries segments neo-corporatism played an important role. (See national 
case study.) The shrimp fishery was traditionally not that strongly regulated. Still the Fish 
Product Board does play its role. 
 
Fish Product Board 
 
Fishermen, fish and shellfish farmers, fish processors, whole-sellers, and retailers are 
united in the Dutch Fish Product Board. In the case of shrimp fishery, the different 
stakeholders meet twice a year in the Shrimp Advisory Board. This Board discusses and 
decides upon issues in the areas of, for instance, public health, quality, inspection, research 
and trade. For the Fish Product Board, an important controlling task is at the fish auctions. 
An officer of the Fish Product Board is permanently based at each auction. These officers 
check whether the fish has been correctly classified according to freshness and size. 
Furthermore, they check the fishermen's membership of the product organisations and the 
product organisations concerning their supply and price arrangements. In addition, the 
officers of the Fish Product Board inspect the products whether they are suitable for human 
consumption. 
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The producers' organisations (POs) 
POs are mainly implemented for playing a role in the implementation of the common 
organisation of the market for fishery products. In the Dutch shrimp case their main 
function is to crush shrimps if prices become to low. The EU subsidizes a part of the costs. 
 Further, sieving is used as market regulating instrument: Fish Product Board 
facilitates agreement between POs, depends on price and landings, only too small shrimps 
are destroyed. The power of POs is very limited, they are more or less 'caught' in a 
prisoners' dilemma: 
 
'We have always sanctioned fishermen who did not obey to the rules. But it is tricky 
because there are multiple POs shrimp fishermen can become member of. They can 
switch to another PO when not agreeing but merging these POs is very difficult as 
well because there are so much different kinds of shrimp fishermen, who all have 
different interests.' 
 
Fishermen's organisations (FOs) 
The Fishermen's' Union (Vissersbond) and the Federation of Fishery Associations 
(Federatie) nationally represent fishermen. The first organisation attracts members from 
smaller fish businesses (most shrimp fishermen are therefore member of this organisation), 
fishermen are direct member. The Union established an own PO, the PO 'Vissersbond'. 
From the second organisation, the Federation, local associations are member, thus 
fishermen sent delegates to Federation meetings. The following anecdote demonstrates the 
historical background of the complexity of the organisational structure in the relatively 
small shrimp sector. D.E.T.V is the original fishermen association at Wieringen. Due to 
'purely power hunger of one person', new association was established in the mid seventies, 
'Visserijbelangen', though both local associations represented exact the same interests. 
Visserijbelangen choose another strategy, became member of the Federation while 
traditionally D.E.T.V. was member of Union. Then Visserijbelangen established its own 
PO as well. Thus union is linked to D.E.T.V. and PO Vissersbond while Visserijbelangen 
and PO Wieringen are 'one package' and have strong ties with the Federation. 
 
7.3.5 Patterns of Interactions 
 
'Patterns of interaction result directly from the mutual choice of strategies by the members 
of a group. Given the physical features of the commons and the characteristics of the 
relevant technology, on the one hand, as well as the decision-making arrangements 
available to govern its use, on the other, individuals make choices, from which there 
emerges some pattern of interaction' (Oakerson 1992, 49). One can say that these patterns 
can be measured along a scale ranging from a free-rider strategy to a cooperative strategy 
as far as it concerns the interaction pattern of the exploiters/fishermen. We also want to 
know how government and organisations score on the scale of cooperativeness. There are 
other parties; traders and German and Danish shrimp fishermen. 
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Trade 
 
In spite of the dependency of the shrimp fishermen of a few tradesmen, many informants 
do not judge negatively upon them: 
 
'You would almost state that Heiploeg is god to some fishermen. The fisherman 
lands his shrimps and the whole catch is directly bought up. The enormous price 
fluctuations in the shrimp trade, a small trader simply cannot anticipate. That is why 
one is so glad with these two big men. And they really do not take an unreasonable 
part of the profit.' 
 
'The better prices of the last years are no coincidence. Trade has brought the sale 
mechanism to a certain level and that stabilises at the moment. Both parties have an 
interest to realise better prices. Last year we had luck. In Germany there was nothing 
to fish. You sometimes think the fishermen have influence but that is not true. It is 
the trade that determines the price. Puul [a second big Dutch shrimp trader] and 
Heiploeg, you can judge that story in two ways. If you want something, you try to get 
as much grip on the situation that is what they do as well, in a certain way. Hygiene, 
sales increase, that kind of things demands for large investments and these two 
traders have invested. Parties that did not show up are parties that could not follow 
this model and try to undermine the market in certain periods. But the two big traders 
are the only ones who can handle these large quantities. Heiploeg and Puul offer a 
certainty which did not exist before.' 
 
 Still when prices are high, traders do not store, in order to have to buy not too much. 
Consequently demand is decreasing and prices are decreasing. Because of low prices 
demand is increasing. 
 This well-known cyclical process is difficult to regulate for shrimp fishermen, while 
they have to catch shrimp and most of them are not allowed to fish other species. The Euro 
cutters however, can switch from demersal fisheries towards shrimp (if they have a 
licence). So if quotas are low, they will choose to fish for shrimp, lowering consequently 
shrimp prices. 
 Also the German and Danish (and to a smaller extent the Belgian) shrimp landings 
have influence on the price movements. That's why the Dutch, German and Danish Pos 
started a 'trilateral consultation'. 
 
Trilateral Consultation and self management 
 
The trilateral consultation appears to be formed in reaction to the Sylt fishery and the 
internationalisation and concentration of trade. The Sylt is an island in the 12mileszone of 
Germany, accessible for Dutch fishermen thanks to a bilateral agreement. Dutch fishermen 
have explored the area since the seventies but more structural since the eighties. Three 
reasons evoked by the Sylt fishery leading to the trilateral consultation, are mentioned: 
interseasonal cold storage, the meeting of different nationalities, great oversupply. 
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'If the large vessels start to fish at the Sylt at the beginning of the year, the prices go 
down rapidly. In reaction, catch restrictions are introduced. But then the Wadden 
fishermen start to protest because their season starts in August.' 
 
 Influence of trade was that they became price manipulators through international 
trade lowering the prices at unexpected times, in other words, international closed price 
development, made possible by the developing monopoly position of two traders in the 
three most important shrimp landing countries. 
 
'Fishermen landed seven, eight tons shrimps per week which led to marginal prices 
and a great oversupply and if we did not catch anything in the Netherlands, the 
Germans might have a good year and then we still did not receive a good price.' 
 
 Besides POs, traders and a few fishermen participated in the trilateral consultation. 
Fishermen and traders agreed on the amount of weekly landings, and the traders 
guaranteed a minimum price of 5,50 or 6 guilders a kilo, in scarce periods the price can go 
up till 10 guilders. Traders left some three years ago. One says it is because of the NMA 
interference, others state that trade became angry with the fishermen when these men 
introduced strict catch restrictions. Some say that it was advantageous for trade as well to 
regulate landings, as it would decrease transaction costs. 
 
'It is true that the trade has often participated in the consultation. And if the storage 
then is crammed ... They rather do not give insight about the status of their stocks 
because that is valuable information for competitors, but if the stock is huge ...' 
 
Self management at risk 
So when market developments make it necessary, the POs meet in order to try to influence 
the market. In the beginning they agreed on a fish time reduction: a fishing ban in the 
weekend. The last few years one tries to restrict landings to keep prices at a reasonable 
level (De Wilde, 2001). Although not all informants are convinced of the direct relation 
between the good prices of the last years and catch restriction, they all agree that without 
the catch restrictions the whole situation would be far more difficult to control. Somehow, 
everybody agreed that the trilateral consultation became a more powerful player thanks to 
the agreement among the POs the last years. 
 So due to all kinds of patterns of interaction, like licensing, investments, selling of 
ITQs, Euro cutters, freezing of capacity, few traders, storage possibilities, quota 
regulations and market developments self-management came into existence. 
 However, the fishermen that developed themselves, as mixed fishermen, fishing for 
shrimp and quota fish, are becoming les interested in collectively arranged self-restriction. 
 
'We have now arrived at such a point that we steer for our own course. We are a 
mixed sector. If there is a something to earn in a certain period and the others refuse, 
that is then their decision. We do not restrict because of the restricting. When there is 
something to fish, you have to be at sea. Our own course is that we will not comply 
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too much with things others tell us to do, which hinder making a proper gross 
revenue' (spokesperson P.O. Wieringen). 
 
'We have arranged good prices for three year now, so that at length producers 
received such a price that they could make some investments. And that is where the 
misery starts again' (spokesperson trilateral consultation). 
 
'…at the other side (Wadden area) they have sold all rights. Then you have a bare 
business left. Of that group 40% has to disappear because there is an overcapacity 
according to the Multi Annual Guidance Plan. We are not in that group. Artificially 
you sustain this overcapacity by catch restriction. We think this is rather unworkable. 
You do not have to be that social' (Wieringen fisherman). 
 
 So solidarity and self-management appears to be at stake in this sector. What does 
the shrimp sector needs next?  
 211 
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